On the second day of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, one of President Vladimir Putin’s closest aides refused to follow his orders.
Putin had asked adviser Dmitry N. Kozak to demand Ukraine’s surrender, according to three people close to Kozak. Kozak refused, saying he did not understand what the Russian leader wanted to achieve with the invasion. As the conversation grew tense, Kozak told Putin he was willing to be arrested or even killed for not complying.
Only later did Kozak discover that Putin had put the call on speakerphone in 2022, according to the sources, causing senior officials in the presidential office to witness this rare moment of insubordination.
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Kozak was a lone voice of dissent in Putin’s inner circle, a small chink in the president’s tight control. With few people willing to challenge him, Putin maintained almost complete control over Russia’s conduct of the war. This partly explains why, almost four years later, the Russian leader maintains his tough demands even as pressure grows for a ceasefire.
Kozak, 67, resigned as Putin’s deputy chief of staff in September, a month after the The New York Times revealed his private criticisms of the war. In interviews since then, six Russians close to Kozak have told how a 30-year Putin confidant became a center of anti-war sentiment among the Russian elite. Most spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of retaliation for speaking about confidential Kremlin policy.
Kozak, the highest-ranking official to break with the president over the war, continues to live in Moscow. He worked with Putin in the 1990s, when they were both senior officials at St. Petersburg city hall, and believes his personal ties give him some protection, the sources said.
Kozak made no public criticism. An acquaintance of his, political analyst Arkady Dubnov, said Kozak refused to be interviewed for this article.
But Dubnov said events since the invasion on February 24, 2022, have only reinforced Kozak’s views. “His assessments, made to Putin on the eve of the start of the war, turned out to be frighteningly correct,” said Dubnov, who lives in Israel.
Not inner circle
Kozak’s hands shook as he took the pulpit. He explained, sometimes stuttering, why negotiations with Ukraine were not progressing. He said he had more to say, but Putin interrupted him.
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“I suppose we’ll talk about that later,” Kozak said.
It was February 21, 2022. In a televised Security Council meeting, Russia’s top officials supported Putin’s imminent invasion.
Kozak didn’t agree.
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He had known Putin longer than almost everyone in the room. He had previously managed Putin’s first re-election campaign, coordinated preparations for the 2014 Winter Olympics and overseen the integration of Crimea into Russia.
In early 2022, before the invasion, Kozak was negotiating with Ukraine about the proxy war in the east of the country. In January, he held an eight-hour meeting in Paris, which Ukraine called a “very positive sign.” Several former Ukrainian and American officials with knowledge of the negotiations believe Kozak was actually seeking a diplomatic solution, not just buying time as Russia prepared to invade.
As Putin massed troops, Kozak wrote a long memo pointing out the likely negative consequences of the war, according to his confidants. One person who saw the document said it warned of the possibility of Sweden and Finland joining NATO — a prediction that was confirmed.
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On February 21, Kozak spoke to the Security Council again, in a part of the meeting that was not broadcast, according to people close to him. The Ukrainians will resist, Kozak said. The sanctions will be tough. Russia’s position in the world will worsen.
Putin then asked everyone except Kozak and the permanent members of the Council to leave the room, according to the sources. He asked Kozak to repeat his arguments. Afterwards, he dismissed everyone except Kozak, who was still at the pulpit.
They stood alone under the vaulted ceiling of the Kremlin’s St. Catherine’s Hall, about 30 feet away.
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“What is that?” Putin asked Kozak, according to two people close to him. “Why are you against it?”
Kozak didn’t budge. It was the last time the two spoke before Russia began bombing Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, in the early hours of February 24.
Refusing an order
Some outlets reported that Kozak had called Andriy Yermak, Ukrainian President Volodimir Zelenski’s chief of staff, in the hours after the invasion, demanding Ukraine’s surrender.
Kozak has told several allies that this story is false. He claimed that it was Yermak who called him that day. Kozak wanted to work toward a peace agreement as quickly as possible, the sources said.
On the second day of the invasion, Kozak was negotiating a possible ceasefire with Davyd Arakhamia, another Ukrainian official, according to three people close to him. The deal would involve Russia guaranteeing Ukraine’s security and withdrawing troops from all parts of the country except Crimea and the Donbas region.
The negotiations angered Putin.
On the evening of February 25, Kozak briefed Putin on the Kremlin’s secure telephone, according to the sources.
Putin reprimanded Kozak for overstepping his mandate when discussing territorial issues and ordered Kozak to tell Ukraine that Russia would only negotiate surrender. For Kozak, Putin seemed to abruptly change his position. He said he could not negotiate if he did not know Russia’s ultimate goals.
Putin ignored these concerns and ordered Kozak to negotiate as instructed. Kozak refused. It was in that call that Kozak told Putin he was ready to be arrested or killed for his refusal, the sources said.
At the end of the tense call, Kozak agreed to inform Ukraine of Russia’s demand for surrender. He called Arakhamia, with Putin listening in silence. Arakhamia refused.
The following day, February 26, Putin’s position changed again, according to the sources. In the morning, Putin’s first deputy chief of staff, Sergei V. Kiriyenko, called Kozak and said that another Kremlin aide, Vladimir R. Medinsky, would take over negotiations with Ukraine.
That night, Medinsky and Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich went to Kozak’s house. They said they would go to Belarus to negotiate with Ukraine under Putin’s new mandate: to discuss security guarantees, but not Ukraine’s borders.
Representatives for Yermak, Arakhamia and Abramovich did not respond to requests for comment. The Kremlin also did not respond.
Challenging the system
Kozak never resumed his formal role in negotiations with Ukraine. He lost power to Kiriyenko, who this year took over Kozak’s portfolio to manage relations with other ex-Soviet countries.
But he didn’t lose his job. He maintained his office in the Soviet-era Presidential Administration building, a few blocks from the Kremlin, where he met with Western emissaries on parallel channels, according to several people familiar with the events. He smoked compulsively as they discussed possible peace plans. He said he maintained access to Putin, signaling that the Russian president was aware of these secret conversations.
At one point, the president suggested to Kozak that he present proposals to improve Russia’s economic climate. Several confidants who saw Kozak’s memo were surprised by it.
The document proposed that Putin stop the war, negotiate with Ukraine and promote internal liberal reforms. Kozak suggested that the Russian judiciary be independent of oversight of security agencies — an almost heretical idea given the power of the Russian security services.
Some confidants said they were surprised not only by the proposals, but also that he shared them outside the Kremlin, as Putin tends to keep everything secret. They said Kozak seemed concerned about his legacy and wanted to distance himself from Putin.
A confusing legacy
Dubnov, an acquaintance of Kozak in Israel, said Kozak believed “he worked for the state, and not for Putin’s personal interests.” The break between them, Dubnov said, came when Kozak realized, with the invasion, “that for Putin there are no limits that he is not willing to cross.”
“The price the country is paying for its leader’s great power ambitions has become unbearable” for Kozak, Dubnov said.
Like many in the Russian elite, Kozak remains loyal to Putin while avoiding public criticism. And Putin also demonstrated a certain loyalty to him.
Kozak traveled to Israel several times for medical treatment, as well as Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates. This showed Putin’s confidence, as he limited official travel during the war.
In September, Putin accepted Kozak’s resignation—remarkable, given that Putin prefers to keep his senior officials loyal by appointing them to positions without real function rather than letting them leave.
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