Professor Dogan Cetinkaya explains the social and class tensions behind Turkish nationalism and describes how Turkish capital, including the military-industrial complex, spreads to, utilizing traditional historical relations with.
Turkey has a strong presence in today’s Libya. What is the historical depth of this relationship?
The history of relations between and Libya dates back to the time when the area was under Ottoman rule.
Libya was part of Turkey’s dreams for power and expansion in the Mediterranean, both during the Ottoman Empire and in the modern era.
In the 19th century, with the efforts to modernize and renewed centralization of the Ottoman Empire, Libya came under the immediate control of Constantinople. However, although some of these policies produced results, Libya remained a distant place where they often banished political opponents.
Indeed, the phrase “I will exile you to Fezan” is still used today in Turkish as a threat. The Ottoman rule in Libya, then, was never very strong.
After the 1908 revolution, the New Turks sought to strengthen the empire through the training of a constitution and a more central control. However, this led to Italy’s invasion of Libya. Today, many people in Turkey remember Libya mainly because Mustafa Kemal (later Ataturk) went there and tried to organize a local resistance.
The Ottoman Empire did not want to launch a full war, so it allowed some officers to unofficially go to Libya and encourage some tribes to resist Italy.
However, this effort ended with the start of the Balkan wars and Turkey’s links with Libya have been interrupted for a long time. While Libya was an Italian colony from 1911 to 1943, anti-capitalist movements in the northern African country only received distant and symbolic support from Turkish intellectuals. When Libya became independent in 1951, Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize it, but relations remained limited.
Things changed during the rule of Muammar Gaddafi, who came to power in 1969 through a coup. One important reason for re -heating relations was that Gaddafi supported Turkey after intervening in Cyprus in 1974, when the Western world imposed sanctions on Turkey.
However, the actual deepening of relationships came in the 1980s, when Turkish companies and construction companies started large projects in Libya. Many Turkish workers and investors moved there, which helped strengthen the links between the two countries.
Dogan Cetinkaya
How do you explain Turkey’s policy in Libya after 2011 and the so -called “Arab Spring”?
After 2011, with the protests of Arab Spring, Gaddafi lost power and was killed. At that time, Turkey had a one -party Islamic government, which supported Arab Spring in North Africa.
The ruling “Justice and Development Party” (AKP) and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan supported the “Muslim Brotherhood” and other Islamist groups against secular other than authoritarian regimes in the area. Initially, Turkey supported the provisional government of Libya, but as political chaos was growing, it had to take a more specific position.
He has chosen to support the Government of National Agreement, based in Tripoli, instead of that of the “House of Representatives” in Tobrouk. In 2019-2020, Turkey signed military agreements and formed a strategic partnership with the “Government of National Agreement” (GNA). With prestige, such as the Sea Pact and the nationalist idea of the “blue homeland”, Turkey sought to expand its influence.
He claimed rights at sea, especially in areas between Libya and Turkey and the Aegean, causing tensions with Greece.
In this context, Turkey provided military support to the Tripoli government, with on -site advisers, with armed dresses, and even with the mission of mercenary fighters. Although this policy has produced some real results, the rhetoric for the “blue homeland” was more concerned with politics and diplomacy than in a real war.
Instead of launching complete military clashes, Turkey made small -scale interventions and tried to gain the support of the people through cultivating nationalist emotions. Despite its bold tone, this policy was not aimed at direct conflict with countries such as Greece, Cyprus or Egypt.
Although the 2019-2020 period seems to mark a significant overthrow in Turkey’s foreign policy, it was in fact part of the Turkish state’s attempt to maintain capital accumulation. It was an answer to the economic crisis faced by Turkish capitalism. The state used its military power to help businesses penetrate new markets and participate in a regional reconstruction.
Turkey’s role in Libya was not only about foreign policy, but also in serving the interests of construction, energy and subcontracting sectors. By slowing down the domestic economy and the volatility of labor, this move was a way to seek new sources of profit abroad. The state once again undertook the task of transporting, managing and protecting capital.
How do you evaluate the Turkish idea of the “blue homeland”?
The idea of the “blue homeland”, often discussed in Turkey lately ,. However, what lies behind this rhetoric is much deeper. It is more related to class interests and history. The real function of the “blue homeland” is to relieve the crisis of Turkish capitalism, opening areas abroad for profits and creating new ways of developing capital. Activities such as oil and gas exploration, maritime border talks and military presence abroad are not only geopolitical, but are also shaped by class dynamics.
The reason for the “blue homeland”, often emphasized in recent years in Turkey, is superficially presented as a matter of national sovereignty. However, the underlying dynamics of this policy must be analyzed in a deeper, class and historically founded framework. Its main function is to mitigate the crisis of Turkish capitalism, redirecting it to accumulation abroad and creating new fields of exploitation for capital. Energy exploration activities, negotiations on maritime jurisdiction and military power events are not only geopolitical strategies, but also expressions of class interests.
The reason for the “blue homeland” is a hegemonic plan aimed at rebuilding social consensus through the state security mechanism and nationalist ideology. While poverty and precaries of working classes are deepened, invoking an external threat serves to obscure internal class cracks. In this sense, the “blue homeland” is at the same time a capital strategy and an ideological mechanism.
In addition, energy resources exploration activities, which are at the heart of this policy, provide large capital groups new opportunities for contracts, while public resources are transferred to the private sector under the guise of national security. Companies involved in investment in the defense industry, the shipbuilding of military ships and the construction of submarines are the main beneficiaries of this process. At this point, the state once again functions as a catalyst for capital expansion.
In conclusion, the reason for the “blue homeland” is one of the reproduction mechanisms of the hegemonic state-capital block in Turkey. It acts as a “crisis management” tool, in which militarism in foreign policy and nationalism in domestic are strategically operating. From a political point of view, it is necessary to reveal the deepest conditions of this rhetoric and to reveal the class interests behind the nationalist-militarist mask.
