A was founded on the construction of consensus between political elites. This trait can be seen as negative or positive. On the one hand, such negotiations prevented definitive solutions to inequalities that mark Brazilian society; On the other hand, they also prevented conflicts from breaking into violence, producing stability.
This is one of the axes of “negotiated democracy – party politics in Brazil of the New Republic”, the historian and the political scientist, both teachers of FGV -SP.
In the book, the two return to the slow transition started in the government to show how the dictatorship worked hard to continue to have its share of power in democracy – and, in fact, several allies of the regime managed to perpetuate themselves. The authors go through the clashes in the constituent and advance to several governments, until reaching the
The result is an informative synthesis about the recent history of the country. The duo argues that Brazilian democracy has experienced its peak between the government and the management of the petista – when, on the right or left, there was a consensus in defense of social advances.
Now, well, now it’s all more complicated, says Limongi to Sheet. He argues that it is no use kicking against the conservatism of Brazilian society, says that the country’s intellectuals should respect Congress as a voice of society and maintains that it has no ability to protect the political system. Below is an edited version of the interview.
A major concern of the dictatorship is that, after the transition, the right could continue in power. And several leaders of this field, in fact, have managed to continue in politics. Does the system born in the new republic tend to conservatism or is this trait a vocation of the Brazilian voter?
Hard to say. But there is no institutional bias that provokes greater or lesser. There is no precepts, it is the functioning of democracy. Democracy is intrinsically conservative, the democratic game tends to the center.
You need to negotiate, you can’t impose your will. Here, the pressure for reforms and change hits the executive – and the pressure for conservation as well.
There are things that most of the population do not want. It can be more conservative in moral, cultural issues, and this is something you have to live with. If you are a little more modern, but most are conservative, live with it. You cannot impose your vision, but that does not mean that the fault is of the institutions.
We cannot reach an agreement, for example, whether or not to allow abortion. There is no middle ground. Or may or can not. Our system is majority and allows, by Congress, that society be heard. There is a tendency in the analysis in Brazil to disrespect the legislature as an expression of society.
In what sense?
To make a reference, for example, who said that it is up to the Supreme to push a modernizing agenda… When the court tried to advance the issue of abortion, a problem was created. As much as Lula wanted to have gone further at this point, but they felt that society did not want because Congress expressed it, and had to moderate positions.
Here comes the Supreme and gives the reaction it gave. Part of this reaction is, “Are you not listening to me? Are we saying it’s not to do that!” The sensitivity of politicians and their negotiation needs to be valued. Brazilian intellectuals despise Congress all the time.
The negative view of the legislature and its identification with the center, I think this is an ideological and disrespectful reaction with representative institutions. It is as if Congress was not legitimate. Respect the result of the election. If you didn’t like it, work to reverse. Brazil is this, a more conservative country in values.
One of its central points is how the new republic was not able to break with the inheritance of the dictatorship. Investigations on the scammer acts – now, the complaint against those involved – signal a break from this culture of conciliation?
An absent point of the book is an analysis of how the constituent has reinforced the power of both the executive and the judiciary, represented in the Supreme. This strengthening comes from a distrust of the legislature because you think Congress will necessarily be conservative. This idea is seen as a fact, it comes from the 1970s, or even before.
At the beginning of the system, as these Supreme Judges still come from the military regime, they have another head and do not intervene so much. From the crisis of the monthly and overthrowing of the Supreme Barrier clause, it is the sign that the Supreme Court has decided that it will protect the political system – and that distrust should not only be as to the legislature, but also as to the executive. From a mistaken interpretation of what would such coalition presidentialism be.
The Supreme is not able to reorganize the political system because it does not know how the system works, it has wild ideas. Then you have an expansion of the action of the Supreme – and the action against it is part of this process.
It does not start with the former president. There was the moment when the Supreme prevented being a candidate, under the same rationality, that the petista would be a danger to democracy. A is part of this process. I can be against Lula or Bolsonaro… but there is a deliberate, sequential intervention of the judiciary to control the political system. And I would rather not happen because these guys are not elected.
Do you see a retreat from the judiciary as something possible?
No. After leaving the bottle, the genius does not return. It would need an awareness that this power is excessive and militates against the institution itself, so that the institution itself continues. But thinking about it is believing in fairies, magic wand. It can be restricted more, decrease this expansion…
But there is also an increase in the power of Congress, especially since the Michel Temer government and especially on the budget through the amendments. Is this also a genius out of the bottle?
I don’t think this is a genius outside the bottle, even if we know how much this power of the legislature really increased, how much it can be reconfigured, etc. There is no empirical analysis of the power of these amendments, who really controls them… but it is an exaggeration to think that the whole congress benefits from them. Who benefits is a small group.
They are putting limits, it is harder to return to the status quo, but it does not mean that the executive has lost control over the budget. Lost about a small portion. For a group of deputies? Yes. What is this group doing and what are the consequences for the political system? It is still unknown.
What we know of past studies before this moment now is that amendment did not give as much electoral advantage as it was. Amendment is part of this folklore, this distrust that Congress will always be a low.
Much of this anti-legislative argument is based on an assumption that anyone knows what the optimal distribution of amendment resources would be. Who has this information? The central planner? Neoliberal economists, who don’t think about the information system needed to see which locations ask for resources? Or the editorialist of Sheet? It seems that the editorialist knows which city needs the most money for the
The representative system produces part of this information. It is necessary to hear the deputies, not the bureaucrat of the Ministries of Health, of Education. Are there distortions that come from this, isn’t it the best system? Ok, but it’s not the worst. There is a shouting about this that is too much.
The scenario for 2026 points to another bipartisan dispute, how has the rule in the new republic?
There is a lot of imponderable there to make any kick. Majority election, even with two shifts, tends to have few candidates. Even though there are many, the viables tend to be two and a half – that is half of the third way. If it doesn’t rain knife, it will give it. Especially when the president is a candidate for reelection, he is most likely in the second round.
We have many governors in central states completing their second term. For those who are ambitious, instead of going to president, they can go to governor. The unknown is the. It depends on the organization of the right, if Bolsonaro is a candidate, supports the governor of São Paulo… the other is the health of Lula, given the effect Joe Biden.
When you say the new republic has experienced an peak between Itamar and Dilma, does that mean that we are living a decline now?
Before there was greater moderation, a common agenda. Advances in health, education and social protection were consensus. Bolsonaro shakes this consensus and says he will undo everything that was done after redemocratization. And it says that everything that smells the state has to leave.
They didn’t do any of this. They did a lot of silly, destroyed a lot, but they didn’t revert. When they found themselves in the need to campaign for reelection, they did so in the most irresponsible and politically possible way. They made the prescription of the irresponsible inspector and expansion of social spending.
It says something. Any attempt to reverse this process of greater social attention has no political-electoral support. And that’s good.
So, on the one hand, we may be exaggerating the conflict in the cultural, moral plane, paying close attention to the symbolic, without realizing what is at the base. For example, in the fiscal package that was setting it up, the whole problem has always been where to cut. And where do you have to cut? Only social spending. There it is hard, the political cost is very high.
Another issue is the management of the link between social policy and wage policy. There was a real appreciation of the minimum wage, and this impacts the largest social expenditure, which is social security. Haddad played as a rehearsal balloon disconnecting both, but no one accepts, it’s dangerous because the government will have an incentive to reduce pension payment. And it hits people. Then the government acted on its own hands.
It gives a lack of flexibility, but the world is what it is. We will not have a wonderful growth because this is how the Brazilian economy is working. It is living with it there. And it will be this congress. Brazilian society is conservative, it is no use screaming. It is downloading expectations and not shouting that everything is wrong, like a bunch of crazy palms.
X-ray
Fernando Limongi, 67
PhD in Political Science from the University of Chicago, he is a retired professor of political science at USP. Currently teaches at the São Paulo School of Economics of FGV (Getúlio Vargas Foundation). He is the author of books such as “(2023) and” budget policy in coalition presidentialism “(2008), this in co-authorship with
