Article says that Antaq’s technical note was not submitted to public consultation nor did it receive a prior technical opinion from bodies specializing in competition defense
It is imperative to contest the thesis that the technical area of (Federal Audit Court) and the public prosecutor’s office would have made an error in the analysis of the auction for the Tecon Santos 10 terminal. In reality, what is continually observed are fragile assumptions adopted by (National Waterway Transport Agency) in technical note 51, of 2025, and this becomes increasingly evident.
The aforementioned technical note, which proposed restrictions on the participation of incumbent operators, lacks a clear methodology, was not submitted to public consultation nor did it receive a prior technical opinion from bodies specializing in the defense of competition.
In the opposite direction, the TCU, supported by its own technical staff, sought independent assessments to support its respective analyses. The reporting minister opened a specific public panel to discuss the competition issue. The Subsecretariat for Economic Monitoring of the Ministry of Finance, when prompted by the Court, ruled out the need for any restriction on participation in the event and defended the maintenance of broad competition. THE (Administrative Council for Economic Defense), also activated by the TCU, concluded that the new concession does not present competitive problems that justify the prior exclusion of incumbents.
Among the alternatives discussed within the regulatory scope is the possibility of divestment if one of the company’s shareholders in TIL you da will win the auction . This solution would imply the sale of the stake in the terminal currently operated by joint ventureresulting in the separation of the port operations of the two companies.
By assuming that, in this scenario, there will be 4 operators before and after the auction, without competitive gains, the thesis that the Public Ministry together with the TCU would have been misled treats the competitive environment as static and disregards essential structural elements.
The fact is that such reorganization significantly changes the competitive dynamics. What is currently a joint action would become direct rivalry, with each economic group controlling its own terminal and adopting independent pricing, investment and service attraction strategies.
Antaq itself recognized that, in this scenario, there would be greater balance in the distribution of capacities between operators, with positive impacts on rivalry, efficiency and commercial conditions for users, as they are 2 of the largest port operators in the world, with long-term investments in Brazil and a strong willingness to compete in a fully competitive environment.
Another point completely absent from this most recent thesis launched to justify the exclusion of competitors in the auction is the strategic role of infrastructure, especially the redistribution of berths, as a determining element of competition in the Port of Santos.
The availability of berths determines how many large ships each terminal can receive, the level of idleness or saturation of the facilities and the capacity to accommodate new routes.
In the scenario of eventual divestment by one of the partners, BTP would be under the control of a large global operator with 3 berths available, Santos Brasil would continue operating with a capacity equivalent to 4 berths, Tecon Santos 10 in the hands of another operator with 4 berths of capacity, and DP World, owner of 2 berths with freedom to expand its own infrastructure.
On the contrary, if a new participant enters the market, the configuration becomes asymmetric: 3 terminals with sufficient capacity for operators to compete for large ships, while BTP partners would remain limited, in theory, to 1.5 berths for each economic group. This is a strong structural imbalance with a direct impact on competitive dynamics.
Argentina’s experience illustrates this strategic error well. Over the last few decades, the country has fragmented the Port of Buenos Aires into multiple areas operated by different groups, under the premise that the multiplication of operators would mean more competition. The result was just the opposite. Excessive operational dispersion generated inefficiencies, coordination difficulties, an inability to attract larger ships and a progressive loss of competitiveness compared to neighboring ports. Artificially increased competition did not produce healthy rivalry, but rather an unbalanced system, with operators unable to invest, compressed margins, overlapping conflicts and operational performance far below expectations.
Effective competition is not built by creating players by decree, but with arrangements that favor scale, efficiency and real competition based on operational merit.
Another serious failure of Antaq was to define the relevant market in an excessively narrow way, limiting it to the Santos Port Complex. This definition disregards the broad geographic substitutability observed in the sector with effective alternatives, such as the ports of São Sebastião and Itajaí and the private terminals already authorized in Santos and Paranaguá, which produces an artificially concentrated portrait that does not correspond to the competitive reality.
The error-inducing thesis ignores yet another inconsistency. Tecon Santos 10 will only reach full capacity in 2034. Antaq’s analysis does not consider any of the projects that are advancing in parallel and that will directly affect the level of competition, such as the new terminal in São Sebastião, the 3 TUPs (Private Use Terminals) authorized in Santos, the new port of Imetame (ES), the new super terminal in Itajaí (SC) and the urgent expansion of capacity in Paranaguá (PR).
Over a 9-year horizon, it is inconsistent to assume that none of these projects will be implemented, which distorts any assessment of the expected competitive environment, i.e., the projected concentration may never materialize and there is no guarantee that any operator will hold a dominant position in the future.
Finally, there is no technical basis that justifies restricting the participation of incumbent operators in the Tecon Santos 10 auction. The idea that previously excluding active companies would increase competition does not find empirical or theoretical support, while reducing the number of qualified competitors reduces competition for the market and does not ensure gains in market competition.
In the reality of the facts and data, the technical area of the TCU and the Public Prosecutor’s Office at the Court did not make any error. The conclusions are aligned with the best technical understanding of the sector and the guidelines of authorities specializing in competition defense.
This content was produced and paid for by Luis Claudio Montenegro. The information and opinions disclosed are the sole responsibility of the author.
