While world leaders gathered in New York this week to the UN General Assembly, the focus was on immediate crises, including Gaza and Ukraine, with both conflicts with prospects to extend for this year and by 2026.
I attended several General Assembly meetings with presidents of both political parties. The discussions tend to be dominated by the headlines of the moment, but, looking back, the story of these encounters is often marked more for what was not approached than what it was.
At the 2013 Assembly, for example, no one predicted that the following year would be dominated by the global threat of the Islamic State. Ten years later, in 2023, no one imagined that, in a few weeks, Hamas would invade Israel and set the Middle East on fire. Similarly, in 2019, no one anticipated a global pandemic that would soon change our way of life.
This year does not seem to be different, because if we look forward, the relentless pace of events in today’s global affairs can be just an appetizer of what is coming.
No solution to the current crisis
Let’s first consider the immediate crises, which occupied much of their attention this week.
In Gaza, the year began with the promise of a ceasefire agreement in three phases, designed to ensure the liberation of all hostages and finally end the war. This agreement collapsed in March, after the first phase, and since then we have seen negotiations have, along with a humanitarian crisis, the largest Israeli military operations since the beginning of the conflict, and hostages that continue in captivity.
Today, there is no immediate end in sight, nor a consensus on what to do next.
In New York, several countries led by France and the United Kingdom have recognized a Palestinian state, whose borders and sovereignty attributes will be defined at some point in the future. These countries also asked Hamas to income and surrender their weapons – something that could definitely end the war – but they have no real ability to realize this outcome.
Unfortunately, . They have provoked Israel’s contrary reactions in the West Bank and hardened Hamas’s demands, aligned with his distorted view that the 7th October was worth the cost in Palestinian lives in Gaza – making a possible diplomatic resolution of this terrible war even harder to achieve.
In Ukraine, the: requested by a unilateral ceasefire were replaced by appeals to a comprehensive agreement; Military support to Ukraine was interrupted and then resumed; and sanctions against Russia were threatened but never implemented.
President Donald Trump’s high level domes in August – with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska and European allies in Washington – served to highlight Putin’s maximalist goals, which seeks to acquire territories that could not achieve in the battlefield and ensure that Ukraine cannot defend himself from future Russian invasions. Ukraine will never accept such terms, leaving diplomacy to the drift.
Nothing that is said or done in New York this week will change Putin’s calculations, while Ukraine prepares for a harsh winter and some of the greatest Russian attacks of the entire war.
China, Iran and North Korea
In the end, there are probably many discussions about Gaza and Ukraine in New York this week, but no initiative is expected to help reduce or resolve any of these conflicts.
Now compare the performance of leaders in New York this week with a summit held three weeks ago in Beijing – allegedly to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. The image was striking: Russian President Vladimir Putin, China President Xi Jinping, and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, united in a symbolic hug for ordinary global goals, along with Iran’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian.
This alliance of countries – – not just symbolic. It is actively shaping A, with Ukraine being the front line at the moment.
North Korea sent tens of thousands of soldiers to fight alongside the Russian troops against Ukraine. Iran has provided drones and has transferred technology so that Russia can now produce Iranian drones in its own territory, which resulted in swarm attacks launched against Ukraine in the last six months. China remains the largest buyer of Russian energy products, helping to finance the war and support the Russian economy.
Now consider that Xi Jinping has ordered China’s popular liberation army (PLA) to be prepared for a possible Taiwan invasion by 2027 – an event that would be truly catastrophic, with estimates of a global economic shock and the interruption of advanced semiconductors that support essential aspects of our daily life.
Will we look back in a few years and ask ourselves like no one at the 2025 UN Assembly was discussing this possibility?
So far, most experts do not believe that Xi Jinping will order an invasion anytime soon – and may never do it – rather than non -military operations of “gray zone” such as cyber attacks, advertising, military exercise, economic pressure and diplomatic insulation. The goal is to gradually weaken Taipei’s confidence until the island is pressured to accept complete unification with the continent without the need for a large -scale war.
However, the chances of an invasion are estimated at up to 35%, according to the Global Guardian risk assessment company, and tend to increase as Beijing strengthens its military readiness.
With each passing month, Xi – as well as Putin in relation to Ukraine – will calculate opportunities and costs in search of its clearly declared goals in relation to Taiwan.
This is what connects the crisis in Ukraine to much broader global risks:
If the Crink Alliance continues to be strengthened month after month, and Putin faces increasingly lower costs for its Ukraine aggression war, the risks of a more aggressive Xi stance on Taiwan will also increase – as well as the aggressiveness of other group members, including Iran’s hegemonic ambitions in the Middle East and the unpredictable behaviors of North Korean in the Korean peninsula.
2026 as a “year of transition”
President Donald Trump, as he said, “They were hoping I was watching.” Later, he wrote in Truth Social, in a message directed at Xi Jinping: “Send my most warm greetings to Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un while you conspire against the United States of America.”
The president was certain about the intention and purpose of this meeting. These leaders sent a message to Washington. The question now is: What message Washington will send back?
Thus, Trump’s second year’s second year is configured as a historic milestone that can pave the way for a world of consolidation and stability – or to a world of growing disorder and conflict.
If the risks and costs of transfrontic aggression decrease to Putin and the other Crink Alliance leaders, then we can expect the second scenario. If the costs increase, and the alliance network historically kept by the US strengthened – from NATO to Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and Philippines – then we can expect the first.
To complete the scenario, we have the continuous race between the United States and China in the area of Artificial Intelligence – the nearest existential technological competition we had since the Cold War – and thus, everything is prepared for 2026 to be perhaps one of the most decisive years of a generation.
Consolidation or growing disorder
President Trump often talks about the conflict in Ukraine as a burden he inherited, and as a problem related only to the fighting in eastern Ukraine. Some of its main counselors have belittled Ukraine’s relevance to American interests, or seen the subject as a distraction from the need to stop a future conflict over Taiwan. This two -dimensional view ignores the global implications of conflict in Ukraine, as was evident in Beijing’s recent summit.
Crink Alliance capitals clearly see Ukraine as a central conflict for their future interests, and are acting based on this vision. Similarly, American allies in the Pacific – especially Japan and South Korea – have been vocal advocates of Ukraine, recognizing that a defeat of Russia there would help to contain and deter the XI ambitions in their region.
Therefore, a strategist who analyzes next year should think three -dimensionally, seeking to consolidate Ukraine support with increasing economic costs to Russia, while aggressively pursuing a negotiated agreement that allows the war to end.
Similarly, in the Middle East, ending the war in Gaza and resuming a regional integration agenda remains fundamental to peace in that region and globally, with even more limited Iran.
If both conflicts continue to get worse, without an end in sight, the seams of the global order will break even more, with the Crink Alliance increasingly taking advantage in various regions of the world.
This is the scenario that few have discussed in New York this week, but it may be the most central issue for the future of global security and the position of the United States in the world.
