During the spring and summer, con offensives disappeared from the front. Russian mechanized units were replaced by light infantry attacksorganized in between two and five soldiers, or even in civilian vehicles such as ATVs. Some Russian media even speculated on the surreal possibility of “return of the cavalry” as an infiltration method.
The apparent shortage of equipment led to the belief that Russia had run out of suitable military equipment. However, the reality seems more complex. The Russian army still has at least 2,500 armored vehicles storedwhile several hundred more are under repair or in transit to the front. The problem is not the quantity, but the quality and aging of the models.
In its effort to maintain the pace of operations, the Kremlin has increasingly turned to older models of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Each reactivated unit requires long repair and modernization processesslowing Moscow’s ability to sustain a prolonged offensive.
Despite this, the Russian army has decided to reintroduce large-scale mechanized attacks in various sectorsespecially in the , in the Donetsk region. There, since mid-October, videos released by both sides show columns of armored vehicles advancing under Ukrainian fire, in scenes reminiscent of the first months of the invasion.
However, the results have been devastating. In numerous cases, between 15 and 20 armored vehicles were destroyed in a single attack. Still, Moscow has insisted on maintaining pressure, probably in an attempt to achieve its military objectives before the arrival of winter.
In total, Russia lost at least 76 armored vehicles in just one monthonly in the Pokrovsk area. These figures do not include losses recorded elsewhere on the front, suggesting that the real cost could be considerably higher.
Pokrovsk, the new epicenter of the Eastern Front
The question many are asking is why the Russian command has decided to use such a costly and ineffective tactic again. One of the answers seems to be in the strategic importance of Pokrovsk.
At the beginning of the year, several observers noted that the Kremlin’s main military objective in 2025 would be to consolidate the full control of the Donetsk region. To do this, Russian forces must capture Pokrovsk and Toretsktwo key industrial centers in the west of the oblast.
Toretsk fell in mid-summerbut Pokrovsk continues to resist after a prolonged siege. According to Ukrainian intelligence sources, the Russian president, would have urged his army to capture the city before mid-November, probably in order to present a tangible success on the front before sanctions and winter further complicate the internal situation in Russia.
Logistical and seasonal factors
He change of season has also played an important role. During the autumnwith the arrival of rains and mud, light and civilian vehicles used in infantry attacks (such as motorcycles and quads) have lost functionality. Los muddy roads They limit their mobility, forcing the Russians to return to using heavier armor.
Besides, Falling leaves have reduced visual coverage which previously allowed small Russian groups to approach undetected. “With bare forests, infantry units are much more visible from the air,” explain Ukrainian military analysts. This makes mechanized attacks, although more costly, tactically inevitable to maintain pressure on the front before winter freezes movement.
A risky bet
The massive deployment of armored vehicles also responds to an already known pattern: accumulate resources over several months to launch them in saturation offensives. Moscow has used this tactic not only with tanks, but also with missiles and drones, seeking to wear down Ukrainian defenses through successive waves.
However, the results are far from favorable. Despite some local progress, the material losses They far exceed territorial gains. “Russian forces are paying a very high price for every meter gained. And with the current intensity, its reserves of combat-ready vehicles could run out in a matter of weeks“says a European military analyst.
