A mobile shield to see, confuse and lock drones before causing havoc – interperoper with Ukraine and thought to decide in minutes. “In war time, it is speeding for a secret,” says defense expert Ana Miguel dos Santos
The European Union faces a sequence of Russian airspace violations. In recent weeks, incursions have been detected in Denmark, Poland and Romania, and Russian fighters have crossed the limit of Estonia. These episodes, coupled with continuous bombing of Ukraine, rose a warning level in the European capitals and opened a practical discussion: How to wrap drones and aircraft that routinely test the east flank defenses?
Since last week, and also this Monday, political signs have multiplied in favor of a “wall of drones”.
Last Tuesday, the European Commission called for the creation of a “drone protection wall,” recalling recent attacks on four member states. Spokesman Thomas Regnier stated that the initiative will bring together Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, with Ukraine as a technical partner; Denmark has already associated with effort. On Friday, after a meeting with defense ministers of 10 Member States and Ukraine, European commissioner Andrius Kubilius placed this “wall” as an immediate priority, defending an effective detection network (radars and acoustic sensors) and drone interception. He stressed the cost asymmetry of this war: “If you use an air missile from a drone fighter, you are spending a million to destroy something that costs ten thousand.” And this Monday, Volodymyr Zelensky proposed “a fully reliable joint shield” with European partners to protect the Ukrainian and Eastern European sky.
From what is spoken in simple terms, it is from a mobile and scalable network that connects sensors and command centers to short -range neutralization. First detect and follow; When possible, disturbing electronically; If necessary, shoot down with drone ammunition and cannons, reserving more expensive missiles for threats that justify you.
The idea is to reduce the cost by interception and close entrance doors that today come out cheap to those who attack and guys to those who defend.
Here comes the reading of Security and Defense expert Ana Miguel dos Santos, who prefers another designation: “It makes more sense to talk about ‘Iron Dome Europe’. ‘Wall’ brings memories that do not help, especially to Germany, and what is at stake is an air defense system in concrete and defined conditions.” The expert insists that the goal is strictly defensive: “This is not provoking Russia. If we lock the doors of the house, why does Europe not to defend?”
The urgency results from the economy of war with drones. “The cost of slaughtering an drone with an air-to-air missile of a fighter is much higher than that of neutralizing it in a dedicated system,” he says. The war in Ukraine showed, moreover, how drones “remove soldiers from the combat field and lower human costs and material” s. Therefore, involving Kiev accelerates European learning: “Ukraine operates drones and anti-gades every day. Procedures, training, software and sensor integration have already been tested under pressure.”
The advance, however, will not depend only on technology. “In war time, it is quickly the secret,” says Ana Miguel dos Santos, but “the consensus rule” between 27 member states makes the decision slow. There are different sensitivities and geographies with distinct risk perceptions. “In Poland, no one doubts the need and the effort of defense; in Portugal it is more difficult to justify.” To circumvent blockages, the expert welcomes her for coalitions from more exposed countries – Baltico, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and now Denmark – with interoperability from the first day and narrow integration with Ukraine.
The project also has an economic dimension. The commission wants production on scale and a “network approach” that combines startups, gym, defense industry and governments. Portugal, notes the expert, can gain from this: “The distance from the front-to-the-face gives conditions for production and testing, and there are already national companies working in this area.” But leaves the warning: “The geographical periphery is not a shield. The threat [russa] It also arrives through the sea and digital systems. ” Hence the need to prepare not only means, but also people and routines. As Ana Miguel dos Santos says, there is talk of “All of Society e All of Government” – That is, involving state and society – to“ create resilience in civil society ”and“ know how to react in alarm. ”In practice: regular exercises and a clear chain of command (who detects, who validates, who authorizes) to decide in minutes if the drone is to neutralize.
There is a concrete problem of forays into European airspace. There is an operational proposal to answer you with a “drone wall” – or, as the expert prefers, an “European Iron Dome” – that is mobile, introducing and financially sensible. There is urgency, there are difficulties in consensus and there is potential for industrial reinforcement. And there is a red line that Ana Miguel dos Santos repeats to ward off wrong readings: “This is a defense, it is not awarding. It is protecting people and infrastructures and preventing the routine of raids from becoming new normality.”
