“Ato “turn it” if it collapses” says in “Vima” o Vali Nasran Iranian-American professor at the Johns Hopkins University Graduate School of International Studies in Washington, D.C., “then the balance of power in the region changes in ways that will not benefit Moscow and Beijing”.
In your latest book “Iran’s Grand Strategy: A Political History” (Princeton University Press, 2025) emphasize the regime’s pragmatic character, while the dominant reading in the West is that of ideological rigidity, if not outright fundamentalism. To what do you attribute this misunderstanding?
“I think this is a real problem because the West and especially the US is very comfortable with simplistic, black and white images. Yes, Iran is an Islamic Republic that emerged from an ideological revolution, but its primary concern is state consolidation, not revolutionary zeal. and act on it. They are driven by a specific national security vision, very similar to Putin’s.
Iran, like Russia, sees itself as a strong regional power to be respected. This perspective is deeply rooted in Iranian history and politics. I believe that after Khamenei, neither the political class nor the Iranian people will abandon the perception of Iran as a great power or the US as an adversary that denies it legitimate rights.
These are deeply rooted notions in Iranian politics, in the bureaucracy, in the intellectual elites of Iran, with roots in the early 20th century. The major criticism of the Islamic Republic is that it has created a situation in which Iran underperforms. He doesn’t live up to his full ambitions and has managed to get the entire world trying to stop him from achieving his greatness.”
I would like to dwell a little more on how Iranians see themselves. In the West we often perceive Iran as a backward society, heavily subjugated to religion…
“Iran is a very sophisticated society in many ways. For example, Iran’s leading university of technology is ranked among the best in the world, especially in its electrical engineering programs. In Iran today there is essentially a domestic version of Amazon and Uber, its financial system is fully digital, there are advanced production lines in many sectors because it cannot import many things. Russian interest in Iran is partly because the Russians wanted knowledge of how a complex economy under sanctions works.
I would also add that Iranian society is now de facto secular, in two senses. Firstly in the sense that even within the bureaucracy and the Revolutionary Guards there is a degree of pragmatism.. These tasks are not based on religion, but on pragmatic decision-making and often a technocratic mindset.
Iranians have also become secular in the sense that they believe in the de facto separation of religion and state. Moreover, there are now many Iranians who are openly secular, especially among the younger, urbanized generations, because they have lived under the rule of religion and their cultural worldview has become strongly secular.
One of the things that became apparent in the headscarf protests a few years ago and again after the 12-Day War with Israel is that much of Iranian society has moved beyond religion and the Islamic Republic, to such an extent that the regime can no longer control it. In this sense, Iranian society is extremely dynamic and has a great influence on political developments, because ultimately the state will have to reflect where the society is if it wants to survive, especially under external pressure.”
How close has Tehran come to Moscow and Beijing?
“We hear that China and Russia are aggressively helping Iran rebuild its defenses. But actually, I think Iran doesn’t need, like Saudi Arabia, to be given whole systems. He can build them.
What it needs is technology and capabilities to do it, especially in the field of missiles. From China, for example, perhaps better electronics technology was needed, as well as solid fuels which the Chinese apparently provided. The Russians, for their part, provide Iran with critical technology and components, whatever they can afford that they do not use in Ukraine themselves.
Why? . This is imperative for their strategic calculations and is especially true for Russia, which considers Central Asia and the Caucasus as its “neighborhood”. If the US turns on Iran, if Iran collapses, then the balance of power in West Asia changes in ways that will not benefit Moscow and Beijing.”
In terms of intra-regime dynamics, do you think the hardliners still have the upper hand?
“I think those in the upper echelons of the regime are concerned with two main questions. First, how do you defend the country? And secondly, why did you end up where you did?
but the scope of the debate around it, on which it must achieve consensus, is now larger. And he’s not the toughest. It is actually the most conservative element. On a strategic level, he and the ruling elite believe they have been vindicated as to the intentions of the US and Israel vis-à-vis Iran – regime change. On the other hand, they realized that at the tactical level the proxy strategy (Hezbollah, Hamas) failed, while the missile strategy did not.”
