This follows from the report on the activities of the Slovak Information Service (SIS) for the year 2023, which was taken into account by the members of the National Council (NR) of the Slovak Republic last week. In 2023, Russia’s interest in obtaining information from the environment of our armed forces, the Ministry of Defense and NATO regarding the provision of assistance to Ukraine continued. For example, SIS also noted the active interest of the Chinese side in cooperation in the academic sector, especially in the field of natural and technical sciences.
“Despite the significant initial effect of the measures taken by the Slovak Republic after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Russian intelligence services operating on our territory adapted to the new situation and gradually renewed their espionage activities. SIS has therefore intensified its information activities and preventive action“, the message reads.
Russian intelligence activities continued to mainly concern efforts to obtain protected and sensitive information from the political, economic, economic and security fields. “In one case, the findings of the SIS resulted in the expulsion of an intelligence officer of the Russian SVR intelligence. In addition, the SIS proposed to prevent entry to the territory of the Slovak Republic to a citizen of the Russian Federation who was granted a visa in the Slovak Republic despite the imposed ban on entering the Schengen area,” the material states.
In 2023, the SIS in Slovakia did not record the implementation of aggressive special operations by the Russian services, such as liquidation missions or sabotage.
The Chinese side used various tools to spread its influence in Slovakia. “Among them were, for example, the lobbying activities of a major telecommunications company, which proceeded covertly, without participating in official negotiations with the relevant state organizations“, the secret service said. The Chinese side continued to approach Slovak educational and research institutions with offers for cooperation, while the motivation was mainly to obtain financial or technical resources offered by China.
The SIS annual report also talks about hybrid threats. In 2023, Russia focused mainly on the territory of Slovakia to collect information on various aspects of aid to Ukraine and on the effectiveness of measures taken by Russia in connection with the imposition of Western sanctions. “The Russian Federation, in parallel, continued to spread official narratives aimed at maintaining public sympathy for the Russian Federation, its culture and politics,” the report reads.
To a limited extent, Chinese actors disseminated content consistent with Russia’s narratives and were interested in some aspects of military aid to Ukraine. The representatives of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Slovak Republic continued to try to establish and cultivate new contacts and cooperation with a focus on the economic, economic, cultural area and education. According to SIS, the Chinese embassy mainly focused on building a positive image of the country.
In connection with the early elections to the National Assembly of the Slovak Republic, held in September 2023, The SIS did not record the occurrence of phenomena or events that would confirm a systematic and targeted attempt by a foreign power to intervene in the electoral processes.
