From the point of view of the narratives, Lula received a gift from the United States with the end of sanctions against Alexandre de Moraes, and this should give him an important advantage. On the other hand, he will need to demonstrate a lot of ability to deal with the political cost of governing, especially in an election year, in which interlocutors have their own agendas and interests.
and approved the call, which changes the way sentences are applied to those convicted of the January 8 attacks. In the Senate, the proposal passed by 48 votes to 25 and reduces punishment by preventing, in certain cases, the sum of crimes such as coup d’état and violent abolition of the democratic rule of law, in addition to providing reductions for those who did not organize or finance the acts. Lula has already signaled a veto and, if he does, Congress could still overturn the decision.
In the plenary, the project is described as a “correction of excesses” by some and a “shortcut to impunity” by others. In the more than 100,000 public Telegram groups monitored in real time by , among the messages that take a position on dosimetry, around 86% advocate easing sentences, almost always alleging “persecution” and “injustice”, with calls for “amnesty”. The rejection of the measure, close to 14%, appears anchored in the motto “no amnesty” and the idea that reducing penalties normalizes the attempt at institutional rupture.
The government’s conflict with the government increases the political cost of negotiations, a price that will rise even further in 2026 as it is an election year. Furthermore, any movement needs to take into account the fact that, in order to have governability in a next term, Lula depends on the construction of a more aligned Senate. The opposition also knows this, increasing the pressure for the political approach to prove correct.
If the national scenario brings challenges, foreign policy does not alleviate either, and the president needs to deal with the situation. In December, operations intensified in the Caribbean and began intercepting oil tankers leaving Venezuela, in a strategy that the government describes as a blockade of oil trade linked to the Venezuelan regime. From the Venezuelan side, accusations of “piracy” and promises to take the dispute to international forums came.
In this context, it has a rare opportunity to build bridges and become an interlocutor in a conflict that involves oil, migration and democracy. However, if it fails or appears hostage to one side, it loses credibility, and this could have an effect on government approval. Foreign policy, which usually yields little electoral agenda, is a political trap if a failure in negotiations results in war.
Palver data shows that, among the messages that take a position on Venezuela, around 77% react with vocabulary of “sovereignty” and “imperialism”, targeting the USA; the other 23% support Trump and treat Maduro’s fall as a desirable outcome. However, it is important to highlight that the vast majority do not take a position, but only share headlines, videos and rumors, the perfect scenario for any well-constructed narrative to have a radical impact on public opinion.
The combination of the two agendas will bring a lot to Lula and his team. On the one hand, Congress signals that negotiations in 2026 will be more expensive and more tense, because sensitive issues become currency for pressure. On the other hand, the Venezuelan crisis could elevate Brazil to a mediation role that it has not played for years, but also serve to undermine the popularity of the Lula government. The consequences of the decisions taken should not be immediate, but miscalculations on these issues can be very costly from an electoral point of view.
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