Iranian Supreme Leader Office/ EPA
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranian Supreme Leader
Isolated internationally, with the population protesting in the streets again and with a Trump motivated by the recent success in ousting Maduro, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei could be the next leader to be attacked by the US.
Perhaps no one outside of Venezuela or Cuba should care more about the U.S. capture of nominal president Nicolás Maduro than the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ali Khamenei.
Khamenei and his regime are in trouble, and it is unclear how they would survive if the Trump administration decides to support the millions who want a new system of government without Khamenei and his followers.
Iran has no state allies willing to intervene militarily in your favor. Furthermore, its once-powerful network of partner and allied militias – Lebanese Hezbollah, Houthi rebels in Yemen and other members of the Axis of Resistance – has become unable or unwilling to engage. And the Iranian economy is in ruins amid an ongoing water crisis, with no prospect of a solution.
Furthermore, the Iranian people returned to the streets to voice their grievances against harsh economic conditions as well as government corruption, mismanagement and hypocrisy, echoing conditions similar to those in Venezuela in recent years. Finally, President Donald Trump turned his attention to Iran. On January 2, Trump warned Khamenei that if his forces violently crack down on protesters, Iran will be “hard hit” by the US.
Trump’s warning and show of solidarity will likely embolden protesters, which will almost certainly lead to an even greater crackdown by Iranian internal security, as has happened in the past. Such US intervention could lead to the overthrow of the ayatollah, whether intentional or not. Furthermore, Maduro’s fate demonstrates that the Trump administration is willing to use military force for this purpose, if deemed necessary.
These conditions place Khamenei’s regime under greater threat today than perhaps at any other time in its 46-year history.
Growing threats, internal and external
If Khamenei hopes to survive politically or mortally, there are three options.
First, it could give in to US demands to halt Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. Second, Iran could rush to produce a nuclear bomb. Lastly, I could run away.
In hopes of restoring deterrence, Khamenei could also continue to rebuild his country’s military capabilities, which were significantly damaged during the 12-day war in June 2025, in which Israel and the US aimed destroy Iranian nuclear capabilities.
Israel is eager to stifle Iran’s reconstitution plans, protests are spreading and intensifying, and Trump – through hostile rhetoric and offensive military actions – has warned Khamenei.
Khamenei’s problems are not his alone. The revolutionary theocratic system of government he leads runs the risk of collapsing. And its military and homeland security apparatus may not have the time or capacity to simultaneously deal with growing and interrelated internal and external threats.
There are two fundamental factors that analysts consider when evaluating enemy threats: offensive capabilities to inflict damage and hostile intentions to use those capabilities to harm enemies.
Determining offensive capacity implies assess the quality of the complete arsenal of a country or organization – air, land, sea, cyber and space capabilities – and how trained, disciplined, integrated and lethal its forces can be. Determining intentions involves assessing whether, when and under what conditions offensive capabilities will be used to achieve their objectives.
If states hope to survive when subjected to such pressure, their defense strategy must take into account the differences between their own military capabilities and that of the enemy, especially if the enemies intend to attack. Or states need to convince enemies to be less hostile, if possible.
Maduro’s mistake was his inability to defend yourself against vastly superior American military capability, while also believing that American leaders would not remove him from office. Maduro bet and lost.
Bad choices
Iran’s supreme leader faces a similar dilemma: first, there is no predictable path that allows Tehran to produce or acquire the military capabilities necessary to deter Israel or defeat the United States, unless Iran develops a nuclear weapon.
Decades of mutual hostility, the memory of Iran’s once-clandestine nuclear weapons program and recent calls by Iranian parliamentarians for the development of nuclear bombs minimize the possibility that American leaders will see Khamenei’s intentions as anything more than hostile.
But as the clearly weaker party, it is in Tehran’s interest to change Trump’s mind about the country’s hostile intentions. The way to do this would be to abandon uranium enrichment.
In terms of threat analysis, the regime’s oft-repeated cries of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel” have perhaps sent an easily misinterpreted message: that Iran’s hostile leaders intend to destroy the US and Israel. But simply do not have this capacityfor now.
President Theodore Roosevelt once said, “Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.” Today, he could say that Khamenei acted recklessly by expressing himself with such virulence, considering the power of Iran. The United States and Israel have military capabilities far superior to Iran’s – as demonstrated by the Twelve Day War – but, at that time, they did not share the same intention. Although Israeli and US operations were aimed at neutralizing Iran’s nuclear program, Israel’s objectives were broader and included targeting senior Iranian leaders and destabilizing the regime.
Fortunately for Khamenei, both personally and institutionally, Trump immediately called for a ceasefire following US B-2 bomber strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities, outlining the United States’ narrower objectives, which, at the time, did not include regime change in Iran.
But this occurred before US forces removed Maduro from Caracas and before protests began in Iran, both coinciding with Israel’s preparations for a second round of hostilities against Iran.
Will they go without Khamenei?
During the Dec. 29 press conference at Mar-a-Lago with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Trump warned that the U.S. could “beating up” Iran if the country reactivated its nuclear facilities.
This is different from the ominous warning that the US could intervene on behalf of Iranian protesters; it would certainly be on a different scale.
However, possible US intervention could embolden protesters and further undermine and destabilize the Islamic Republic’s regime. Khamenei, predictably, mocked and dismissed Trump’s warning.
It could be a serious mistake.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned on January 3, 2025 that Khamenei should not “play dirty” as Maduro did. Khamenei, Rubio said, should take Trump’s warnings seriously.
If Iran refrains from violently cracking down on protesters, there is a possibility that anti-government protests could topple the government. But the odds that the supreme leader survive a popular uprising are probably greater than surviving an unrestrained American or Israeli army determined to establish a new post-Islamic Republic Iran.
Otherwise, Khamenei will have to quickly deal with US and Israeli military superiority. But Iran is bankrupt, and even if sanctions weren’t continually strangling the Iranian economy, the country would likely never achieve military parity with the US or Israel.
Alternatively, Iran may conclude that it needs quickly develop a nuclear weapon to mitigate American and Israeli military capabilities and deter future aggression. However, it is extremely unlikely that Iran will be able to do so without American and Israeli intelligence discovering the project, which would immediately trigger an overwhelming military campaign that would likely accelerate regime change in Iran.
E, just like Maduro, or supreme leader is completely alone. None of Maduro’s closest partners – China, Russia, Cuba and even Iran – were willing to fight in his defense, despite weeks of warnings and an increase in the US military presence near Venezuela.
Under these circumstances, it may be impossible for Khamenei to deal with the overwhelming military capabilities of the US and Israel. It could, however, reduce the threat by doing what is necessary to ensure that the United States’ objectives toward Iran remain narrow and focused on its nuclear program, which could also keep Israel in check.
However, Khamenei would have to demonstrate unprecedented restraint, avoiding violently repressing protesters, and a willingness to abandon uranium enrichment. Due to historical animosity and distrust towards the US, both things are unlikelyincreasing the likelihood of a future Iran without Khamenei.
