The relationship between US President Donald Trump and his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky has unquestionably improved, but the real prize Kiev seeks appears to be out of reach for now.
After nine months of extraordinary diplomatic acrobatics and verbiage, Trump still prefers to give Russian President Vladimir Putin one more opportunity to convince him, rather than direct military escalation.
But there was — amid the fawning praise and the conviction that an elusive peace was at hand — some good news for Ukraine. Even Trump’s final word on the matter, a Truth Social post made as he was leaving for Mar-a-Lago, suggested that “they should stop where they are” — a ceasefire along the current battle lines, suggesting something Kiev could well tolerate.
“We have to stop where we are. It’s important to stop where we are and then talk,” Zelensky told CNN during a press conference after the meeting.
In fact, the day could have been much worse for Ukraine.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky speaks during a press conference in Lafayette Park, in front of the White House, in Washington DC, on Friday (Manuel Balce Ceneta/AP)
First, Trump extolled the deadly virtues of Tomahawk missiles, the supply of which, according to him, was the central theme of his meeting with Zelensky. “That’s why we’re here. The Tomahawks are very dangerous…it could mean escalation – a lot of bad things could happen.” This is a threat unimaginable when Trump came to power: the president happily signaling that he could give the best of his arsenal to Zelensky so that Ukraine could attack Russia in depth.
Yet at the same time, Trump undermined his own threat by immediately clarifying the nature of the deal to Putin. “Let’s hope we can end this war without thinking about Tomahawk missiles,” Trump added. “I think we’re very close to that.”
The truth is that Trump is probably still far from the deal he called “Number 9,” a reference to the number of peace agreements around the world in which he claims to have participated. But his new approach — threatening real military escalation, through American technology bought by European allies and then supplied to Ukraine — could, in time, bring closer the deal he still says Putin wants.
The threat is as much psychological as it is military. The US does not have enough stock to supply the “thousands” of Tomahawk missiles that Trump said he joked with Putin on Thursday that he could give to Ukraine. Missiles are typically launched from the sea, so in the best case scenario, Ukraine would have to wait months to receive a few dozen that it would have to adapt for land launch.
They are extremely expensive. Its range is not much greater than that of the drones that Ukraine currently launches every night into Russia. If it used them, Kiev would have to hit targets that justify the Tomahawk’s $2 million price tag—which means hitting important military or government infrastructure, something Trump could veto. Trump and Zelensky appear to have agreed to leave their agreements ambiguous: Zelensky refused to elaborate on the Tomahawk talk, saying the US did not want to escalate. When asked whether he was optimistic or pessimistic about the missiles, he responded that he was “realistic.”
Second, Trump is now unafraid to admit that Putin may be manipulating him – an important, if belated, epiphany. He added: “I’ve been manipulated all my life by the best of them, and I’ve done very well.”
The Budapest summit with Putin does not yet have a concrete date and appears to be yet another moment in which the Kremlin may try to gain even more time. But Putin will meet a US president perhaps more aware of his own failings in dealing with the Kremlin leader and what it takes to get Moscow’s attention. Trump has now followed the advice of European allies: Putin responds more clearly to force.
Whether Trump ever delivers on this threat is arguably less important in the changing dynamics of the conflict itself. Zelensky sat across from Trump in a position few observers imagined possible in the spring.
As Putin’s much-vaunted summer offensive drags on into the fall, it has singularly failed to capture any major eastern cities. That could change in the few weeks left before winter in November. But the intense attrition, losses and costs of the summer months still left Pokrovsk, Kupiansk and Kostyantynivka in Ukrainian hands. Kiev’s hold is precarious, and Russian advances into open terrain and through small villages leave Ukraine in a poor position heading into the winter. But surprisingly, Kiev’s key positions mostly held.
Given the manpower, resources and morale crises that hung over Ukraine in May, this is surprising and could change the dynamics of the coming months. Putin has returned to playing his military cards and has not (yet) achieved his objectives. In a few weeks, winter will leave the trees leafless, making it difficult for Russian infantry to advance, hiding under the leaves against the threat of Kiev’s drones.
Ukraine has again defied expectations, in part because of its determination and sacrifice, but also because, as Trump admitted, “They make a very good drone.” This new dynamic can still change.
But for the Kremlin, the pressure for results is approaching an uncomfortable need to explain recent failures.
Can Putin afford to fight through the winter, through the spring, until the fourth summer, to once again aim for ever more minimalist goals? Gas shortages due to Ukrainian attacks on oil refineries, rising inflation, faltering payments for new military recruits and Moscow’s consistent failure to make a real breakthrough suggest he cannot.
Zelensky survived a spring and summer in which Ukraine’s main ally turned against him and tried, without Kiev, to reach a peace agreement with its enemy. Ukraine saw Europe fill the void left by the United States financially and militarily, and then saw the same recalcitrant White House offer it its best missiles.
Zelensky used to be the global salesman of the case to support Ukraine’s defense and allow it to become a member of NATO. Now he travels to NATO member countries, introducing them to the up-to-date and rapidly evolving Ukrainian drone technology.
The recent changes are less comforting for Putin. Yes, China still supports him, but India is certainly paying a price for the secondary sanctions imposed by the US on its purchases of Russian oil. (Trump suggested that India had decided to stop buying Russian oil on Friday, which is suggested not to be the case).
Russia’s plan and its support base depend on a military victory. Putin has not yet achieved this. He may succeed—surprisingly—in the coming weeks, given the propensity of late October to bring sweeping changes to the battlefield in this war.
But regardless of the ability of Russia’s closed, autocratic society to suppress dissent, one question is becoming increasingly urgent for Putin: “What’s your next move?”
