A Catalan political manager, disagreement with a sentence, said that Spanish justice is the Guantanamo of European Justice. Discarded this tendentious and populist hyperbole, it must be recognized that justice is loaded with discredit and distrust. This is not a novelty. This distrust determined the implementation of popular action in our first so that any citizen, without being a victim or harmed, could pursue bribery, bribery and prevarication committed by the judges, even if the prosecutor does not accuse, depriving him of the accusatory monopoly since then.
The Constitution of 1869, the fruit of which it dethroned Isabel II de Borbón, maintained the popular action to pursue any crime committed by the judges in the exercise of their position. Thus he channeled distrust of the possible indulgent corporatism of prosecutors and courts in the face of the crimes committed by his colleagues.
The 1882, inspired by the liberal ideas of the 1868 revolution, introduced popular action in ordinary legality. In their prologue it could be read: “The Spaniards, (…) have formed false ideas about judicial policy, (…) looking with unfortunate suspicion to magistrates, judges, notaries and sheriffs.” It seems written this morning.
The popular action of the Law of 1882, a genuinely Hispanic institution, meant a fundamental innovation: it could be exercised not only against the judges suspected of crimes in the exercise of their position, but against any author of any crime. It was established as a controller complement to the public service. All the activity of the judges and prosecutors generated distrust and deserved that control. Thus he has been in our laws since then and is reflected in the current
It is admirable that it allows the altruistic direct citizen participation in the administration of justice, but, correlatively, it is worrying that it is the door of irruption in the process of “the most unusual and crazy claims of criminalization of our political system”, as he recently regretted he did not quote anyone, but obviously referred to the abusive blackclain instrumentalization of popular action, exercised by and similar, but also Unhappyly economic, political or media.
It would be useless to try to cope with this worrying chanthagist instrumentalization, limiting and conditioning popular action until its jibarization, or with insincere regrets of the court. His jurisprudence about the admission of popular action has been suspiciously changing, according to who were the complainants and complaints. Sometimes, he has opened the door to those unusual criminalizations that he later regrets. The last one, that of the Attorney General.
The Supreme Court seems to accompany the chantajista instrumentalization of popular action, indifferent to the exculpatory evidence, entrenched in their suspicions, suspicious. It seems to want to irremissibly drag the prosecutor to the bench, “already defeated or at least disarmed,” as described the prologue of the 1882 law, when he criticized the ancestral judicial system of absolutism. The problem of popular action is not only who bursts maliciously into the process, but who opens the door.
