Rare ministers of supreme cuts were subject to reports in international prestigious journals, such as. The tone of the report on the minister is of disapproval. The wear of the court is evident – and now internationalize. The relevant question is: Does judicial reputation matter? According to Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, it matters a lot.
In, the authors argue that reputation is central to the authority and effectiveness of the courts, especially since judges lack, as they would say, “the power of the sword and money.” From a main-agent model, the book proposes that judges are agents of society (the main) and that reputation acts as a mechanism to ensure compliance, access to resources and institutional protection.
The reputation is shaped by internal hearings (members of the Court and Judicial Actors) and external (media, politicians, public and gym). The authors also maintain that there is a growing tendency for judges to turn to external hearings, especially in more transparency contexts if there is public pressure. Among these trends, the internationalization of the reputation, for various reasons, such as a virtually inexorable dynamic.
On the other hand, there is an important between the individual reputation of the judges and the collective reputation of the Court. In our case, monocratic decisions exacerbate the problem. Among the factors that the authors identify as harmful to the individual involvement of judges in non -judicial functions – depression, participation in commissions, elaboration of public policies. Examining the Supreme in the light of the book’s findings is an anomalic cataloging exercise.
The most serious implications of the decline of judicial reputation concern the gradual vulnerability of the institution. All successful attempts at intervention in higher courts in Latin America were preceded by a gradual loss of confidence in the judiciary, motivated by attacks on their reputation. This is what demonstrates a thorough study on interference from the executive and legislative powers in the supreme cuts of 18 Latin American countries over 30 years. These interferences took on various forms – irregular names and dismissals, impeachments, unilateral increase in the number of judges. Such attacks are reactions of populist leaders to threats perceived to their political survival and tend to occur at the beginning of the mandates. The probability of interference is inversely proportional to the population’s degree of confidence in the judiciary. And there is a perverse mechanism here: presidential popularity tends to rise after attacks.
Confidence in judicial institutions in Latin America is generally low – and only median in Brazil. It is curious to note that all ministers have a higher than positive negative assessment, according to Atlas/Intel survey. That is, individual reputations do not exceed the collective reputation.
The more power accumulate the higher courts, the greater the incentives to control them. STF control has become the central objective of political dispute in the country. Which affects your reputation. The consequences are immeasurable.
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