A new chapter of her war opened yesterday 2,000 kilometers away from the slaughterhouse of the Donbas front, in our neighborhood. The attack by Ukrainian drones in its heart against a tanker of the so-called “shadow fleet” through which it circumvents sanctions on oil exports, shows how close this war that sometimes seems far away is to us. It also shows how much the methods and tactics of warfare have changed in the 21st century with the massive use of those capable of tipping the balance of power between two or more adversaries, with military as well as psychological operations.
Swarm of drones
it did not sink the tanker, which was empty of cargo, but made it useless, as Kiev claims. The company’s video shows that it was not a single drone but a swarm, as explosions on the tanker are recorded from different angles, i.e. from cameras on different flying devices. The Ukrainians say the message is being sent to the Russians who are supporting the invasion war machine with oil revenues. But there are fatally other recipients, in the Mediterranean and beyond, both of the Ukrainian attack – which took place on the day of the crucial EU meeting – and of Moscow’s possible retaliation.
First of all, this attack moves the war climate from the Black Sea (where last week there were attacks on tankers) to the Mediterranean which rains many more countries. It further internationalizes the conflict, creates a climate of insecurity in the region (with a potential increase in insurance premiums as Russian President Putin has hinted), while casting a shadow over countries that could be held jointly responsible if it is proven that the drones were launched by one or more of them. Another, more likely version is that the drones did not take off but were dismounted, i.e. they were launched from a ship, war or commercial, even from a fishing vessel or boat, on which they could have been assembled.
“Cobweb”
A similar operation, but on land, codenamed “Spider’s Web”, was carried out last June by the secret service of Ukraine against bases of strategic bombers deep inside the territory of Russia (as far as Siberia and the Far East). The drones were transported near the bases in trucks. They were assembled on site and hit the bases causing damage to both military targets and Russia’s prestige. It is likely that in this operation, as well as in the blowing up of Russian natural gas pipelines in the Baltic in 2022, Western secret services also had a hand.
These kinds of asymmetric attacks are very difficult to prevent with the surveillance of sea areas by warships. Even if Russian tankers were equipped with countermeasures or accompanied by Russian warships, it is doubtful that there would be sufficient defense against drones in all cases, as the experience of the Red Sea showed (Houthi attacks that paralyzed shipping).
Besides, the escort by Russian warships would in practice nullify the concept of the “shadow fleet”, would have high costs and would create risks for misunderstandings and entanglements. Alas if Russian surface vessels and submarines present in the Mediterranean took action against ships suspected of carrying Ukrainian drones.
The circulation of the above scenarios is a success for the Ukrainian secret services at the level of psychological operations, but it may backfire. The last thing the governments and peoples in the Mediterranean countries would want would be for the war to move from the trenches of Ukraine to their own shores and seas.
