Two levers often move things in. One is the maximum accumulation of forces around the privileged Catalan objective at all times, identifiable with unity policies. The other is the contribution to Spanish governance through agreements with the government force in Madrid. He knew how to activate the first, thanks to the unit consensus that allowed to recover the Institution of Republican self -government that is the. He reached unthinkable levels of power thanks to the second in all phases of recovered democracy, and was still a stretch until 2012. He thus obtained notable counterparts from all: first of UCD, after the and of and again and last of, to the ultimatum on the fiscal pact in full European monetary and banking crisis. The equation worked even with, when he agreed most behind Maragall.
That equation, accompanied by the economic leadership of Catalonia and with governance as a fixed function, was a guarantee of stability and conflict resolution, which never missed, within the constitutional channels. No one as Pujol has extracted so much power from the formula, even personal and family, since together with explicit pacts there were always the inevitable agreements in the penumbra areas. Otherwise, his first victory or his 23 years of government would not be understood, in which he maintained excellent communication channels with state institutions. As awkward that the nationalist rhetoric was, trust was assured. The rope could be tightened, but nobody agreed. The bad moods overturned ritually on the Guerrism And his epigons, but especially against Catalan socialism, caught in a stealthy and Machiavellian consensus between González and Pujol: you help me to send me in Madrid and I cut the wings to the Catalan comrades.
I would like to recover the representation of the economic right, but seven deputies do not constitute a strategy, nor can they return to Catalonia the leadership that was lost under their presidency, much less in the case of someone who does not value political stability or legal certainty. Like Alberto Núñez Feijoó, a PSC was submissive to the Moncloa and a dominator of Catalan socialism as González was once. It is a remarkable paradox that the most Catalan PSC then had less political margins than the current one, while the PSC now crossed out of Spanish marks the passage to the PSOE and has more institutional power in Catalonia and in the whole of Spain. and Puigdemont compete with each other for some power lever, but is the one who is closer to becoming at the same time with the springs of the Tarradellismo and of Pujolismo that advanced to Catalonia during the twentieth century until the retreat of the XXI.
