For almost four years, The Russian invasion of Ukraine has involved a huge military effort, But recent figures reveal a heartbreaking balance: what Moscow has managed to achieve on Ukrainian soil is barely what it has demanded from its own country.
According to the most recent estimate from the British weekly The Economist, Russia has achievedsince the beginning of the invasion. In contrast, its cost in lives – and in men of military age – would be on the order of 1% of its pre-war male population.
These alarming proportions cThey turn the conflict into a brutal example of the so-called “metric of sacrifice”: many losses for very few kilometers gained. And it calls into question Moscow’s hopes for territorial expansion, especially when such advances are slow, sporadic and in many cases symbolic.
From 2022, The Russian advance has been paused. The figure of 1.45% corresponds to the net gain of Ukrainian territory in this period. Furthermore, in 2025 Russian forces would have captured some 4,562 square kilometers; In 2024 that figure had been 3,734 km².
Even with an apparent rebound in advances – in November 2025 they reached 690 km² in 30 days – progress still seems negligible throughout Ukrainian territory.
On the other hand, Russian “field casualties” are chilling: The Economist estimates that between 1 and 1.35 million soldiers have been killed or wounded since the beginning of the invasion. That figure potentially means that up to 1% of combat-age males in Russia have been victims of war.
What does this mismatch reveal?
First: the cost/benefit ratio of the Russian offensive turns out to be a big deficit for Moscow. A country that sends men to die—or become incapacitated—for marginal territorial gains. Is it worth the sacrifice? Many ethical and strategic questions and policies emerge when looking at the pure data.
Second: lThe war seems more about attrition than about conquest. Although the Russian forces continue trying to advance, each kilometer conquered costs them dozens or hundreds of lives. In such a scenario, real progress is minuscule and expensive. The human losses do not far outweigh the benefits.
Third and finally: maintaining this war at that cost implies a prolonged erosion of Russian society – not only military, but also demographic. That a relevant percentage of the male population of combat age has been lost speaks of a profound impact on generations, families and communities.
Although the data reflects some recent acceleration, The truth is that the captured territories are small.often rural areas, fields or territories without great urban density. There has not been, according to the analysis, the fall of any large city.
Even apparently important towns continue to resist: for example, the city of Pokrovsk – with about 61,000 inhabitants before the war – has been under siege by Russian troops for more than a year and is still not under total control.
In other terms: Russia has failed to consolidate a stable occupation of densely populated territories or strategic with a lower human cost. On the contrary: each meter gained requires an overwhelming sacrifice, without that territory offering a clear and lasting victory.
The war could last until 2028
If the current pace is maintained, fully conquer all the partially occupied eastern regions – such as Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson or Zaporizhzhia – It would take several more years. According to related calculations, taking the remaining 20,345 km² could prolong the war until May 2028.
The analysis of The Economist summarizes a harsh and unequivocal conclusion: Russian human losses do not correspond to the few gains on the ground. This imbalance reveals what many already suspected: that the invasion, seen objectively, is a strategic failure, at least in terms of territorial expansion.
