It has the potential to provoke a true geopolitical revolution. There are no certainties about what he will do – given the unpredictability of the character and the ambiguity of his campaign in certain aspects – but the available indications point to a profound impact on international relations as likely. This can occur on different levels, including, clearly, the commercial level. Furthermore, there are four conflicts through which this impact can be transcendental and lasting. Two are wars in full development (Ukraine and the Middle East), while the other two are potential wars (Taiwan and Korea). Below is an attempt to offer an analytical reading of the available elements.
Ukraine
During the campaign, Trump has repeatedly insisted on two concepts: his willingness to force a peace agreement and his unwillingness to continue paying for kyiv’s war effort. At no time has it defined the conceptual features of the first or the calendar of the second. It is likely that even he is not clear exactly what he wants to do.
Ukraine and its partners hope that the Pompeo doctrine can prevail, with which Trump’s former Secretary of State proposes forcing Vladimir Putin to an at least relatively reasonable agreement through a series of measures that lead him to believe that it is not in his best interest. continue in the fight. Among these measures would be an increase in energy production (by the US and, ideally, Saudi Arabia) that would lower prices, an increase in military spending by NATO countries, a strengthening of the US defense industry USA and a large loan – not non-refundable aid – to Ukraine. But, within the Trump universe, Pompeo is part of a minority traditionalist segment, which will not necessarily be able to impose its theses. Another segment, the isolationist, will push for a very different policy. Trump, for his part, has said he will stop the war immediately, and hates the idea of spending more money.
In the last legislature, Republicans for months blocked the approval of a new aid package under the influence of the Trumpist theory that spending so much American money in Ukraine is absurd. Finally, they gave the green light, in all likelihood because Trump understood that without that help the November presidential elections would have been held with a defeated Ukraine and with the Republican candidate universally considered responsible for that debacle.
There is no doubt that Trump will not want to go down in history as the leader who presided over the complete collapse of Ukraine. But the balance between that and is extremely complex at a time when . It is possible that complete defeat could take place without the political will for it to occur.
The context is that European countries have made a considerable effort to support Ukraine in the face of the invasion, but American support is irreplaceable. Not only is the United States by far the first military support for Ukraine (about 56 billion euros from 2022, compared to approximately 10,000 each for Germany and the United Kingdom), but it is the only one with the capacity to provide essential military support. intelligence and special abilities. The EU is far from having managed to increase its productive fabric to be able to compensate for the absence of the first support from Ukraine. That of the United States, although also limited, is an indispensable pillar.
On the other hand, Putin just received a . At the same time, he undoubtedly perceives the hesitation and fatigue of his opponents. He will insist.
An outright Russian victory would be a historic turnaround. But even an agreement that sanctioned a strong territorial reduction and the inhibition of the foreign policy freedom of what remained of Ukraine would be a geostrategic success for Russia that would not only have an impact on the region, but would change global relations, with the understanding that Western democracies can be held back in matters of utmost importance by the mere superiority of willpower. It would be a message with an immeasurable effect on a global scale: both for the European allies, who would touch firsthand the reality of American detachment from the region, as well as for the entire galaxy of authoritarian regimes dissatisfied with Western primacy, which would confirm its weakening and the disintegration of the bond between its main representatives.
Near East
Trump’s first presidency made clear his absolute support for Israel and its colonizing plan, and also his determination to redesign the map of the region, fostering an alliance with the Sunni monarchies that would corner the Shiite axis. The Biden Administration has given immense military support to Israel. Trump’s could give him an even greater one on the political level.
Washington estimates that Washington has given military aid worth about $18 billion (€16.8 billion) to Israel between October 7, 2023 — the day of the infamous Hamas attack — and September 30, 2024. This is in addition to the approximately 4,000 million annually supplied in recent decades. Israel’s brutally disproportionate response, an intolerable collective punishment, would not have been possible without all of that. However, although insufficiently and ineffectively, the Biden presidency attempted to draw some limits and maintained its attachment, at least rhetorically, to the two-state solution. Now the scenario can get worse.
To begin with, until the enthronement of the new president on January 20, Benjamin Netanyahu can count on more than two months of absolute freedom with an outgoing and delegitimized US Administration. It is likely that he will continue his campaign, under the logic that an intense conflict is his best guarantee of remaining in power. Then, you will have a president who is very happy with illegal colonization and who broke the nuclear agreement with Iran that Barack Obama had sealed and the Europeans wanted to maintain. Trump may pressure him to end the war and take credit. If this is the case, it is possible to foresee a great willingness to make concessions on the part of the White House in the face of Israel’s colonizing abuses and a transactional relationship with Saudi Arabia and other Sunni regimes that will allow them a wide range of action if in parallel they carry out large contracts for the purchase of armament—a scheme that was already seen emerging in the first presidency.
This would have multiple consequences. Not only will it likely place the gravestone on the aspirations—and the right—of the Palestinians, but it will also drive Iran further into the arms of Russia and China, consolidating the nascent Asian authoritarian axis alongside North Korea.
Taiwan
Although the relationship of the new Trump presidency with China will be marked from the outset by the tariffs that the United States may impose or the new restrictions on access to sensitive technologies, an essential strategic point in the medium and long term will be the signals that the new president will send about from Taiwan.
It must be remembered that Xi Jinping has repeatedly pointed out that the “rejuvenation” of China that he seeks necessarily entails the assertion of Beijing’s control over the island. in case it is attacked unjustifiably.
Although the will to preserve the primacy of the United States over China is a central part of Trump’s speech – and is, incidentally, the only bipartisan consensus in Washington – the isolationist instinct and the reluctance to get involved in war operations are an essential part of his policy. If Beijing were to interpret Trump as unwilling to activate itself to defend Taiwan, this could change calculations about the opportunity for military action to subjugate the island.
Corea
The closer ties between Pyongyang and Moscow raise many concerns. The first reason is obvious: through military support for Russia, North Korea seeks to obtain aid from the Kremlin in return—military technology, food, energy—and in general a possibility of not depending only on China, expanding its options, having a triangular capacity instead of just bilateral. But some wonder if the activation of this mutual war support clause is a step to strengthen the options of attacking South Korea. This is not likely, but it is not advisable to rule out anything, especially if the isolationist branch ends up prevailing in the new Trump Administration.
There is no certainty about what Trump will do. None of the worst-case scenarios may materialize. But the record of the first presidency, and the recent campaign, gives the impression that – unlike what happened in 2016 – he will not surround himself with figures from the establishment republican—who curbed their instincts—. So he didn’t even think he would win, he didn’t really have a program or a team prepared. This time it’s different. This time a deep break in the network of alliances built by the United States after 1945 and a consistent alteration of the geopolitical landscape seems more likely.
