Imposing a deadline in a negotiation for an agreement that desperately desperate is a risky tactic when the only thing is done is to move away.
President Donald Trump threatened with it and stressed on Wednesday that it is easier to make a deal with Russia than with Ukraine. However, this seems to be a dangerous and wrong reading of your own situation. It’s easier for Trump to press Kiev, yes, because the country is dependent on US help and secret services to survive. But that does not mean that Russia is more receptive to an agreement. In fact, they are dragging their feet.
This is where the gap between a business life and a life dipped in geopolitical negotiations widens desperately. Trump is not in the real estate world – not trying Putin to buy something. Trump is pressing hard and quickly so that Kremlin agrees with the terms to end the war that Putin clearly guessed that will improve, and not get worse over time.
Trump briefly pressed Putin on Thursday, publishing “Vladimir: Stop!” After the Russian missiles hit Kiev killing at least 12 people. But even the rebuke used a friendly lexicon and seemed so disturbed by the moment of the Russian attack as with his victims.
Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly rejected the US and Ukraine offer, which has been lasting for 44 days of a 30-day unconditional ceasefire. Instead, Kremlin unilaterally declared a truce for the 30 -hour Easter and that Ukraine claimed to have violated about 5,000 times. Both parties accused themselves to violate a truce in the field of energy and infrastructure between March and April.
This attempted ceasefire has left a huge question mark about whether diplomatic agreements will be honored or fulfilled. The allies of Ukraine point to the Easter truce – unilateral, brief and sudden – as proof that Kremlin thinks that ceasefrees serve to recover, and that negotiation is what happens when gaining time to later achieve military objectives.
The biggest problem with Trump’s agreement is that it is not publicly known what he expects Moscow to give in. A lasting break in the fighting seems, based on the evidence of the last month, to be an exaggeration. The White House may wish a broader deficiency between the US and Russia. But without a lasting agreement to Ukraine, this would result in a long -term fissure in the transatlantic alliance and even in the NATO. This would probably scare many republicans of the system, countless Americans, damage the dollar and the economic and geopolitical position of the US. These are real costs that would exceed the gain of a probable brief reconciliation with Kremlin.
Trump’s second problem is that it is not clear either – in public so far – what he expects President Zelensky Ceda. In Wednesday’s message, Zelensky said to “do what he has to do,” but it is not clear what “doing” is.
Trump was specific not to require Kiev to recognize Crimea annexed to Russia as part of Russia, as has been reported (the Ukraine Constitution prohibits such an act, since it also requires Ukraine to become part of NATO – an ambition Trump could also ask you to abandon).
The agreement proposed by Trump, it seems, can ask Ukraine to accept the freezing of the front lines and perhaps the American recognition of Crimea as Russian. But both concessions are of limited utility.
Crimea is a peninsula, linked to parts of Ukraine occupied by Russia, but separated from Russia by a precarious bridge. European and Ukrainian sanctions will continue to isolate Crimea after any peace agreement, and both Europe and Kiev have made it clear that they will not accept their recognition as part of Russia – the change in land borders by force. With this, Trump is offering Putin a fragile Figueira leaf of respectability. But is that in itself certainly enough?
So what about a deal that freezes the front lines? This may also not be in Moscow’s interest. Putin’s recent attempt to drag the diplomatic process suggest that Kremlin thinks his best days on the battlefield may be in front of him. The price of oil can continue to fall and Moscow may feel the scarcity of ahead labor. However, these problems are lower when compared to Kiev’s recruitment problems and the likely reduction of their financing when Biden’s money is over next year.
The other Kremlin vague red lines, expressed by various employees, will be equally disturbing to longer peace. They do not want European troops to act as a peaceful peace or reassuring force on Ukrainian soil – a very advanced idea on their planning, which echoes the initial version of a peace plan proposed by US envoy Keith Kellogg when a private citizen. They are against the continuation of foreign aid to Ukraine – and the sharing of information with it. Russia wants sanctions to be raised at the outset. None of this is compatible with the largest safety concerns on the continent and will force Europeans and Ukraine to act alone. Also this does not lead to a peace agreement.
The main problem is that Putin thinks time is on his side and Trump has repeatedly said that time is going through. These two contrasting positions will not lead to a lasting agreement. Kremlin may have perhaps realized that it can, over months, make small concessions to the White House and slowly build a geopolitical picture that is most favorable to it. Consider the first 90 days of Trump’s presidency and how much the world has already changed in favor of Moscow.
At each critical point, Moscow also sees Trump turn against Zelensky. Kremlin sees few or no consequences for violation of the energy ceasefire-or his own unilateral ceasefire. He sees a vividly impatient US president, whose team is often unintentionally with the facts and whose main sent, Steve Witkoff, had difficulty naming Ukraine regions under occupation in a recent interview to Tucker Carlson. All of them are also partially under Russian occupation.
The more time Moscow speak the better the agreement. The more time fight, the better it will probably be on the battlefield. There are all incentives for Kremlin to keep diplomacy alive, even if it is to sign an initial and chaotic agreement that can later deny. But there is no reason to believe that you want conversations that effectively solve the war, or want to want to stop.
