The forces of Hayat Tahrir Al Sam (HTS) and the Syrian National Army backed by a series of small, but significant, interventions against the Assad regime in the summer of 2024.
From their well -established base in Indlib and on the outskirts of Alepos, the chieftains began to meet diplomats, count reactions and calculate their scope for action. It was soon obvious that he would open a front with Damascus.
They had conveyed military force, the faithful to Assad forces did not seem to have a thrilling morale, neither Hezbollah nor Hamas could raise serious resistance. Confidently, the opposition forces against Alepo and Homs in the fall, without meeting vigorous resistance.
Nothing seemed capable of blocking the way to Damascus, which on December 8 ,. The president He found refuge in Moscow, where he was granted asylum.
In the next period, the Iranian military forces retired bloodlessly, while bombarded heavy military equipment of strategic importance that apparently did not want to fall into the hands of Islamists who could threaten his territory. At the same time, the army occupied positions beyond the already controlled Golan Heights.
Building its relationship with the Druzens in the South, Israel secured a seat belt in southern Syria, while Turkey has influenced throughout the country. As Turkey and Israel’s seat belts are in touch, the question for many diplomats is whether Syria will play a catalytic role in evolving security relations between Israel and Turkey. This would have a wider impact on both Greece and Cyprus.
To understand the evolution of this relationship we addressed the Galia LindenteraResearcher at the Institute of National Security Studies of Tel Aviv (INSS) and the most prominent specialist in Israel and Turkey.
Galia Lidennstraus.
With the fall of the Assad regime, Israel’s apparent belt in southern Syria and the Turkish “Near Abroad) are inappropriate. What does this mean to coordinate Israel and Turkey’s security policies?
“During the Civil War in Syria, Turkey’s first concern was developments in northern Syria, while Israel’s attention was focused on the south. The situation has now changed. Turkey is starring in Syria and is interested in the country’s course in general. On the other hand, Israel’s ambitions are more limited.
To the extent that Syria is stabilized and no longer a threat to Israel, coordination between the two countries does not need to be significant. But assuming that weapons transfers to Hezbollah will continue through Syrian, things change. Israel will be obliged to act and there may be friction with Turkey. “
As the opposition was based on Indlib, HTS forces seemed to be mainly supported by Turkey. Today the same forces are alleged to have relations with the Gulf countries. How does Israel understand Ankara’s influence in Damascus?
“Following the fall of the Assad regime, the most likely scenario for Syria is Turkey’s involvement in every decision in Damascus. Ankara’s influence will increase. However, the rebuilding of Syria needs capital and the involvement of other forces that will have a say in what will happen from now on. Israel is pressing for the new regime not a threat to its national security. In any case, Israel realizes that Turkey will have an increased influence on Syria in the near future. “
As Iran recedes from Syria, is there any opening for the development of a new relationship between Israel and Turkey National Security Structures? Could the two countries come to a new and common understanding of issues such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Regional Security?
“For Israel it is an existential danger, while for Turkey Iran is just a regional challenge. These opposing approaches have involved different treatment and limited coordination room for recent years. The only obvious field of coordination concerns the risk of terrorist attacks on Turkish territory. For example, let’s take the preventing Iranian attacks on Israeli citizens in Constantinople in 2022.
There is an obvious lack of confidence between Ankara and Jerusalem and I do not appreciate that the situation in Syria can dramatically change this scene. Regarding the Muslim Brotherhood, there is also a gap between the approach of the two states. For the Justice and Development Party (AKP) there is an ideological link, with Turkey being a vital supporter of the leaders of the movement and organizations such as Hamas. For Israel this movement and its offspring are a risk of national security. After the massacre of October 7, Israel has renounced Hamas and focused on trying to weaken the organization. “
What should Athens expect from its relationship with Israel in terms of the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus?
“Since 2010 we have been seeing a substantial heating of Israel, Greece and Cyprus relations. This development is to some extent to concern Turkey’s claims in the region. Indeed, many Turkish movements in the region have been revisionism for decades. In any case, there are ways to limit this revisionism and if the coordination of Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Egypt and Moderate Arab states continue, given the US support, we can limit the most negative consequences of this instability. “
Mr. Elias Roumbanis He is a scientific associate of IDIS
