“The rumors about my death have been greatly exaggerated”, protested the American writer Mark Twain (1835-1910) in a note to the journalist who had published the “belly”.
The irony comes to mind when predictions about the fate of the current system of government — coalition presidentialism — multiply. With each tougher clash between the Executive and Congress, or with each measure taken by the Federal Supreme Court to exceed its powers, a —perhaps irreversible— crisis of our institutional arrangement is declared, a sure promise of ungovernability.
The most complete analyzes point to the possible loss of the Executive’s ability to dictate the legislative agenda. This weakness would be caused, either by the expansion of the powers of the Legislature, driven by parliamentary amendments and large resources from the Party Fund; be it also due to the immoderate expansion of .
The weakening of the Presidency and its inability to coordinate the other two Powers would be disarticulating the government’s gears, which would leave the country to God’s fate. The scenario contrasts with the period 1994–2014, when the predominance of the Executive would have provided functionality to the system, throughout the mandates of Fernando Henrique and Lula and also, at least, in the initial years of the first government of .
The diagnosis is one of institutional disarray indicating, in the opinion of some political scientists and the majority of respected press commentators, the exhaustion of multi-party presidentialism. Perhaps this conclusion is somewhat exaggerated, would say Mark Twain.
It is true that the Executive saw its instruments dwindling in order to keep the reins of its support coalition in Congress short. Nor will it be denied that the Supreme Court has become much more active, although always provoked by parties, social organizations, subnational governments or even in tune with the Palácio do Planalto.
But two factors that have little to do directly with the institutional design of the Republic make relations between the Executive and Legislative branches especially complicated in this period.
The first is the discrepancy between the preferences of the Executive, with its center-left agenda, in the face of a Congress with a conservative majority, with a strident far-right minority and less experienced leaders in both Houses. The second factor is the uncertainty ahead of the 2026 presidential elections, which affects the behavior of the pragmatic right, dominant in the Senate and Chamber: neither it breaks with the government nor embarks on Lula’s re-election plans.
In any case, despite the circumstances, Congress’s decisions do not endorse the diagnosis of ungovernability. Yes, the Executive suffered defeats and saw many of its vetoes overturned in 2025. But it has the prospect of important victories with the approval of the Income Tax reform — the largest redistributive program ever conceived in the country; with the National Education Plan; with the Anti-Faction Law project, all being processed; and , awaiting presidential sanction.
Coalition presidentialism, as old as Brazilian democracy, seems far from dying. He is transforming.
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