What Europe has launched under the shadow of the Russian threat is of no use if, when an emergency occurs, soldiers, tanks or defensive systems do not quickly reach the place where they are most needed. And that is what is currently happening in a European Union where permits to move armies across borders can take weeks and even months, lost in a bureaucratic tangle, and where many bridges, roads or railway networks are not adapted to heavy and complex military transport. To overcome these problems and have agile forces, the European Commission presents this Wednesday a “military mobility” plan that seeks to create a “military Schengen” that facilitates the movement of troops and weapons in the European space.
“You cannot defend a continent if you cannot move through it. Some can make the difference between winning and losing a war,” underlines the Commissioner for Transport and Tourism, Apostolos Tzitzikostas, in a meeting with a group of journalists in which he broke down the proposal that the European Executive must formally launch this Wednesday for analysis by the Member States and the European Parliament.
One of the keys to the plan is to harmonize rules to streamline the entire bureaucratic process to mobilize troops from one country to another. “We want to establish very clear rules and procedures for cross-border military movements,” underlines the Greek commissioner. To do this, Brussels proposes, on the one hand, that each country designate a national military transport coordinator (currently you have to knock on several doors and ministries, a situation that also varies in each State) to act as a single window to manage demands of this type.
Furthermore, in times of peace, the Commission proposes establishing by law a maximum period of three days for the country through which you want to pass to indicate whether or not it gives permission for the troops of another State to cross it. The situation accelerates, however, if an emergency is declared (at the request of a Member State, the Commission will then take the proposal to the Council, which must quickly decide whether to agree to declare this extraordinary situation). In that case, the process to transfer material and especially troops across borders must be reduced to a few hours and, in principle, member countries will not be able to reject the request. However, some are being analyzed caveatsespecially in view of the fact that there are four Member States where military neutrality governs that may be compromised by these proposals: Austria (the country that raises the most doubts, due to its important geostrategic location), Ireland, Cyprus and Malta.
The “military Schengen”, which the States and the European Parliament will have to approve before it can be launched, also provides, among others, for the creation of a solidarity fund for military mobility inspired by the one that helps mobilize emergency aid, personnel and material, in the event of disasters, such as forest fires or floods. Similarly, in the military case, this “fund”, created in part with voluntary contributions from participating countries, could have military reserves and means of transport thereof – trains, ferries, strategic air transport – at the disposal of the States.
The Commission’s military mobility plan – a proposal for a regulation to harmonize the often diverse and disparate national provisions, as well as a communication with several lines of action – also contains an important leg dedicated to the improvement of the European dual-use infrastructure, both civil and military.
“We need a network of roads, railway networks, ports, airports, tunnels, etc. that meet military requirements, that is, they are suitable to support the loads, weights and sizes of military equipment,” says Tzitzikostas.
It is not, he emphasizes, about creating a whole new infrastructure, but about “improving” the existing one. To this end, the Greek official advances, more than 500 projects have been identified – which will be kept secret for security reasons – that are guided by the principle that they can be carried out quickly to also increase capacities rapidly. These are plans such as reinforcing roads and railway networks, widening tunnels or expanding ports. The work of identifying the projects is carried out in coordination with NATO, to which 23 of the 27 European partners belong, which also includes defense spending from the GDP. A part of that percentage, 1.5%, will be dedicated to projects related to security in a broader sense and that is where these infrastructure expenses that the Commission is now proposing can come into play.
The European Executive’s military mobility plan is known after the one presented at the beginning of the year by the EU Court of Auditors on this issue. The Luxembourg auditors, in addition to underlining that the budget for this key part of the project of a safer Europe capable of defending itself for which the EU has set the 2030 goal had been calculated too low, warned of multiple “bottlenecks”, bureaucratic and infrastructure, that prevent the EU from achieving its objective of “guaranteeing a rapid and fluid movement of personnel, material and military equipment in and out of the EU at short notice and at great scale.”
Tzitzikosas assures that these shortcomings have been taken into account. And he points out as proof the budgetary reinforcement dedicated to military mobility in the Commission’s proposal for the next multiannual budgets 2028-34: up to 17 billion euros, ten times more than in the current budget, which was exhausted halfway through. In total, Brussels estimates that the development of military mobility in the EU will require investments of up to 100 billion euros. But not everything has to go at once, not even from a single piggy bank, he points out. In addition to national budgets, cohesion funds and other European funds may also be used, as well as allocating part of the program for joint purchases in European defense.
