“There is always more clarity and warm, more reason and profit, when it is available for bayonets to ensure the right that complains.”
Authored by General Pedro Aurélio de Góis Monteiro, one of the most powerful military in the country in the first half of the 20th century-the Army’s leader in the so-called Vargas Revolution and the Vargas era, deposed Getúlio in 1945-the sentence is quoted twice in “Brazilian authoritarian utopia”, by the historian Carlos Fico, just launched by the Critical Seal, by Editora Planet.
It combines perfection with the spirit of the book, whose subtitle is as explicit as Góis Monteiro’s sincericide: “How the military threatens Brazilian democracy since the birth of the Republic to this day.”
Full Professor of History at UFRJ (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro), the author didactically detail all 13 blows or coup attempts in the country since the one that set the Republic in 1889.
The 14th, the attempted coup by which it is accused, is quoted briefly in the conclusion of the work, which has technical review of another reference academic in the area, the political scientist João Roberto Martins Filho, from UFSCar (Federal University of São Carlos).
The scholarship threat is still very recent, the author justifies, who still risks, in an interview, a distinction for her: if in the past the motivation of the military was more ideological/doctrinal, now the main engine was the preservation of material advantages, to maintain benefits (such as special social security) and to amuse positions.
As I explain in the presentation, the purpose of the book “is simple: show that all Brazilian political crises characterized by the rupture of constitutional legality (…) were caused by military.”
“The Brazilian Army has always disrespected democracy. They violated all the Constitutions of the Republic. Rebellions against legitimate decisions; corporatism -motivated subsidies; state blows and coup attempts. Indiscipline and subversion mark the trajectory of the military in Brazil,” writes the historian.
Despite the relevant and improper role of uniforms as political agents, society is practically unaware of them, I point out.
The “authoritarian utopia” of the title synthesizes the author, is “the military understanding that Brazilian problems would be overcome and Brazil would become a ‘great power'” if obstacles were eliminated that prevent this ascension. “The main obstacles [no entender dos militares] would be ‘communist subversion’ and ‘corruption of politicians’.
In “authoritarian utopia” mr. He mentions the Bolsonaro government. Is it because, from the historiographical point of view, is it very recent to analyze what has happened in recent years?
It is very recent. History experience shows that more decisive documents and revelations only come over time. We are in the middle of the trial of the Bolsonaro coup process. And we have basically testimonies, one or another documentation. They produced lush evidence against themselves, and several came to light, but usually the most decisive revelations take time.
The military is very jealous of doing minutes, often documenting things that are even surprising later. So it won’t be a surprise if in the coming years this kind of revelation comes out – and then I may do an afterword.
Would you risk telling how long is it necessary to have a clearer picture of what has happened in recent years?
I think in five years we will already have. But probably before that we already have at least one more concrete signaling than there was, I say, that it is not just through testimonies, but of written documentation.
Even the military historically considered as Democrats, such as Marshal Henrique Lott, come out badly in the book. Isn’t there a legalist military leaders in Brazilian history?
I think Rui Barbosa and General Lott do not go well from the book and that a lot of people will complain about it, because Lott, for example, is very estimated in left sectors, who consider him legalistic. What happens in most cases is that a few generals take the lead of scammer initiatives. Others are in doubt, watching. Some also position themselves against, and most are changing, waiting to see what will happen, because a coup initiative is a very risky thing.
This does not mean that there has not been and there are no professional military against coup and who defend the legality. This has always been. The case of the 64 coup is very enlightening. A first act of the so -called supreme command of the revolution revolutionized mandates, another suspended political rights of those who were not parliamentary and had an act that punished military. And this first wave of punished military personnel is more numerous than the unpaid or civil parliamentarians who had suspended political rights. They were passed on to the reserve compulsorily. You can’t say they were left -wing military, but they were nationalists or that they were legalistic and opposed to the 64 coup. So there are always military personnel with this legalistic profile.
Mr. It says that Article 142 of the Constitution (according to which the Armed Forces “are intended for the defense of the homeland, the guarantee of constitutional powers and, at the initiative of any of these, the law and the order”) is one of the facilitators of this military interventionism and argues that it be changed. But the Lula government is not based on Congress to approve a PEC in this regard – which was even proposed by a PT deputy. If you had a more solid parliamentary base, do you think the Lula government would change this article?
I hope so. It is very difficult to know what would happen, but I think so. Congress is very conservative, it has been increasingly. And conservatives generally tend not to be in accordance with this type of restriction to the military. So I am even very pessimistic about the possibility of changing the wording of article 142, I see no possibility that the current government make this change, but I think it would be essential.
In the case of Lula, even if he was based on Congress, I doubt if he would, his history with the military allows not to think that not. On the part of civilians/politicians in general, there has always been a resignation, I would even say a fear of confronting military interventionism. Why?
Even in all episodes of coup or coup attempt, when this subject comes to Congress, if you see what you said, this reverence of parliamentarians. From the last century to the latest episodes. The parliamentarians always, even those who condemn, end up making a deference, saying that, however, it was a very serious crisis, it is even understood that there was military intervention. So this reverence has always been.
Since the end of the dictatorship, no president has faced this problem properly, even when there was a political condition for it. It seems to me that there is a generational issue. Anyone who is 70 years old, those people who faced the dictatorship more decisively, somehow developed this… not to mention fear, I would use the expression excessive caution, most likely because of the confrontation in the past. It is a speculation.
Perhaps because the bayonet and cannon inspire fear… It even has the phrase of Góis Monteiro that mr. He quotes twice in the book, that when he has the bayonet, it is easier to argue…
Exactly. This is a very strong thing. The President of the Republic, anyone who was, would fit the military as uniformed civil servants, for whom society gives the right to use arms – and therefore, using these weapons against society is a very serious crime. So a more affirmative stance would be at all desired, but unfortunately it has never happened since the end of the dictatorship.
There is another aspect: it is a contradiction that the military is such important political agents-indevidently, they should not be, but they were and are-and, on the other hand, society to know them very little. There is even the caricature that the military is for nothing, just to paint half.
The National Congress, for example, has no specialized parliamentarians in the military. No one discusses the National Defense Plan. In general, there is an ignorance. It is even ignored the kind of value that motivated a curious episode, from the general who wanted to have a legalistic leadership, is annoyed because he was not summoned to it and ends up moving to the scammer wing [o general é João de Deus Mena Barreto, um dos líderes militares na deposição de Washington Luís em 1930].
That is, the motivation of this general was very specific in nature and has to do with the feeling of honor, the feeling of not being discredited, since he was in the proper position to act in that case and was set aside.
As your book shows, coup military has never been punished in Brazil. Do you believe this time they will be punished? And if so, what can this change in civil-military relationships?
I think this must already be a warning to the military forces. Not so much the relationship of society with the military. But insofar as it is unheard of, these forces will most likely understand that something has changed. Because, after all, those generals were in the defendants’ bank responding to an interrogation in the Federal Supreme Court, which never happened. Then something changed.
Mr. writes in the epilogue that this will be your last book. Still new, 66 years old, why the last book?
I teach for 40 years … I research these subjects for 30 and so many years … I think there is a time when we have to leave the scene elegantly, even to make room for other readings. And also not to become repetitive.
I hope not, but maybe I do some afterword if there is a new interventionism experience. So I am hoping that there is no need to do an afterword.
X -ray – Carlos Fico, 66
Born in Rio, he is a full professor of UFRJ (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro), CNPq researcher and one of the country’s leading scholars on the 1964-1985 dictatorship. He is the author of “The Great Brother: From Operation Brother Sam to Lead Years”, winner of the NATIONAL LIBRARY SERGIO BUARQUE Award in 2008, and “How they acted – the undergrounds of: Spying and Political Police”, among other books.
