Hundreds of millions of euros from the 10 billion euros provided by its support for its accession course, are alleged to have been channeled by its government to finance businesses across Europe.
According to the funds – which are available through the EU’s pre -access mechanism (IPA) since Turkey received a candidate regime – they were initially intended to support political and administrative reforms with the aim of aligning the country with European standards. In the period 2014–2024, Turkey received 4 billion euros from the total amount. In the current financial framework, Ankara is expected to receive a significant share of the € 14.32 billion pledged for the period 2021–2027.
However, according to this article, part of this aid is said to have been secretly channeled into espionage operations to EU member states. Both the Turkish interior ministry and the Foreign Ministry are alleged to have been exploited by millions of euros from the European IPA funds to collect information – either within the EU.
The mechanism of diversion of funds was said to have been thoroughly structured to seem legal. Nursery companies, pre-emptive organizations and agents were used to fund spy funding as support in Turkey’s European accession course. Fake invoices were issued to convene the actual character of the expenditure.
On June 16, 2025, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan revealed in a letter to the Turkish National Assembly that his ministry spent 339.9m euros from European funds in 2014-2024, while the Ministry of the Interior used EUR 327.9 million in the same period. Fidan did not specify how these funds were used. According to sources, however, the money – which was intended for administrative reforms – were channeled into espionage networks operating through Turkish diplomatic missions.
Fidan’s letter
Fidan, a former head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Service, has radically restructured the Foreign Ministry from his appointment in the summer of 2023. He placed a number of MIT executives in top ministry positions and reinforced the role of the Information and Research Directorate (İstihbarat Ve. Turkish embassies and consulates in secret business centers.
Under his leadership, a new service was founded, the Directorate -General for Diplomatic Security (Diplomatik Güvenlik Genel Müdürlüğü, DGGM). Officially, DGGM’s mission is to boost the safety of Turkey’s approximately 260 diplomatic missions worldwide. In practice, it acts as a showcase for sending additional agents abroad. The service is directly referred to Fidan and receives orders from him personally. DGGM also took responsibility for the security of foreign embassies in Turkey – a role that was previously practiced by the Protocol in cooperation with the police. This change gives Fidan a pretext for intensifying foreign diplomatic surveillance businesses in Turkey.
The aggressive expansion of intelligence services comes at a time when the budget of his ministry has been significantly cut by Erdogan. Suspected that Fidan has political ambitions to succeed him – a role that Erdogan wishes for his son, Nezmetin Bilal Erdogan – has almost reduced the percentage of the state budget directed to the Foreign Ministry, from 0.4–0% to 20% to 20%.
Without the intermediate supplementary funding, the percentage is even lower. For example, in 2024 the ministry received 31.4 billion Turkish pounds (about $ 1.08 billion) from a total budget of 14.7 trillion pounds (about $ 506.9 billion), or only 0.21%.
To offset the cuts, Fidan is increasingly focused on European funds.
Shipment of police officers abroad
Another key player in Turkey’s secret businesses is the Directorate of Intelligence of the Directorate -General for Security (Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü İstihbarat Dairesi Başkanlığı), which oversees an extensive network of agents. The Ministry of the Interior sends police abroad with the pretext of the security of embassies and consulates – many of them also serve as law enforcement. In fact, they act as secret agents.
In the last ten years, the Erdogan government has intensified these informants to monitor EU countries, focusing particularly on Turkish communities or foreign embassies in Turkey. The goals of these monitoring operations are political dissidents, journalists, NGOs and members of the Gulen movement, especially in countries such as Germany, France, Sweden, Austria and the Netherlands. Despite the knowledge of the abuse of European funds by the Turkish government and pro-government agencies distinguished for their pro-antigenic and anti-European rhetoric, the EU has so far not taken substantial measures. The European Commission has not blamed the Turkish authorities, nor has it imposed conditions for preventing future abuse.
Why doesn’t Europe react?
One main reason for this silence is the so -called “immigration paper” used by Erdogan against Europe. By checking the flow of irregular migrants through Turkey to the EU, the Turkish president has secured significant rewards from Brussels. The EU, fearing a new migratory crisis, prioritizes short -term safety and migratory management, setting aside democratic values.
In an environment of increasing instability in both Europe and the Middle East, the EU seems reluctant to clash with Turkey, a NATO member state with the second largest army in the alliance. European leaders prefer to maintain a functional relationship with Ankara, even if it means that the Erdogan regime’s authoritarianism, which continues to undermine fundamental rights.
While the money of European taxpayers is used to undermine political freedoms and democratic institutions, both in Turkey and within the EU, Brussels seems willing to sacrifice financial transparency and accountability in the name of pragmatism.
