From 2027/28, the Champions League will open the season with a special match organized by the champion. This new commercial property can be sold independently to a global streaming platform.
The new category is in the official notice for the next media cycle led by UC3, UEFA’s joint venture with the Association of European Clubs, and was published by SportsPro last week amid football’s fight for streamers’ dollars and global reach.
The tailored package created by UEFA is an explicit courtship of Netflix or any other platform that is willing to use the biggest brand in European football as a lure. The provocation from Nick Meacham, from SportsPro, is ironic: could it be more obvious?
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It is the most ambitious revamp in the league’s history at the very moment football is being repackaged as a global media asset rather than a regional product with fragmented distribution.
UEFA tries to justify the change under the cold pretext of numbers. The projection is for a 10% increase in annual media revenue, from 4.4 billion to 5 billion euros.
As analyst Carlo De Marchis notes, football is experiencing the collapse of national distribution models. Global platforms have shaped new consumption habits and pushed leagues towards a borderless economy, where audience is scale and determines power.
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Get used to the “UCL on Netflix” idea. Or on Disney, Amazon, Apple, DAZN. Although UEFA has not yet fully digested the rupture it proposes.
The entity faces the dilemma of those who need to navigate between two worlds: the consolidated model of local bidding and the future promise of a single global auction. As consultant Mike Darcey rightly put it, the entity operates in this limbo, with no guarantees that the international market will even materialize, but compelled to find a middle ground that preserves its value without alienating traditional buyers.
UEFA’s political engineering to appear disruptive without breaking the system
What is intriguing about UEFA’s new strategy is not the opening to streaming itself, but the number of contradictory scenarios it has created for itself.
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As Darcey recalled, global streamers advanced in sports incrementally, without crossing a boundary still considered taboo in the industry: a major sporting event overcoming the historic model of national licensing and selling significant rights on a global scale.
The question is: does UEFA intend to break this barrier?
The new Champions League rights cycle will be six years long (2027–2033), breaking the traditional three-year model. Today, the matches are divided into four packages per day: first choice on Tuesday, other games on Tuesday, first choice on Wednesday and other games on Wednesday. Bidders may purchase more than one package, including full exclusivity.
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For the first time, a global first-choice game will be able to be sold. A single match per week can be broadcast worldwide on one platform. It will also be possible to compete for multimarket packages, instead of bidding country by country. Long-term contracts are now allowed thanks to the relaxation of EU competition rules.
The proposal, in turn, has structural limitations. UEFA will not allow this global partner to freely choose between Tuesday and Wednesday. Due to pressure from traditional broadcasters, the global package should be fixed on a single day, probably Tuesday. This destroys part of the value of the package, as the most relevant game often takes place on Wednesday, recalled Darcey.
If Netflix really wanted to make an impact on European football, it would make more sense for it to buy national packages in strategic markets and build more relevant local offers for each fan base. In the analyst’s view, this would strengthen the remaining packages, as each country’s best game would continue to be available to other bidders.
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“The global proposal is more complex – and less attractive – than it appears (…) UEFA faces the challenge of balancing the appeal of a revolutionary agreement with the practical need to maintain a functional broadcasting ecosystem for all markets”, pondered Darcey.
The European model that worked for 30 years began to show cracks
The Champions League was built on a local model of selling rights. As De Marchis explains, the tournament was conceived in the 1990s during the expansion of pay TV in Europe. The continent was divided into national markets and each broadcaster purchased exclusivity in its territory. The system delivered revenue maximization, protection from local regulations and broad distribution.
This arrangement came under pressure when streaming entered the scene. DAZN and Prime Video, for example, purchased rights selectively, advancing niches that traditional broadcasters did not serve.
The turning point came when Amazon entered strategic markets such as Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom. In the last 2024–25 season, Prime Video brought together more than 13 million viewers in the United Kingdom and Ireland. (I will go into more detail about this later in the article)
De Marchis claims that the old model still delivers financial stability and predictability, but it no longer matches the behavior of new audiences. Fans migrate to on-demand, young people spend more time on YouTube and TikTok than on linear TV and clubs have started to question why a global competition continues to be distributed as if it were still a regional product.
UEFA wants to appear global without losing local control
One solution considered by Darcey would be to maintain the current format: first holding the 50 national auctions and then negotiating with global streamers. The problem is that no bidder would keep an offer frozen for months while UEFA tries to organize the rest of the pieces. The risk of withdrawals and renegotiations would be high.
UEFA also knows that it cannot run 50 auctions simultaneously. Even with the entry of Relevent Sports as a new commercial agency, replacing TEAM Marketing, the operation remains too complex.
Initially, the plan is to conduct parallel auctions only in the five largest European markets (United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Spain) and use these results as a reference for the rest of the continent.
Darcey questions whether this solves the problem or just pushes the difficult decision to later. UEFA gains data to calibrate prices and narratives, but continues to avoid answering the main question of the process: will it truly invest in global reach or will it remain hostage to the local model?
The choice of the American agency Relevent reinforces the declared ambition of modernizing the sale of rights, focusing on scale, commercial storytelling and synergy between markets.
The risk of designing packages for streamers and ending up paying the bill
Darcey warns of a recurring error when leagues try to “globalize” their rights. By targeting streamers and creating tailor-made packages to attract Netflix, Amazon or Apple, the league risks isolating the product and crowding out the rest of the market. The result could be the opposite of what was planned: less competition, weak supply and a drop in value.
The Premier League has already experienced this scenario. In 2018, it included a 20-game package clearly aimed at Amazon in the domestic auction. There were two entire blocks: a complete round during Black Friday and another on Boxing Day, dates of high consumption. Sky and BT quickly bought the other six packages and lost interest. They were satisfied with what they took and did not make additional offers.
As the analyst recalled, the package designed to be “attractive” was stuck. Amazon did not appear in the first round and the auction stalled. It was only three months later that the league managed to reach an agreement. The amount was not disclosed, but estimates point to around 30 million pounds per year, something close to 1.5 million per match. For a product like the Premier League in the UK, it was an embarrassing price.
And where does YouTube fit into this story?
The final of the last Champions League between PSG and Inter marked the end of the first season of the Champions League on Prime Video in the United Kingdom and Ireland, and also the boost of Amazon as a relevant player in sports rights in Europe.
More than 13 million viewers followed the competition, making it the most watched sports season in the history of Prime Video in Europe. Another record: the game between PSG and Liverpool in the round of 16 attracted more than five million people and set a new audience peak in the United Kingdom.
Amazon’s advance comes at a time of reorganization of the value of rights in the European Big 5. Last season, the Premier League, LaLiga, Bundesliga, Serie A and Ligue 1 combined for 11.3 billion euros in media revenue.
Despite having , the Premier League remains isolated with a new domestic contract worth £6.7 billion from August. The Bundesliga managed an upward adjustment and reached 4.48 billion euros. LaLiga maintains stability until 2026/27. While France has built its D2C infrastructure but is still seeking market traction, Italy has failed to establish its direct model after negotiations with traditional broadcasters collapsed.
This scenario opens up space for opportunistic movements and the entry of players who were on the margins of the dispute. That’s when YouTube comes into the picture.
If in the United States the platform bears the label of the largest “TV channel” in terms of consumption time, in Europe it has not yet assumed a relevant position in live sport.
And analyst Ian Whittaker provokes: if YouTube wants to compete for TV advertising budgets in Europe and be recognized as premium media, it cannot avoid football forever. It needs to prove that it is a legitimate destination for top-tier rights.
Having these rights would guarantee political entry into the media power game. They would function as a tool to convince advertisers and content creators that the platform is no longer complementary and is now competing for main programming.
For now, there is no public movement from YouTube in relation to European football.
The final test: does UEFA go all the way or back down at the first hurdle?
Carlo De Marchis projects a likely scenario if Netflix decides to play only the first choice match per round on a global scale. Entry would follow the company’s usual pattern: experimental, data-driven and low risk.
It would be the same strategy applied in the NFL Christmas games, the Tyson x Paul event and the Tour de France. First, test. Then they climb.
With one game per week, Netflix gains cultural relevance in football without assuming the operational weight of a complete package. It does not compromise the streaming infrastructure, does not unbalance the cash flow and keeps the narrative in line with what it already dominates: telling stories.
The package would allow integration with originals, something that no traditional broadcaster can replicate. Imagine complementary content around the weekly round: documentaries, behind-the-scenes, editorialized post-game and global distribution of clips. The company would create a “Champions universe” capable of connecting hype with retention.
At the same time, it strengthens the advertising business. The ad-supported plan gets premium live inventory, offering global delivery for brands and testing new commercial formats.
On UEFA’s side, the process depends on the performance of the bidding in the five largest European markets. As Darcey explains, if the regional dispute for Tuesday’s match does not generate enough value, the global plan will be shelved. The rest will continue in the current model, sold country by country. End of subject.
If there is a strong proposal, UEFA will ask a second question. First, thank you for the regional offer, then open the door: how much would it cost to extend this to the whole world?
To paraphrase Darcey, the simultaneous process across all five markets would act as a partial bridge, making the leap of faith less intimidating.
