The Israeli Prime Minister, spoke publicly for the first time this Tuesday about the crisis between the Minister of Defense, Israel Katz, and the Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army, Eyal Zamir, stating that “it is better not to listen to reports from interested parties,” according to Israeli media.
“It is better not to listen to reports from interested parties. The prime minister is determined to resolve the problems and will do so in the best possible way,” Israeli media quote a spokesperson for the president’s office.
The Israeli Minister of Defense warned this Tuesday that disciplinary measures will be taken against other senior Army officials, once the review of the investigation report on those of October 7, 2023 is completed.
On Monday, until this new internal investigation is concluded, Katz also paralyzed the appointments of new senior military officials for 30 days, a measure criticized by the head of state, Eyal Zamir, who alleged that it would harm the Army. “Stopping the appointments will harm the IDF’s capabilities and the preparation process for upcoming challenges,” Zamir stated in a statement on Monday.
“The chief of staff will continue to hold meetings on appointments as planned, in accordance with his authority and will submit them to the minister for approval as necessary,” he added.
This state review plans to study “the need to conduct additional investigations” of issues that the armed forces have not yet addressed, such as the ‘Walls of Jericho’ document, an intelligence report that came into the hands of the Army in May 2022 and that anticipated the attack, but ignored.
On Sunday night, based on this study, Zamir dismissed from the military reserve several generals and senior officials whom he held personally responsible for the military failure that day. In total, Zamir removed a dozen senior military officials from the armed forces reserve, including generals, vice admirals, colonels and lieutenants. Some of them had already publicly resigned from their positions, one of the few authorities in Israel that day.
Among them are Major General Aharon Haliva, then head of military intelligence, Major General Oded Basyuk, then chief of operations, and Major General Yaron Finkelman, who had recently assumed command of Israel’s southern military region that day, will be relieved “from the reserve cadre and will no longer be part” of the Army, according to a statement from the military institution.
General Haliva was the first military leader to resign in 2024, after acknowledging his responsibility in the October 7 tragedy. He has now been formally dismissed from reserve duty. In his resignation letter, Haliva stated that the intelligence directorate he commanded “did not fulfill the responsibilities” assigned to it. “I carry the weight of that tragic day, day after day, night after night. The agony of this war will remain with me indefinitely,” he concluded.
General Finkelman resigned for similar reasons, while General Basyuk announced his departure after the 12-day war launched by Israel against Iran in June 2025.
In addition to the three dismissed generals, the Army announced disciplinary sanctions against Air Division General Tomer Bar and Vice Admiral David Saar Salma, head of the Air Force and Navy, respectively. Four other generals and four senior officers also received disciplinary sanctions.
More than two years after the attack and offensive against Gaza in retaliation, Netanyahu has not apologized or taken responsibility for the attack. Nor has he ordered a state commission to investigate these responsibilities. Thousands of protesters joined opposition leaders in the city of Tel Aviv on the night of Saturday, November 22, once again demanding a state commission of inquiry, which the prime minister opposes.
A damning report
As you remember, the military dismissals formalized this Monday are the culmination of an investigation within the Army to detect the failures of October 7, 2023. The Turgeman Committee, headed by retired general, Sami Turgeman, highlighted several findings in its report of November 11, 2025, based on 25 internal investigations.
“The Israel Defense Forces failed in their primary mission on October 7: to protect the civilians of the State of Israel,” concluded the head of the Israeli Military General Staff, Eyal Zamir, who ordered the formation of the investigative group.
The report shows a “long-standing systemic and organizational failure” within the military apparatus. The text speaks of a “conceptual error” due to the “gap between the strategic and operational reality and the perception of reality in the Gaza Strip and regarding Hamas.”
In addition, it points to a “failure of military intelligence” in its “inability to raise the alarm” despite the fact that the Army had “exceptional and high quality” information.
The committee of experts appointed to prepare the report regretted “deficient decision-making processes and deployment of forces on the night of October 7, 2023”, of which it points out to the General Staff, the operations directorate, the military intelligence directorate, the Southern Command, but also the Air Force and the Navy.
The Air Force is accused of failing to prepare defenses against low-altitude threats such as drones and motorized paragliders, while the Navy is accused of failing to defend Israel’s maritime entrance against Hamas infiltrations.
However, the document highlights that the Israeli Army did not raise its alert level before the attack, which limited the rapid response capacity of both forces.
The Army’s internal investigation revealed a chain of errors in key Defense bodies, whose negligence and inefficiency made Hamas’ incursion possible, evidencing structural failures in what is considered one of the most solid armies in the region. The Directorate of Military Intelligence, of which General Haliva was commander, “failed to detect Hamas’s operational evolution, neglected long-term investigation of its growing power, and failed to provide early warning,” according to the investigative committee document.
Major General Oded Basiuk held the third highest position in the military hierarchy as head of the Operations Directorate. His unit “failed to prepare for a surprise war scenario, neglected the lessons of Operation Guardian of the Walls, and failed to conduct assessments of the situation on the night of October 7.”
The Southern Command, responsible for Gaza, whose commander was Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman, was “unable to provide early warning, secure residents or adjust operational plans to the threat.”
