The choice of goals and the synchronization of recent Israeli attacks in Iran leave no room for doubt: its primary goal is to undermine Tehran’s potential to develop a nuclear arsenal. But Netanyahu himself rushed to broaden his strategic goals, stating that the war with Iran “could certainly” even lead to a change of regime.
The revelations of attempted assassination of the Supreme Leader, a plan allegedly rejected by the US president, are intensifying the indications that in the background of the war, more than the prevention of a nuclear Iran.
But what happens, if Hameni is really murdered or the theocratic building collapses? One scenario is the imposition of a military law led by IRGC (), which will attempt to preserve the “continuation of the revolution”. Another possibility is the attempt to control the Guardian For the appointment of a new top leader by the harsh factions, in an opaque and introverted political scene.
At the same time, Benjamin Netanyahu seems to invest politically in a possible popular overthrow. As he said: “The decision to rise the people, this time, belongs to themselves.” But even if it happens, a pro -Western regime is not the most likely scenario.
Who rules Iran?
The current state regime in the Islamic Republic of Iran is a complex mix of theocracy, authoritarianism and elementary parliament. At its core lies the supreme power of the Supreme Leader, an institution founded by Ayatollah Ruchrohah Khomeini after the 1979 revolution. Despite the existence of elected institutions such as the Parliament (Majles) and the Presidency, power is closely controlled by the religious.
The current senior leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has been in power since 1989. The process of succession is officially determined and controlled by the Council of Guardians – a body of 88 Shiite priests elected by the people, but only after a strict approval of the Councils. In practice, the process lacks transparency and is characterized by harsh internal conflicts between factions, without a clear or pre -agreed transition plan.
In the last elections, despite the presence of a moderate candidate, current President Massoud Pezkian, participation in the polls fell below 40%. At the same time, the Freedom House organization gives Iran only 11 out of 100 in the world’s freedom rankings. Candidates, such as former President Hassan Rohani, from the 2024 elections, have reinforced the legalization crisis.
Guards of the Revolution: The shadowy power and the possible successor
Behind the institutional showcase, the most powerful political -political force in Iran is the body of the Islamic Revolution (IRGC) guards. By a bodyguard of the Supreme Leader, he evolved into a powerful military body with his own structure and hierarchy, economic autonomy and political influence that often outweighs the elected president.
The IRGC adheres to the tough line of the regime: it controls strategic businesses, holds the reins of the penetrating circuits, benefits from international sanctions and suppresses any liberalization attempt. In the event of the collapse of the religious leadership, it is considered the most likely pole of power and the natural administrator of a transitional period.
The guards may fully manage state affairs by imposing military law, further limiting political and social freedoms, and maintaining the country’s authoritarian framework – possibly under a new “tough” top leader or even with the support of his son.
Liquidity, succession crisis and popular anger
The absence of charismatic successors within the religious elite intensifies the risk of internal conflicts and instability. The conflict between “radicals” and more moderate institutional factors is intense, while the pressure from abroad (sanctions, threats, attacks) and internal (mass protests such as after the death of Mahsa Amini) had shaken the strengths of the regime.
The truth is that society has been boiling in recent years: many Iranians, frustrated even by the moderate system of the system, may massively express their dissatisfaction. A spontaneous popular uprising cannot be ruled out – as the historical experience of the Islamic Revolution itself has shown.
The transition of power, in such a scenario, will probably be chaotic: without an agreed mechanism of succession, without national consensus and without political legitimacy, the country can lead to deep political and social instability, even coup d’etat.
The possibility of Sandek Laritzani
Another possible scenario discussed in the narrow circles of the Iranian regime concerns Sadek Ardasir Larjani. He is considered one of the most prominent representatives of the theocratic establishment, a former president of the Supreme Court, former head of the Guard Council, and Ali Khamenei’s secrets. It has a wide institutional network, intense religious legitimacy and close relations with the hard core of power.
Laritzani, a member of the powerful Larijani family, has occasionally criticized excessive repression, but without questioning the theocratic architecture of the regime. His presence could offer a “conservative compromise” that will ensure the survival of the regime with gradual internal adjustments – and not a rupture with the past.
However, even if he qualifies as a successor, he is not expected to substantially change Iran’s foreign policy or give her a pro -Western orientation.
Risk without guarantees
The possibility of the collapse of the theocratic regime in Iran does not automatically imply a liberal transition. On the contrary, destabilization can bring to power an even more hard -core, militaristic structure, with unpredictable consequences for the country and the entire region.
For Israel and the US, the strategy of “overthrowing the outside” is a risky bet – with a very chance of paving the way for a more extreme Iran, rather than a more consensual.
