For more than two decades, endless negotiations have been taking place between the Mercosur and the European Union (EU) to achieve a Association Agreement. Again and again, when a definitive closure seems to be reached, new ones emerge. obstacles that reopen the debate.
Although formal links between both blocs were established as soon as Mercosur was created in 1991, the negotiations for a partnership agreement they started in 1999. After twenty years of advances and setbacks, in June 2019 it was proclaimed that they had concluded. However, the European protectionism overlapping and environmental demands stricter measures slowed down the ratification process. In a more fluid and challenging international scenario, in December 2024 A new understanding was announced that resulted, this time, in the formal presentation of the agreement by the European Commission, although divided into two texts.
The separation between a Interim Trade Agreement and an Association Agreement –an alternative that facilitates the approval of the commercial component by the European institutions– constitutes a clear signal of the Commission’s will to move forward and avoid crashes derived from possible vetoes. The question that now arises is whether this time the outcome will actually be reached or whether the process will remain open again. For now, it is the Mercosur countries that are waiting for the Europeans to finish defining their position.
How the Trade Agreement is voted on in the EU
In the Council, international trade agreements require qualified majority: at least 55% of Member States (15 of 27), representing at least 65% of the EU population. Although unanimity is not necessary, the relative weight of France and other States with agrarian sensitivity constitutes a real risk, since the opposition of a single relevant actor can seriously complicate the dynamics. In the European Parliament, approval requires a simple majority of votes. This condition, apparently favorable, has a double edge: it can facilitate both approval and rejection.
The European Commission is trying to persuade reluctant states by incorporation of additional safeguards – presented last October 7 – intended to strengthen protection for European farmers. Apparently, Italy would have already been convinced. Poland, on the other hand, maintains its discontent, although its Minister of Agriculture indicated that possible protection mechanisms for producers are being worked on, which generated opposition criticism for an alleged transfer to Brussels.
In this context, the “France factor” continues to be decisive. The pressure of the influential rural lobby and the political consensus on the defense of agricultural interests explain the French resistance. The most recent statements of Emmanuel Macron – in a context of prolonged internal political crisis – seemed to suggest a certain willingness to reconsider the veto.
Force correlation
However, while the German Chancellor Friedrich Merz created confusion by claiming – wrongly – that, at the European Council on October 23, the Member States had unanimously supported the signing of the agreement, Macron stated that “work continues” to conclude the safeguard clauses introduced by the European Commissionconsidered by Paris as “essential” to improve the text. He also expressed his hope that the process would be completed soon and that the Mercosur countries would receive the corresponding notification and formalize the essential support requested by France.
The desire to move forward quickly on the part of countries like Germany or Spain once again runs into the protection demands raised by France. In recent days, the resigned and later re-elected prime minister Sébastien Lecornuaddressed the European Commission to reaffirm French disagreement with the agreement and demanded measures to avoid unfair competition by South American farmers. Lecornu sent a letter to the Commission: a sensible precaution, after the mysterious disappearance of Macron’s emails to Ursula Von der Leyen reiterating French opposition to the agreement. Von der Leyen is currently under investigation for these events.
In it European Parliament tensions are also observed. The fracture lines are mostly national: the French, Polish and Irish MEPs from across the political spectrum oppose the deal, while those from Germany, Spain and Portugal They are among its strongest defenders. In the Netherlands and Austria, criticism of the deal is widespread, but MEPs are divided.
In ideological terms there are also differences: a sector of left-wing MEPs is promoting a draft resolution to question the agreement before the Court of Justice of the EU. And although he European People’s Party (EPP)the largest group, supports ratification, forty MEPs – including fourteen from the EPP itself – sent a letter to the Commission expressing their reservations and warning of impacts on the agricultural sector. Other MEPs are carrying out field visits; A group of MEPs from the Agriculture and Rural Development committee is visiting Brazil.
What would it mean for it to come to fruition this time?
The agreement between the EU and Mercosur would constitute the largest trade pact in the history of both blocks. However, to paraphrase Borges, “it is not love that unites them but fear.” In the shadow of asymmetrically complementary trade flows and well-defined offensive and defensive interests in both blocks, the protectionist policy of the Trump administration It functions as a determining external factor, promoting a rapprochement that would otherwise have been difficult to achieve. While Mercosur seeks to consolidate itself in the EU as a strategic partner and shows greater flexibility, the EU is more limited by the need to protect sensitive sectors of its economyonce again showing its position as the actor with the greatest defensive interests, and adopting, at the same time, an emphatic stance in favor of the promotion of a rules-based multilateral trading system.
What if it doesn’t materialize? Nor would it necessarily be catastrophic. The Mercosur-EU links They have accumulated more than thirty years of history without an ambitious formalized agreement. If it is not signed and ratified, we would simply continue facing a new episode of a relationship that has us accustomed to partial progress, setbacks and resilience.
