It is a unique case of centralization of decision making in a democracy. He personifies his office. It acts as a holder of the farm folders, foreign relations and justice – to say the minimum. Their decisions are released on their own social network throughout the day. It turns out that the US political system is, unlike unipartidal parliamentary systems, precisely the type of institutional arrangement in which the centralization of decision-making should not be possible ,.
The system was designed to hinder the concentration of authority and ensure robust brakes and counterweights: it combines an independent judiciary with a strong judicial revision, a bicameral legislature whose mandates are lagged over time, an institutionally limited presidency, robust federalism, and a mandate legislative elections that expand the system’s responsibility to public opinion and the performance of the executive.
McCubbins has identified a trade-off inherent in the institutional design of democracies among what it calls decisiveness (the ability of an institutional system to approve and implement changes in policies) and resolution (system capacity to maintain and support these policies over time). Systems with high decision -making capacity tend to be less resilient and more vulnerable to institutional volatility. In contrast, systems with low decisive capacity often face decision -making blocks and government paralysis.
The number and institutional location of veto players shape this balance between decision -making capacity and normative stability. Institutional arrangements situated at the extremes of this spectrum – be with excessive vetoes or with power concentration – tend to generate governance dysfunctions, compromising democratic stability, either because of the inability of institutional adaptation or the ease of capturing the system by autocratic profile leaders. Highly decisive systems facilitate rapid approval of change-in which they can weaken democracy-becoming more susceptible to political instability. On the other hand, systems with low decisive capacity, when faced with recurring institutional impasses, generate paralysis and a responsive deficit in the face of social demands.
In presidentialism, the strong separation of powers tends to limit decision -making capacity, as it distributes the power between different institutional actors, requiring some consensus for policy approval. The separation of purposes-the divergence of political preferences between the actors who control institutions-also reduces the decision-making capacity, making it difficult. The reverse – political alignment between institutional actors – can result in the hegemony of a single force; At the limit, in the elimination of veto points that guarantee brakes and balances to the executive.
The combination of the mandate of the ballot box (at the electoral college and popular vote), the control of the two congressual houses, most in the Supreme Court, the middle -term elections in 2026, and the prohibition of another reelection generates an incentive structure that produces trumpland decisionism.
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