In a decisive vote in the trial of the coup plot, he recalled the successive blows of state in Brazil, citing the 1964 democratic rupture that instituted the. If it is already cliché to see a historic milestone in the condemnation of the, it is also true that the punishment of the eight members of conspirata cannot be understood without the clarity of the reasons that led to the so -and -so -boring.
After all, exceeded regional movements, such as A, is indeed the first time military is punished in Brazil by attacks against the constituted power. Historians identify three reasons that made the military’s accountability viable: the one that expanded and legitimized society’s rights, building a consensus on the preservation of democracy, the decrease in social inequality and the lack of support of the economic elite to the impunity of scammers.
“The 1988, the strengthening of the prosecutor, the Federal Police and the own allowed the country to face serious political crises,” says historian Carlos Fico, professor at UFRJ (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro). Among the condemned are the generals, and, and the.
In recent days, I have posted on his social networks a table that set up during the research for his newly released book ,. In it, there are 14 coup attempts in Brazil only in the republican period. There is a repetition with symptom characteristics: all failed blows were followed by amnesty.
In the historian’s view, the repeated forgiveness only generated impunity and authorized the same people – always in the Armed Forces, institutions that hold the monopoly of violence – to practice new blows. He remembers, for example, the amnesty given in 1956, to remedy the symptom once and for all, is said against the amnesty projects, now claimed by the opposition in Congress.
The historian Thiago Krause, from Unirio (Federal University of the State of Rio de Janeiro), states that social inequality is the structural element of the coup cycle. In an unequal society, he says, it becomes easier to break political structures without consequences for power usurpers. Krause says it is not a colonial heritage, but a reproduction conscious of inequality.
“Now is the first moment you have, at the limit, the minimum social consensus to condemn scammers,” says Krause. “This is due to the rights guaranteed by and the expansion of social assistance and basic services. Only then has the state been able to face the resistance of the elites, building a social legitimacy for the conviction of the defendants.”
In dialogue with Carlos Fico’s table, also historian Rodrigo Goyena, from USP (University of São Paulo), identifies the proclamation of the Republic as the original sin of coup. After all, the form of government constituted today in Brazil originated from a civil-military coup. Led by Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca, military, they were associated with slave elites to dismiss Dom Pedro 2nd. At the time, says Goyena, the idea was inaugurated that the military would be an illustrated political force, in contrast to Massa Ignara and the politicians themselves, seen as demagogic.
“In general, the coup reiteration happens in Brazil when there is a misalignment between government, productive capital and financial sector. When the three units are misallain,” says Goyena, agreeing that inequality contributes to the cycle of scams and amnesties. “It is a pattern that concerns the way the country behaves in historical transitions, with an articulation to preserve the status quo, in which the ruling class preserves interests. Amnesty suggests preservation and recommodation.”
Goyena, however, is more skeptical as to the Constitution the unprecedented judgment of military. In his view, which enabled the response to the scammers was a division of military, government and the units of economic power. At least so far, he says, there has been no consensus on the elite to support impunity.
Inflection point in history, the condemnation of the defendants of the coup plot produces doubts about the past and the future. Historians differ, for example, about the ability of judgment to broaden society’s interest in the memory of the 1964 coup.
On the one hand, I say it is ironic a government like Bolsonaro, such a militaristic, to serve to illuminate the horrors of the dictatorship, in a moment of intense cultural production over the period, with the hits of the film. On the other, Krause states that the progressive sectors have no strength necessary to dispute the memory of the coup.
Likewise, Brazil has housed, throughout the 20th century, the largest fascist inspiration movement outside Europe, A, whose motto was “God, Fatherland, Family”, the same adopted by pockets. “There is never a extreme right in Brazil,” says Krause. “What was missing for a while was an organized party to take over its flags.”
