Announced as the candidate of the former president () to be the rival of (PT) in the 2026 election, his son Flávio would be 15 points behind the PT member if a possible second round were held today.
Other names on the right, such as governors (Republicanos-SP) and . (PSD-PR), are 5 and 6 points behind, respectively.
The Rio PL senator sentenced to 27 years and three months in prison for attempted coup after losing the 2022 election to Lula and who will only be able to run again at 105 years of age, this Friday (5).
The nomination was seen by the centrão, the MDB and the PSD, the amalgam that is in the Lula government and also has names to challenge him, with displeasure. The numbers from next year’s latest succession survey add more grist to this mill.
The institute interviewed 2,002 voters from Tuesday (2) to Thursday (4), before, therefore, the announcement made by Flávio. The survey was carried out in 113 municipalities with people over 16 years old. The survey’s margin of error is plus or minus two points.
Starting with the second round, given that the fragmentation and rejection of the main names in the field indicate that the bill will not be completed in the first round, what we see is a marginal expansion of Lula’s dominance at the end of July.
In the scenario against Flávio, Lula scores 51% compared to 36%; before, it won 48% to 37%. The surname Bolsonaro is heavy in context.
The senator’s brother, deputy Eduardo (PL-SP) went from 37% to 35%, while in the Lula clash it went from 49% to 52%, within the margin of error.
The woman who went head to head with her imprisoned husband’s children loses 50% to 39% in this scenario assessment.
Tarcísio’s governors lose in the simulation to Lula by 47% to 42%; in July, the score was 45% to 41%.
Ratinho Jr. maintains the competitiveness already seen when he lost by 45% to 40%, now scoring 41% against 47% for the current president.
Datafolha also tested the possible name of the former president against his successor, given that until his candidacy is rejected by the Electoral Court, Bolsonaro can campaign, like Lula, who was then imprisoned and ineligible, Fernando Haddad (PT). The institute proceeded in the same way that year.
Bolsonaro’s advantage fell during the period, which coincided with his conviction and imprisonment. It lost by 47% to 43%, and now by 49% to 40%. But the chances of him contesting the election are, on the visible horizon, nil.
Lula maintained his advantage, usual for those seeking re-election. Datafolha tested five scenarios, one of them with Jair Bolsonaro. Of the four that are feasible today, Flávio and his brother have the worst performance in the family clash against Lula.
The president scores 41% of preferences, compared to 18% for the senator, 12% for Ratinho Jr., 7% for governor Ronaldo Caiado (União Brasil-GO) and 6% for the head of the Executive of Minas, (Novo).
In the simulation in which Flávio gives way to Eduardo, who is currently in the United States in what he calls the persecution of his father, the result is identical.
When their stepmother enters the field, there is an improvement for the family: Lula continues with 41%, compared to 24% for Michelle, 10% for Ratinho Jr., 6% for Caiado and 5% for Zema.
In the configuration with Tarcísio as a candidate, Lula again has 41%, while the governor reaches 23%. Ratinho Jr. has 11%, Caiado, 6%, and Zema, 3%. Obviously, these scenarios presuppose total disunity on the right, making it feasible to assume that withdrawals can be incorporated into more viable candidacies.
It turns out that political logic does not foresee this, but rather waits for the second round to sell expensive alliances. In this sense, what stands out is the options for the final round.
Rejection
It is also made clear in the measured rejection of candidates, the second in the composition of the viability index of an electoral project.
The patriarch of the clan pontificates with 45% of voters who say they would never vote for him, tied with Lula, 44%, considering the margin of error. Without ever having contested a national election, however, senator Flávio, with 38%, deputy Eduardo, with 37%, and Michelle, with 35%, have already registered very high rejection rates.
Much further down come the right-wing governors, most of whom have reasonable to good ratings in their states, but are unknown at the federal level. Zema and Ratinho Jr. have a 21% rejection rate, Tarcísio has 20% and Caiado, 18%.
This all puts Bolsonaro’s choice into perspective, seen as a way of trying to keep his surname relevant, something doubtful day after day.
There is still a lot to be played, but for now the scenario favors Lula, although his high rejection and disapproval of 38%, compared to 32% of a stagnant approval in this round of Datafolha, are more than enough reasons to raise alerts in Planalto for the October 25, 2026 issue.
