It is trivial to recognize that transfers from the central government to subnational entities are marked by a political-partisan logic. There is a considerable body of empirical evidence on this matter. It is important to consider what is new in relation to these transfers.
In the past, federal discretionary transfers and budget amendments benefited the party of the executive branch holder. Transfers are even higher in value than amendments. Most importantly: they are under the command of the Executive.
in the American Political Science Review analyzed the effect of political alignment on federal transfers to municipal governments in Brazil and found that, in pre-election years, municipalities whose mayors are affiliated with the coalition (and especially the Executive party) receive transfers discretionary funds for infrastructure approximately 33% higher than non-aligned ones. This effect is mainly due to the fact that the federal government penalizes municipalities administered by mayors from the opposition coalition who won by a narrow margin (and which provide a counterfactual for the estimation). These data refer to a period of 12 years (1999 to 2010), covering two years of the PSDB government and ).
published in 2017 showed that PT mayors received 58% more resources than those from the opposition. The election of an aligned mayor who lost the previous election implies a per capita increase of R$185 in the municipal budget. The effect of political alignment with the federal government between 2003 and 2015 is considerable: it was equivalent to the average per capita value of Bolsa Família transfers. Transfers were small globally but significant locally. The municipalities received 50% of the total, the states 30%; NGOs, with 20%. The election of a mayor aligned with the president increased transfers to mayors but reduced those made to NGOs. And vice versa: the objective is to prevent the opposition from “hijacking” the political credit generated.
by ministries and showed that they function as super-aggregators of local demands, in a two-way street, also identifying the underlying partisan-ministerial logic. Mayors aligned with the minister — and not just with the Executive — benefit. Cities, National Integration and Health are the champions in transfer, which is why they are disputed between coalition partners. The per capita value transferred peaks in national election years, when it doubles in value.
There are three new factors under Bolsonaro and Lula 3 that have subverted the above logic. The first is the political weakening of the Executive. The second is that the government coalition is loose, allowing there to be two agendas: that of the Executive and that of the Legislative, and not some degree of articulation between the two as in the past. The underlying coalition-ministerial portfolio logic gave way to a balkanization of the government. The third consequence is the brutal escalation of amendment values, reducing the budgetary space for transfers.
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