including her relationships with Greek prime ministers, such as Alexis Tsipras, George Papandreou and Antonis Samaras, refers to critical events of her political career in her memoirs, which were published today.
Merkel even gives an extensive description of the crucial meeting with Alexis Tsipras on June 26, 2015, during which the partners’ proposal was announced to him. It had been preceded by tough negotiations with the lenders obsessing over the memoranda’s disastrous prescriptions and exhausting the severity – if not vindictiveness – of the “first-time Left” government.
about surprise by Tsipras and the last weapon in the quiver of a strategic plan comes to surprise – if nothing else – those who from the first moment rushed to “crucify” him for this decision, speaking of a panic move and frivolity that “didn’t make the ears of the lenders”, but also to confirm the explanations that Tsipras himself gave for the decision to hold a referendum, speaking of a last resort bargaining power.
“Tsipras left us speechless”
In particular, with the SYRIZA government in the summer of 2015, Merkel presents the attitude of Alexis Tsipras and especially his decision for a referendum, which was the climax of the drama, as a result of a strategy that was in fact well planned.
The German chancellor talks about a sudden, but premeditated maneuver that, as she says, left her speechless, as well as the most important European politicians of the time, such as Hollande, Tusk, Lagarde and Juger.
A surprise that came at a time when, as people with knowledge of the negotiations describe, after marathons and multi-day negotiations, the EU was presenting for the first time a specific program for Greece. Until then, they explain, the EU persistently asked Greece to have ownership of the program, that is, to agree to austerity measures, while it itself avoided bringing to the negotiating table a proposal for adequate financing of the country.
The contrast with George Papandreou
As for the cooperation with George Papandreou, in the first period of the crisis, it seems that this proved to be difficult. Merkel describes a prime minister without a clear plan of action: “I asked him directly, ‘What do you want?’ and he replied that he didn’t want anything, while Greece was in a tragic situation”. The delay in presenting a fiscal stabilization plan added to the uncertainty. In a tense dialogue, he describes their difficulty in communicating even with the help of interpreters.
The dialogue in detail: “At that moment I realized that Papandreou hadn’t said anything yet, so I asked him directly: “What do you really want?”. The answer was that he didn’t want anything, but that Greece was in a very bad situation,” he says characteristically and at another point he adds “”when will you present to the Commission your plans for saving the four percentage points of GDP?” I asked Papandreou. “This is important right now, in order to send the message to the financial markets that they can trust you again.” Papandreou replied that he needs time. I couldn’t believe my ears. In the midst of this suffocating pressure to do something about the situation, he acted as if he had all the time in the world ahead of him. We spoke intensely and at the same time, we spoke English, French, German. The interpreters barely had time to whisper our words in our ear.”
Criticism of the Samara government
The Samara government, although politically like-minded, does not seem to have responded to the demands of the time. Merkel notes that Antonis Samaras “failed to fully implement the reforms of the second bailout”, while anger over the austerity measures led to political instability.
“His (Al. Tsipras) victory is due to the anger of many Greek citizens about the euro bailout programs… His predecessor Antonis Samaras had failed to fully implement the reforms agreed in the second bailout program,” she states specifically in her book.
Alexis Tsipras and the dramatic summer of 2015
References to Alexis Tsipras are more extensive, with Merkel describing a leader with a disarming smile and strong cooperative spirit. From their first meeting in Berlin to the dramatic negotiations of the summer of 2015, the chancellor is impressed by his approach: “He was open to cooperation and wanted to make his way into unknown territories.”
Tsipras’ pre-referendum strategy has been described as “well-planned”, taking European leaders by surprise. Merkel recalls the moment she announced the referendum, leaving her and Francois Hollande speechless. Nevertheless, in the final negotiations, the Greek delegation presented a serious group of experts, reaching an agreement that ensured funding and long-term sustainability.
At the July 2015 Summit, the agreement on the third memorandum sealed the stabilization of the country. In 2019, at a seafood dinner in Piraeus, Merkel and Tsipras reviewed the events. “Tsipras explained that he had to show the people that he had exhausted every opportunity to get rid of the troika,” notes the chancellor.
“I had dinner with Alexis Tsipras at a seafood restaurant in Piraeus. We spoke again about July 2015, when Greece’s stay in the eurozone was on a razor’s edge, as I told him. Tsipras explained to me that it was important to show the citizens in a convincing way that the new government had exhausted every margin in order to get rid of the hated troika. When the other member states objected to this, it became clear that it was now an issue that basically concerned the attitude of the Greeks towards the euro. The majority of Greeks rejected the plan, but wanted the country to remain in the euro. This was shown by the re-election of Tsipras in the new, early elections in September 2015. The euro had proved to be stronger,” concludes Angela Merkel.
