The debate about has gained prominence in the political news. One of the recurring criticism of the president concerns the choice not to perform a comprehensive ministerial reform at once, preferring a gradual strategy. However, compiled data in the CEBRAP legislative database suggest that this approach is not new. Considering the appointments published in the Federal Official Gazette, comprehensive reforms, as analysts often ask, do not seem to be the norm in Brazilian politics.
In the first (1995-1998), the president never replaced more than two ministers in the same month. The highest concentration took place between April 29 and May 8, 1996, with four nominations. Already in the second term (1999-2002), the most intense moment of ministerial exchanges took place in the first year, in July and August 1999, with nine nominations. After that, FHC maintained scattered exchanges: for example, six changes were formalized between January 30 and May 14, 2001.
In the first government (2003-2006), there were two moments of greatest movement: January 2004 and July 2005, when eight new ministers took over each period. Perhaps the idea of a broad ministerial reform comes, but in the second term of Lula (2007-2010), there was no moment of great reorganization, but a continuous process of changes-between November 2007 and September 2008, there were eight substitutions, practically one per month.
The same pattern was repeated in the first government of (2011-2014). In the third year of office, eight ministers were exchanged for nine months, being the largest concentration in March 2013, with three changes.
By analyzing in perspective the standard of ministerial changes, we realize that broad reforms are exception, not the rule. Gradual changes allow presidents to evaluate the impact of each appointment, either in terms of technical reputation or in legislative support.
The minister’s trip to mark a continuity: he continues to play a central role in budget control, especially due to the volume of parliamentary amendments to the budget allocated in the folder. His indication consolidates the position of the government in the face of attempts by PP, and Arthur Lira, to recover its influence on the area.
Already the appointment of to the Secretariat of Institutional Relations (SRI) also follows the historical standard of indication of the president’s confidence name at the Secretariat. Considering the period 1999, when the first version of SRI was created, until Dilma’s fall in 2016, only three occupants of the portfolio were from distinct parties to that of the president: Walfrido Mares Dias and José Múcio, both from PTB and the second Lula government, and Temer, PMDB, for a brief period of the second Dilma government. We should not assume that Lula gave up composing with the legislative majority. In addition, parties without strong ideological identity tend to prefer ministries with large budgets and greater public visibility.
SRI, led by Hoffmann, can still become a strategic space for the construction of subnational alliances focused on the 2026 elections.
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