Ukraine conflict accumulates, from its origins, there by 2014, numerous attempts of peace that they did not curdle; failed agreements, or truces that were never fully implemented in the tEat of Operations. Although there are many reasons for this Sound failure of the international community, the root problem lies, as analysts coincide, in the little pressure capacity of the allies about the Vladimir Putin regimeone of the two great nuclear powers on the planet, endowed with vast economic resources and with a marked demographic advantage On an adversary that, although of smaller, has demonstrated great value and is aware that it struggles for its survival. Despite the military setbacks and the worsening of the Russian economyit is a reality that has barely modified in these three years after the invasion, which is why experts urge negotiators to learn from past errors and to assume existing realities on the ground, which are summarized in two : Neither Ukraine will collapse as a state in the face of the thrust of the Russian forces, nor Russia, politically stableit will be defeated militarily and forced to retire to the borders of 1991.
Michael Kennan y Maxim Trudoliubov, Two academics from the Kennan Institute, propose in the pages of the magazine Foreign Policyin an article entitled ‘Ukraine needs peace in inches, not miles‘A radical change of strategy by the West, a kind of peace through small steps that declines the conflict little by little and that allows in the months to come a true high fire, something that was never really materialized after the Signature of Minsk 2 agreements in 2015. “The Trump administration could facilitate a Interactions series Between Ukraine and Russia in which Russia would make some concessions, such as fewer attacks against the electrical infrastructurein exchange for something; Ukraine also has concessions to offer, since it has the ability to attack well within Russian territory, and has maintained Russian territory under its control by almost Half year “both academics write. USA, then, could start thinking about “reduce sanctions“.
The objective of this uncalled progressive It would be to convert the current Ukraine War in a situation similar to that existing in Europe during the Cold war of the twentieth century, where tension and disagreements were permanent between the two main blocks, a period full of critical episodes but without a human bleeding of enormous destabilizing potential as the current war. Initially, “negotiations must have the most modest objective of reducing the intensity of war, slowing it down, avoiding the worst scenarios,” conclude the authors.
Great failure
At this point in the conflict, no one doubts that Minsk’s agreements constituted a Great failure. First, because they never managed to silence arms. The bombings in the war They were daily, despite the fact that a cease-fire. In addition, as Mikhailo Soldatenko underlines in a recent publication of the Carnegie Center, Ukraine and Russia arrived at the Negotiation Board in Minsk with totally contradictory intentions regarding the future: on the one hand, kyiv “aspired to become a successful liberal democracy, while Russia considered the territory as part of its sphere of influence and wanted to maintain its ability to influence the country’s decisions. ” In other words. The pacts were a Kremlin tool to “limit and control the sovereign decisions of Ukraine.”
This contradiction has not been modified in this elapsed decade. And for this reason, Oldenko believes that Allied security guarantees that receives the Slavic State invaded are the key to that, on this occasion, Do not reproduce The war as Russia has recovered from the losses suffered Since 2022. Discarded one eventual integration of the Slavic State in NATO, the analyst proposes that the two dozen defense bilateral agreements signed in the last three years by kyiv with the main countries of the West and established by the cooperation parameters Ukrainian military with these countries include detailed legal obligations about what to do in the event that Russian aggression resumes.
Another of the elements that led to the failure of these agreements was the absence of a credible mechanism To monitor the high fire, which, for more inri, lacked provisions to “sanction” the contestant part that violates the truce, almost always Russia. In this sense, Soldatenko suggests the implementation of measures similar to those governing the Demilitarized Zone that separates the two Koreas, including the deployment of “a multinational peace force” and the establishment of “Follow -up commissions“Of one Evencative Treegua.
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