The United States operation in Venezuela on January 3, which ended with the arrest of the country’s former president, , and his wife, , has opened the doors to a . For now, Washington is leading the way – “I’m in charge,” summarizes US President Donald Trump – and keeping Chavismo in power, via .
Although he always used drug trafficking as an excuse, perhaps immigration, it has become clear that the magnate was looking for the natural resources of Venezuela and that is why the first thing he has done was make lucrative agreements for his country. However, no one knows how this thing called transition is going to develop, in which there are no free elections and the opposition is sidelined – even if they give it free -.
Last week, the American Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, announced to manage the country’s vast oil reserves from Washington. In addition to overseeing production and sales, he also suggested that the US would control the allocation of revenue from oil sales, stating that this would ensure that the revenue benefits the Venezuelan population and not the corrupt powerful. Since oil accounts for the majority of Venezuela’s public revenue, this would give Washington decisive influence over the country’s budget priorities.
This “tax syndicate”
Following these declared plans, Washington political scientists Oliver Stuenkel and Adrian Feinberg have published an analysis in which they review how the lessons of the “fiscal intervention” of the early 20th century should serve as a warning for the Caribbean. And its conclusion is not positive for Trump: “The US plan for Venezuela has a precedent… and it is not good,” they say from the title.
“The Administration’s plan for Venezuela represents a radical change with respect to the US regime change operations of the last eight decades. It reflects neither the ideological motivations of the Cold War nor the democratic idealism that shaped subsequent interventions,” they point out. Instead, the Republican’s vision of “low-cost extraction – managing the sale and revenue of Venezuelan oil without administrators or US troops on the ground – seems to revive a much older model: the fiscal receivership.”
But what is that? It is an approach, pioneered by the president in the early 20th century, that offers a set of instructive historical precedents as Washington “embarks on a potentially risky experiment in Venezuela,” they say. What happened then?
- Between 1904 and the 1930s, the US oversaw fiscal receiverships in several Latin American and Caribbean countries, particularly the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Panama. These agreements did not amount to formal protectorates, but often functioned as such in practice.
- American officials assumed control of key revenue sources—usually customs, which at the time were the main source of state revenue—and, in some cases, also exercised authority over domestic taxation and budgeting.
- Local governments retained nominal sovereignty and formal political institutions, but decisions about revenue collection, debt service, and public spending increasingly flowed through Washington.
US President Donald Trump at a ceremony honoring the Florida Panthers, ice hockey Stanley Cup champions, on January 15, 2026 in Washington.
The previous experiments
The two analysts explain that the Dominican Republic It was the “first big test” of this model. In 1905, faced with chronic political instability and concerns about European intervention regarding unpaid debts, the Roosevelt administration took control of the Dominican customs. The agreement initially managed to reorganize the external debt and restore fiscal order in the short term. “However, the underlying political problems remained unresolved.”
By 1916, renewed instability and armed conflict led to a full military occupation by the United States, which would last until 1924. “The lesson was clear: controlling revenues did not prevent domestic actors from mobilizing alternative sources of financing or eliminate political fragmentation,” they write.
Cuba and Haitifor their part, “involved even more intrusive versions of fiscal control.” Following a controversial election and rebellion in Cuba in 1906, the United States installed a provisional government that led the country for more than two years. “Despite their broad authority, American administrators failed to achieve lasting fiscal improvements,” they note, again. “Corruption persisted and US officials frequently tolerated clientelistic networks to maintain political stability.”
In Haiti in particular, following the 1915 intervention and subsequent occupation, an American financial advisor became the final authority on the national budget. The agreement generated intense popular resistance (including a peasant rebellion in 1919), failed to increase income and left the country in a politically fragile situation after the withdrawal of US forces in 1934, they explain.
“Coercion alone could not generate stability or legitimacy”
“Cases based on formal cooperation did not fare better.” Examples: Nicaragua and Panama. “US tax advisors were invited by local governments seeking stability and international credibility. However, historical studies show that, on average, countries under US fiscal oversight did not experience sustained increases in public revenues,” the think tank article states.
“In some cases, revenues declined. The promise that external technocratic oversight would produce ‘good governance’ proved illusory. Equally important, American investors – often seen as the main beneficiaries – rarely made long-term profits.” And beyond sporadic debt payments, American companies “faced hostile and unstable political environments that undermined durable investments and inflicted reputational costs.”
As there were no successes, by the 1930s, Washington abandoned the model. Under the , the US took another path and “formally renounced armed intervention and withdrew from fiscal administrations, recognizing that governing foreign finances from a distance was politically costly and economically ineffective. Coercion alone could not generate stability or legitimacy.”
Front pages of newspapers in the United Kingdom, with the capture of Nicolás Maduro on a full page, in a newsstand in Somerset, on January 4, 2026.
The current context
“The Trump administration’s plan for Venezuela must be evaluated in this context,” understand Feinberg and Stuenkel. “Trump faces limitations similar to those that limited Roosevelt,” they maintain.
“In the early 20th century, the memory of the Philippine-American War (1899-1902, followed by a protracted insurgency) reduced American public support for prolonged occupations abroad. Today, the legacies of also limit national tolerance for long-term foreign entanglements. However, without a sustained presence, administrative capacity, and political legitimacy on the ground, the prospects for reform of the Venezuelan oil sector remain uncertain, especially in an environment marked by corruption, institutional fragility and the risk of a new conflict,” they argue.
History does not necessarily repeat itself, of course, which is why they point out that Venezuela in 2026 is not the Caribbean of 1906, nor is the US the same. However, these precedents are nevertheless “instructive” in the face of today’s scenarios. They can help prevent, understand.
Fiscal administrations of the early 20th century offered “the illusion of control” but “failed to resolve structural problems, stabilize policy, or generate lasting economic benefits, either for the countries involved or for American investors.” There remains, then, a “recurring lesson”: that “even hegemonic powers face strong limitations when attempting to manage the political economy of other states from a distance, generating anti-American sentiment and mutual support effects.”
The article calls Trump’s request to make significant investments in Venezuela “lukewarm” and that “suggests that they are aware of the long-term risks involved, especially considering Venezuela’s history of institutional volatility and abrupt nationalization.”
“As Washington embarks on its most ambitious experiment in hemispheric control in decades, these harsh lessons from the past deserve special attention,” they conclude.
