Over the last four years, in the face of , the (Superior Electoral Court) has expanded its role in combating , without there being a counterpart in transparency at the same level.
From 2021 to now, the court made the program to combat disinformation permanent, created one in 2022 and, in 2024, by bringing together different actors and bodies, created the Integrated Center for Combating Disinformation and Defense of Democracy.
An initiative whose operation can barely be monitored is the screening of complaints received via an online platform, launched in 2022, through which any citizen can send suspicious posts anonymously, in broad categories such as disinformation that affects “members, employees and collaborators of the ” and aimed at candidates, as long as they affect “the legitimacy of the electoral process”.
Experts understand that, the way the structure is designed, there is harm to the court’s image of impartiality, given that there is a prior analysis of content. Furthermore, without greater transparency and without manifestation from the parties, there is room for possible arbitrariness and the use of unequal criteria.
It is not possible to monitor, for example, what the TSE assessed as situations within the scope of the program and, therefore, what were sent to social networks or other partners for analysis, and what was simply archived — the destination of a relevant part of the complaints: 1,972 of 5,250, according to .
In these cases, it is only reported that there was no minimum data necessary for analysis or that it was outside the scope.
When asked how the external public can monitor and supervise this work, the TSE stated that complaints are made anonymously so that “the complainant does not suffer repercussions” nor does he feel “discouraged from acting”.
of alerts filed and sent to companies were released.
Even in the TSE’s final report there is only generic data, such as the total sent to each company. Not even the quantity per category or the general framework of the measures adopted are reported.
Between the companies, and published their own final reports in December. Wanted by Sheetand Kwai didn’t respond.
The court stated that the results report contains “detailed information on the number of complaints received and the treatment given to them” and that it was first presented to the Ciedde bodies to later be published on the Electoral Justice portal.
André Boselli, coordinator of information ecosystems at the NGO Article 19, considers transparency important, but, above all, he questions whether there is screening by the court, outside of judicial action.
He also argues that, although these referrals are not the same as a court order, the platform will tend to remove the content sent, to avoid problems.
For electoral lawyer Carla Nicolini, there is a prior judgment on these contents from the moment this screening takes place, which she considers, to a certain extent, as a detriment to impartiality.
She makes the reservation, however, that the TSE has been acting in the absence of regulation by Congress.
Ivar Hartmann, law professor at Insper, considers that, without more detailed data on screening and complaints, transparency and accountability regarding the court’s actions become unfeasible.
He assesses that, given the risk of a coup d’état, unorthodox action at the TSE was validated and that, instead of taking a step back now, the urgent measures continue.
Published in May, at the end of his term as head of the court, the step-by-step process of screening was covered in .
The center was created in March by the minister with the aim of bringing together different public bodies, such as the Federal Police, Ministry of Justice and Public Ministry, as well as big techs and regional electoral courts.
It stated that the screening would be carried out by “Ciedde employees”. THE Sheetalready under the president’s administration, regarding the profile of the civil servants. The answer at the time was that Ciedde was not yet operational.
In the final report, the TSE informed that the court’s Special Advisory for Combating Disinformation was responsible for the task. Just like Moraes, .
In June, civil society organizations, gathered in the Coalition Rights on the Network, sent the TSE a request for a meeting with the team that would implement the manual. According to Sheet found out, there was no response. When questioned by the report, the court did not comment.
Questioned in August by the report, the TSE also did not answer why the strategic plan for the program to combat disinformation for the 2024 election was not available. It was after a good part of the campaign, and when the measures were already underway.
Regarding this, in response in December, the TSE stated that the publication “only formalized and increased the transparency” of what was being implemented before, from June to September, adding that the “initiatives and experiments that were underway resulted in suggestions and adaptations to the strategic plan”.
The court also said that “what is put into each plan does not undo or deviate from what was previously prepared, unless there is a specific change”
