Despite a series of , both the (Superior Electoral Court) and the president of the court, minister , have dodged questions about the case.
The court did not answer questions or provide requested data. The minister spoke on Monday (9). Afterwards, he did not answer questions about inconsistencies in the arguments presented.
As shown, several investigations by the Federal Police, Public Prosecutor’s Office and across the country focus on the suspicion that candidates for mayor and councilor in small and medium-sized cities co-opted voters to transfer their electoral registration to these municipalities in exchange for the promise of money or benefits. .
Fraud would occur in most cases through the presentation of false proof of residence by voters, these investigations show, which may have been decisive in some of the results.
Public data from the TSE show that, in more than 700 cities, there was an increase of 10% or more in the electorate just with transfers from other municipalities — titles issued to young people aged 16 to 18 are excluded from this account.
In 82 cities, the increase in voters ranged from 20% to 46% with transfers alone, which led to more than half of these cities having more voters than inhabitants.
For example, there was a 17% increase in the electorate through the transfer of titles. The election was defined by one vote difference, and the winner is the target of the Public Prosecutor’s Office precisely on the accusation of having fraudulently sponsored the transfer of more than 60 voters from other municipalities.
Divino das Laranjeiras, in the east of Minas Gerais, and Elesbão Veloso, in Piauí, were targets of a PF operation under suspicion of fraudulent arrival of hundreds of voters.
Just like these three cases, many others were registered in various states across the country.
TV Globo, for example, showed in November evidence that there was also an illegal voter market in Mangaratiba, a resort in Rio de Janeiro that gained thousands of new voters.
The state with the largest number of municipalities that increased the number of people eligible to vote by more than 20% is Goiás. There were 19, including Guarinos, the champion in growth (46%), and Davinópolis, where the official electorate (4,405 ) is more than double the entire population counted by IBGE.
For weeks now Sheet asked the TSE to identify the previous electoral domicile of new voters in these cities, but received no response.
On Monday, the report sent five questions to the TSE on the topic, including a request for a list of how many corrections and electorate reviews have been made since 2023 and how many are planned for 2025.
There is a legal provision for this type of measure (except in an election year), as long as certain requirements are met, such as an increase of more than 10% in the total number of titles compared to the previous year and the existence of “consistent evidence or substantiated accusation of fraud or other irregularities in enlistment in a zone or municipality”.
The regional courts of Maranhão and Pará in some municipalities precisely under suspicion of fraud.
Also on Monday, Cármen Lúcia spoke out on the topic when releasing a report on the October elections. Mixing information and demonstrating a lack of knowledge about others, he stated that he did not see any defects in the claim or any failure on the part of the court.
This Wednesday (11), specific questions were sent to the minister about the arguments she used to minimize suspicions. There was no response either.
In general terms, the minister said that suspicions in this regard already occurred before 2024 and that the fact that a municipality has more voters than inhabitants is not an indicator, in itself, of fraud.
It turns out that the suspicions that motivated the investigations by the PF, Public Ministry and the Electoral Court itself do not only take into account this indication, but also, among others, the mass migration of voters on the eve of the election and the suspicion of presenting proof of fake residence.
Cármen also said that biometrics has already reached 80% of the electorate, preventing the possibility of the same voter voting twice in the dispute, but in the case in question there is no suspicion that voters have voted twice — but rather, that they have changed the electoral domicile to vote in a location where they have no domicile relationship, emotional or otherwise.
Finally, the minister stated that the PF did not carry out investigations or operations on suspicion of fraudulent collective transfer of securities, which is contradicted by several public reports from the PF itself.
The fraudulent transfer of a reader’s title is an electoral crime, generally covered by articles 289 and 290 of the , with penalties of up to five years in prison, plus a fine.
See the questions not answered by Cármen Lúcia
- In Monday’s statement, Minister Cármen Lúcia cited the suspicions of fraud, initially, stating that the matter was not new and specifically citing an article from a newspaper in Bahia from 2023. I ask: the fact that the suspicions of Fraud not being exclusive to the 2024 electoral campaign takes away their importance, in the minister’s view?
- Then, the minister said that the “loose data” about cities that have more formal voters than population “doesn’t lead to much.” According to data from the TSE itself, 717 cities saw an increase in voters by more than 10% with the transfer of titles alone. Eighty-two of them increased the electorate from 20% to 46%. There are several investigations by the Electoral Court itself and by the Federal Police, in several states, on the suspicion of co-opting voters to transfer their titles fraudulently. Why does the minister talk about “free data” about cities that have more voters than residents, even though this is not the only indication that raises suspicion?
- The minister also said that “we have requested a review of the electorate in some locations and a review of the electorate is not carried out in an election year, precisely so as not to create any type of doubt about the electorate”, highlighting what is in the law (the impossibility of having review or correction in an election year). Which cities had a review or correction in 2021 and 2023 and which will have them in 2025?
- The minister also mentioned in the presentation the migration flows in the country for work, citing the case of the secretary general of the TSE, who lives in Rio, but votes in Petrópolis. In this example given, there was no transfer of title. One of the main indicators of fraud is, necessarily, the transfer of title. What is the logic, then, of this example given by the minister in relation to the suspicions in question?
- The minister also cited the electorate’s biometrics as an important indicator of the absence of fraud, “reaching more than 80% of the electorate”, which “prevents there from being two votes, from a person being able to vote twice”. In this case, there is no suspicion of voters voting twice. The suspicion is that the voter transfers the title from where he actually lives to another city, with which he has no relationship, after being co-opted by candidates from that second city. Given this, what does biometrics have to do with suspected fraud in the transfer of titles, given that this fraud does not involve the possibility of double voting?
- In a press conference after the speech, the minister also denied that the Federal Police had investigations or carried out operations on suspected collective transfers of electoral documents in 2024. A simple Google search, however, shows that several of them have been carried out, with the source being official information from the PF itself. For what reason, as president of the TSE, is the minister unaware of these investigations?
See the questions that the TSE did not answer:
- In view of the provisions of articles 102 to 107 of TSE resolution 23,659/2021, how many corrections or revisions of the electorate were initiated in 2023 and 2024, in which municipalities, and how many are planned for 2025, and in which municipalities.
- There were corrections or revisions that met the requirements of the resolution, but that did not occur due to “convenience and [falta de] availability of resources”? If so, in which municipalities?
- Analysis of TSE data shows that 717 cities had an increase of 10% or more in their electorate in 2024 through the transfer of voter registration cards to these cities. In the 82 cities alone whose growth was greater than 20%, 52 of them have an electorate larger than the entire population counted by IBGE in the 2022 census. Given these numbers, the TSE adopted some ex officio measure (or was informed of measures adopted by the TREs ) for investigation, correction or review of this electorate?
- Does the TSE have data on the previous electoral domicile of people who transferred their titles? If so, how can this data be consulted? If not, why doesn’t the TSE have this data?
- What has the TSE done or intends to do to try to curb the possibility of electoral fraud, especially in small and medium-sized cities, through the massive co-optation of voters from neighboring municipalities?
