Logistic data analysis reveals an increasingly dependent Russia of Asian allies, while exhausting its old Soviet arsenals
More than three years after the beginning of, Russia faces a growing logistical challenge: its vast arsenals inherited from the Soviet era are dangerously close to running out. The information is advanced by, which analyzed detailed logistics data on the movement of military equipment and materials.
According to the report, the sending of military material from the main storage zones from Russia to the combat front dropped dramatically. In 2022, at the height of the offensive, about 242,000 tons were transferred. By 2025, this number is expected to fall to 119,000 tons, a reduction that analysts interpret as a sign that available resources are practically exhausted.
Pavlo Shkurenko, KSE analyst, states that the current rhythm of shipping no longer even corresponds to the capacity of military repair facilities: “The easiest equipment to restore and better quality has already been mobilized. What remains is harder to recover or is unusable.”
Russia has been intensive at old equipment to maintain war effort, including T-72 and T-80 tanks, introduced in the 1970s, and even T-54 tanks, whose production dates back to the 1940s. However, this strategy seems to be no longer enough.
Despite this apparent scarcity, experts such as Franz-Stefan Gady, Vienna-based military analyst, warn of hasty readings. In statements cited by, argues that the reduction in sending armored vehicles may also reflect a tactical adaptation of Russian forces, and stresses that Moscow is investing strongly in reconstruction of their stocks.
Increasing dependence on North Korea and Iran
What is most surprising in KSE’s analysis is the new web of dependencies that Moscow is weaving with Asian allies. More than half of the explosives delivered to Russian forces in 2024, measured by weight, arrived from the port of Nakhodka, on the coast of Pacific, a route directly connecting to North Korea.
Before the war, there was no record of military supplies of this origin. It is now estimated that only 250,000 tons of explosive materials have been sent in 2024. Ukrainian military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov recently said about 40% of Russia’s ammunition comes from Pyongyang, an estimate supported by KSE analysis and South Korean intelligence assessments, which point to the sending of 28,000 containers, as well as ballistic missiles, obuses and even troops.
“The contrast to the image of military self -sufficiency that Moscow tries to design is absolutely shocking,” says Shkurenko.
Another ally involved is Iran. KSE’s analysis identifies about 13,000 tons of explosives that, by entry into the logistics chain near the Caspian Sea, will have Iranian origin.
Although Beijing insists that it does not provide lethal weaponry to Russia, logistics data show an increasingly central role in the functioning of the Russian military industry. Since 2021, machinery and components of Chinese border regions to Russian military industrial zones have doubled, exceeding three million tons.
“Even without providing ammunition or weapons, China is guaranteeing the means for the Russian military machine to continue operating,” says Lucas Rysinger, another KSE analyst.
According to Gady, Russia seems to be using the North Korean ammunition to maintain a constant rhythm of fire in the Ukrainian front, while preserving their national manufacturing ammunition for future scenarios, “possibly even a conflict with NATO.”
