The definition of the COP31 headquarters, scheduled for 2026, has become one of the most significant impasses in recent climate diplomacy. Australia and Türkiye are disputing the nomination within the WEOG regional group — which requires unanimous consensus — and, so far, no solution has been consolidated. The theme transcends logistics and touches on deep questions of legitimacy, global priorities and balance between North and South in the climate debate. The decision gained new momentum after Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese stated that his country will not veto the Turkish candidacy. The gesture was interpreted as an attempt to prevent the impasse from harming Pacific island countries, Canberra’s strategic allies. Still, Australia rejected co-presidency or co-hosting, reinforcing that this model does not exist in the official UNFCCC regulations. The dispute reveals different visions of climate leadership. Australia presents a candidacy supported by robust infrastructure and the support of small island states, which see the regional power as a channel of pressure for financing and adaptation — central themes for those already facing rising sea levels. At the same time, the country is burdened by a recent history of dependence on coal and delays in the energy transition, factors that limit its moral authority in negotiations.
Turkey, in turn, is betting on its strategic position between Europe and Asia and on the discourse of bridging the hemispheres. Its central argument is to increase the participation of developing countries in global decision-making centers. The inclusion narrative, however, faces similar criticism to the Australian ones: Ankara maintains a significant expansion of coal-fired thermoelectric plants and internal policies considered insufficient to align the country with the goals of the Paris Agreement. In both cases, the symbolic benefit is clear. A COP based in Australia would put the spotlight on the Pacific — the most vulnerable region on the planet — and reinforce the climate justice discourse. A COP based in Türkiye, on the other hand, would expand the presence of the Global South in a space mostly dominated by rich or large emerging countries.
But the risk of impasse is real. If there is no consensus, COP31 automatically returns to Bonn, the permanent headquarters of the UNFCCC. For climate governance, this would mean losing the opportunity to anchor the summit in strategic regions, also reducing the symbolic and political impact that alternating venues usually bring.
The picture becomes even more relevant when observed in sequence: the COP30 in Belémwhich reinforces the role of the Amazon in climate geopolitics, and the already confirmed COP32 on Ethiopiathe first time that the African continent has hosted the event in more than a decade. Ethiopia’s choice symbolizes an international realignment around the continent that suffers most from the climate crisis and contributed least to it.
Given this, the decision on COP31 is more than a dispute between two countries. It is a thermometer of the multilateral system’s capacity to reduce regional tensions, strengthen adaptation agendas and recognize historical vulnerabilities. And, above all, it is an indication of how the world intends to conduct climate policy at a time when the impacts of global warming are accelerating faster than international responses.
Whether Australia or Turkey, COP31 needs to be defined urgently — not only to guarantee predictability to the process, but to prevent the international climate system itself from being held hostage by diplomatic impasses at a time when action should speak louder than indecision.
