The use of the technique of initiated in the United States towards 2008 has provided spectacular figures for natural gas extraction and, even larger, of pe-trolio raw, but in this article we only deal with the first of those fuels. From that date until 2024, the production of natural gas increased from 550 billion cubic meters to more than one billion, making the secular commercial deficit of the United States disappeared in 2014 and since then an surplus was generated to 206 billion in 2024.
A part of that surplus could be absorbed with an increase in export to the two neighboring countries through pipes, so that sales to Mexico and – with which it maintains a remarkable gas exchange – raised up to 90 billion in 2024. But the bulk of the surplus was obliged to find new markets. To that end, in the coastal areas of Louisiana and Texas the installation of liquefaction plants was accelerated to convert gaseous fuel into liquefied gas (LNG), transportable in metaneous ships at large distances. The handicap was that the price of LNG was much higher than that transported by pipes, since it had to incorporate the double cost of liquefaction and subsequent regasification in the destination, in addition to maritime freight.
Part of the LNG could go to Asian countries, such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, with high domestic demand and poor gas endowment, although they already had closer suppliers (Australia) or a greater commercial trajectory (Qatar). It could also go to others, such as China and India, which were increasing its modest level of consumption. The countries of Latin America, the Middle East and Africa consumed little natural gas or had their own endowments, so their importing margin was narrow. Thus, the American strategy achieved that in 2024 Asian sales increased to 39 billion cubic meters and in the other regions to 15 billion. But those extensions only absorbed a part of the extractive surplus turned into LNG.
This is how the European continent became an essential objective to give way to the increase in the surplus, although it was an objective that presented four obstacles. First, European countries were braking their natural gas demand. Second, most of its consumption was supplied from Russia through a dense network of pipes. Third, Russian imports were made through long -term contracts signed with the Russian monopoly Gazprom. Fourth, although they admitted certain price variations, these contracts guaranteed a stability that left no room to take advantage of the speculative possibilities that lead the volatility and uncertainty of prices.
In 2019, Europe had increased its LNG purchases up to 113 billion cubic meters, but only 18 of them came from the United States. Still two thirds of natural gas imports were carried out by pipes and 80% of them were supplied by Russia, anticipating that their shipments would be greater when the second branch of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, which connected, through the Baltic Sea the large Siberian deposits with the northern coast of Germany. These features were maintained in 2021, after European consumption and imports were moderated. Until in February 2022 it took place that unleashed the military conflict still in progress. Closing ranks against Russia, the European Commission decided to break the energy dependence with Russia, in addition to other economic and diplomatic measures of retaliation, which were supported by the Biden administration.
Three years later, the 2024 data provides four fundamental consequences. First: European purchases through pipes have been drastically reduced, until half of those made in 2019, because those from Russia are equivalent to a quarter of those made then. Second: LNG purchases have grown to overcome those made by pipes. THIRD: Purchases to the United States have experienced a fulminant ascent up to 61 billion cubic meters and represent half of the European GNL imports. Fourth: The United States has become the world leader in the export of LNG (22% of the total), when in 2016 it did not even export and in 2019 it occupied third position, far from the quotas that osted Qatar and Australia.
A complete success of the American strategy and an advantageous scenario for certain European gas transnational transnationals, for large maritime transport companies and raw material marketers and for banks and funds that wanted the creation of a wide LNG market that, similar to the oil company, allowed the development of financial operations. The contracts signed by the large importers are long -term, between 20 and 25 years, but prices take as reference the TTF index (Title Transfer Facility). This indicator is formed in a virtual market, managed in the Netherlands, where cash contracts are negotiated and, above all, of futures, with a notorious participation of agents guided by strict financial purposes, which contribute to providing the index of intense volatility.
Thus, the void interest of the European Union and the United States is understood to investigate sabotage to the Nord Stream II, whose useless had been indicated as an important objective by the Biden administration. European disdain is understood by the fact that LNG’s purchases have been reduced to their previous main partners, Qatar, Algeria and Nigeria, despite the fact that their prices are significantly inferior to Americans. In short, the silence of the European Union authorities is understood in the face of the growing purchase of a gas extracted with a technique prohibited by community regulations (fracking) due to its environmental and health effects.
In addition to a strategic objective, the United States has achieved a very lucrative business and with different ramifications, in which LNGs provide revenues around 30 billion dollars, of which more than half correspond to European purchases. Figures called to continue growing according to the European Commission’s effort to delve the rupture of commercial relations with Russia, while publicly demanding that European countries increase their purchases of American LNG.
