40 years ago Brazilians recovered the right to choose the president. The reintroduction of the Directs in the Constitution was approved by Congress at dawn from May 8 to 9, 1985 and promulgated shortly thereafter, on the 15th.
However, the measure did not originate from 1983 and 1984, nor from, rejected in 1984.
It took place from Constitutional Amendment 25, one of the first initiatives of the. It changed the constitution of the dictatorship two months after the general’s departure and the possession of the
Senate archive documents show the arguments of the dictatorship so as not to authorize the return of direct election to the presidency.
In late 1983, the ruling senator Dinarte Mariz (PDS-RN) said it would be coup to end the indirect election. “Change the rule of the game at this point, when we are already campaigning for a presidential succession, already made in free, clean and correct elections, represents a coup,” he said.
Who voted for president was the Electoral College, composed of all federal senators and deputies and some state deputies. This ensures the continuity of the military in power, as they usually had a majority in the federal and state legislature.
For the ruling senator João Lobo (PDS-PI), the opposition wanted direct elections because it would be a minority at the 1985 Electoral College, which would choose the successor of. The 1982 legislative elections had given the ruling party victory.
“In 1982, the ballot box, by direct vote, gave the Electoral College to the PDS. It is an acquired right. We have no reason to accompany the resettlement [a favor das eleições diretas] That oppositions are making it work throughout public opinion, “said Lobo.
Senate government leader Aloysio Chaves (PDS-PA) said the electoral college was legitimate: “This electoral college left the same ballot boxes that elected [em 1982] ten opposition governors. How, then, to speak of illegitimacy? “
The dictatorship planned a “slow, gradual and safe” opening. This, however, did not include direct elections for president. This is why Figueiredo’s parliamentary base knocked down the Dante de Oliveira amendment.
In an attempt to empty this proposal of amendment to the Constitution, Figueiredo sent to Congress a PEC providing direct elections only from 1988. “Direct election is not a single remedy to our ills. False is to present the indirect election as a hindrance to the transformations the nation aims,” he said in a speech.
Defeated the amendment Dante de Oliveira, the attention turned to the Figueiredo Amendment. The opposition tried to disfigure it to allow the 1985 election to be decided by the people. Annoyed, the president removed his PEC from Congress.
If the opening was ongoing and was it certain that at some point the elections would be straightforward, why didn’t Figueiredo allow his succession to be decided by the people?
For the co -author of the book “Negotiated Democracy: Party Policy in Brazil of the New Republic”, if there were a popular vote in 1985, the dictatorship would lose control over succession.
“The fear of the military was to be elected a name from the left of the PMDB or even a convinced leftist, as this fear was based. The population was dissatisfied with the dictatorship because the country lived the crisis of foreign debt, the economy was back and inflation was at 200% per year,” says Weller.
The greatest danger to the military regime, according to the historian, was that a leftist president revoke the amnesty law and determined the punishment of the military who committed abuse in the 21 years of the dictatorship, including the death of opponents.
To avoid this outcome, says Weller, the military wanted the first civil government to be made up of politicians from the dictatorship itself.
Faced with the electoral unfeasibility of the military candidate at the Electoral College, the most palatable scenario for most of the Armed Forces would be the victory of a plate that, although oppositionist, was conservative.
It was a plate as soon as the dictatorship allowed to win, formed by, exponent on the right of the PMDB, and José Sarney, newbie novice and former president of the arena and PDS, the dictatorship parties.
“When combining Sarney, the message Tancredo wanted to convey to the military was as follows: ‘You can accept me as president, because I will make a conservative and no rematch government,'” Weller continues.
Theoretically, the political class could expect the National Constituent Assembly, so that direct elections were restored by. Two reasons, however, anticipated the measure for 1985.
In the event of Sarney being prevented or even dying, the successor – the direct election was not instituted – would need to be chosen by the Electoral College of the Dictatorship. In addition, the immediate return of the direct elections had been a promise of Tancredo, and the politicians wanted to show that it had not been forgotten.
Sarney argued with his allies to direct election PEC in early May 1985. It is likely that he did not do so before because he was waiting for the recovery and possession of Tancredo – what never occurred. Sarney sent the proposal to Congress on May 7, 16 days after
What the parliamentarians promulgated, however, was not Sarney’s PEC. They expanded a proposal in progress, by Deputy Navarro Vieira Filho (PDS-MG), who provided for direct election to mayor of hydromineral resorts.
PEC rapporteur in progress, Deputy João Gilberto (PMDB-RS), wrote a substitute as soon as Sarney’s proposal arrived at Congress and took advantage of excerpts from the president’s text. The substitute was approved quickly.
Brazilians spent almost 30 years without choosing the president. The last time had been in 1960, when he won. They returned to the polls in 1989, when they chose Fernando Collor.
Constitutional Amendment 25 brought other news: it created the second round, restored the direct vote to the mayors of capital, hydromineral resorts and municipalities in national security area, facilitated the creation of parties and released the vote of illiterates.
