Strictly speaking there are very few elements that shape the current conjuncture that were no longer present even before the formal investiture of the current government. It is a hyperminority government, in which the president’s party holds 13% of the chairs and whose hard core congressional does not reach ¼ of them. Tax problems were managed even before presidential investiture itself with the approval of expense of $ 150 billion. This unusual and anomalous inversion – Expanding at the beginning of the mandate is a universal standard – already suggested a vulnerable government. In the last year of government there is a combination of tax and political vulnerabilities.
The main trait of the presidential dispute that begins is the fact that Lula is perceived as Pato Manco. The term is associated with institutional rules that prohibit the postulation of the reelection of an incumbent. Technically Lula is not duck mancor as it can compete for reelection. But many relevant actors see effective possibilities that it is not reelected, whatever the reasons for it. The most important thing here is its effects on incentives. These effects are similar to the classic manco duck and the “de facto manco duck.”
In a situation where the president is a minority and, therefore, has to rely on a party coalition, the president’s gravitational power is significantly reduced as his chances of victory are declining or null. Therefore, what matters effectively is the tendency of government popularity and evaluation. In addition to being obviously the architecture of choice: who are the opponents who will ultimately go to the second round. Parliamentarians have privileged information on the issue.
In the fragmentation of the loose and unpublished coalition of 18 parties (it was 8 and 9, under Lula 1 and 2) comes from the investiture. But intensified. Parties await strategically to the point where the defection is inevitable and then disembarked from the government. The cost of support increases. To guarantee some governability in 2025 and the election year the government may more share the government, resulting in the dilution of its identity. It would be a self-infringed defeat.
In addition to the cold coffee of the political chronicle there are more tangible and relevant signs of disembarkation of the base. The most protruding of them in the current context is the unprecedented part of a party leader. But the fact that in the possession of the president of the PSB this week only 4 of the 15 parliamentarians of the base party posted networks does not go unnoticed.
The most curious from the comparative point of view is the unusual fact that potential rivals are of the coalition itself, whose parties occupy ministries. The government has never effectively coalition in the strong sense of expression. There are no syllabus, such as Germany, but about the distribution of the spoils of office ,. It acts as a structure of crossbred mutual locks. As the minority governments suggests, the result is not only calamitous if the costs of political inaction (gridlock) are lower than the risks of measurements by the executive.
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