Russia in force since 2019, when it was imposed after Abandonment of the International Treaty on Nuclear Forces of Intermediate Rank (INF) of elimination of this class of weapons signed in 1987 by the Soviet Union and the United States.
In addition, . “Russia is no longer considered limited by anything. It is considered right, if necessary, to take appropriate measures “warned Dmitri Peskov, spokesman for the Russian presidency.
Given this scenario, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) what The Russian nuclear strategy “seems to be a turning point” and identifies Two trends That, although they exist since before the war in Ukraine, they have accelerated since the conflict began.
The first is “the perception of an increase in American capacity to establish buttocksusing a combination of conventional and nuclear capacities. “It should be remembered that the US provides the vast majority of NATO nuclear deterrence.
The second focuses on “the possibility that the improvement of aerial and antimile defenses at the theater level of operations in Europe can pose a problem for Russian concepts prior to war in Ukraine on the use of nuclear weapons in a calibrated or dosing way, within the framework of a regional war. ”
In other words, Moscow fears that Washington can hit its strategic forces before Russia can answerand EuroPas defenses limit the usefulness of nuclear attacks. Together, Russia and the US control about 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons.
“Strong incentive” to use nuclear weapons
This double concern is pushing, according to the Rusi, towards a more dangerous scenario: “The threat of buttress creates a strong incentive to use nuclear weapons on a larger scale of which allows dosingespecially to the extent that the threat depends on the systems at the theater level of operations, and given the risks of a gradual escalation in the absence of a stable capacity of second attack. “
The experience in Ukraine, the analysis continues, could reinforce this second perception. The Western air defense systems They have shown one Notable efficacyfeeding the idea in Moscow that, in a major conflict, Its nuclear “flexibility” could be reduced. It is no accident that “both concerns have been reflected in changes in Russia’s declaration policy since 2020” and in their military acquisition plans.
The geopolitical board is complicated with China’s irruption as a nuclear weight actor, warns the Rusi. Although it might seem like a advantage for Russia to have another partner that balances the USthe Rusi warns that “An unquestionable good is not necessarily considered“The reason is that Chinawith its military expansion, Incentives the deployment of US capacities in the Pacific“a measure that Russia perceives how threatening“.
Future “uncertain”
In this context, the Studies Center recognizes that “The way to follow is uncertain”. Comments that a lot will depend on “the Stability of United States commitments with Europe“And of the Advances in integrated aerial defenses and deep attack capabilities. Although it also emphasizes that Russia has letters What to play: From New regional scope systems to better Antispacial capabilities.
The central dilemma that arises is that explicitly linking Western investments in defenses and deep attacks with Russian concerns can “limit the freedom of Russia to use nuclear weapons as a coercive tool.”
However, here emerges what the Rusi calls “the Stability-Instability Paradox“:” Restricting Russia has a cost. The events that limit the freedom of perceived action of Russia before a conflict can also hinder the control of escalation within a conflict. “
