The failure of 3 was written in stone, . There are no surprises here, as we will see below. There were surprises, but of a different nature: it generated a wave of national solidarity that benefited the government. The same goes, to a lesser degree, after the evidence that came to light in 2024. The political gains arising from these events are dissipating.
Three factors were present — some even before the inauguration — that clearly foreshadowed what was to come. The first of these is the hyper-minority nature of the Executive, leading it to form 18 parties, more than double its previous mandates (8 and 9 parties, respectively). The most heterogeneous coalition in the historical series implies high management costs.
Secondly, this coalition’s preferences conflict with those of the Executive on behavioral issues and economics. But management follows the historical pattern of governments, exacerbating problems of governability. It is marked by strong disproportionality in the distribution of money (the PT and historical allies hold almost half of the ministries) and the purchase of support via amendments, as has now happened with the “fiscal adjustment”.
Third, and even more important, even before taking office, the government encountered fiscal problems: the transition measure expanded federal spending by R$150 billion.
Lula 3 is faced with a dilemma. To guarantee governability, the government will have to guarantee more proportionality in the distribution of ministries. But doing so will further dilute Lula 3’s political brand, which is already very weak (as signaled, among other things, in the municipal elections). As a result, the party and its greatest leader will face an unparalleled erosion of reputation and declining political capital.
There is yet another destabilizing factor: those of the president weaken him; turns it into a lame duck, which gradually reduces the efficiency of traditional management. For coalition partners, the gains from participating in government are diminishing over time. The Executive’s bargaining power is diminished by the inability to make credible promises.
The shortening of the Executive’s political horizon takes place in a context in which it will have even stronger incentives and a sense of urgency to leave a legacy, which could lead it to radicalize its rhetoric and pursue expansionist policies. In reality, this already happened at the beginning of the mandate with criticism of Bacen. This is not just a political strategy to shift blame for the poor fiscal performance that was announced. Here it is coupled with the idea of going down in history as a world leader on three fronts: in the fight against poverty (through the expansion of social spending), in the defense of democracy and in the environmental area.
But the strategy due to disastrous fiscal performance and consequent crisis of credibility. The defense of democracy, in turn, was deeply tainted by support for tyrannies, and . And in the environmental area, where the fruits would be easy to harvest, the country’s inability to face the problem at the domestic level undermines its international aspirations.
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