After two weeks of protests in the central slogan “death to the dictator”, militiamen allied with the Revolutionary Guards and armed with automatic weapons stormed the crowds in swarms of motorcycles. With the help of snipers, they targeted and shot thousands of their fellow citizens. Morgues are overflowing and bodies in bags are piled on bloody sidewalks. The dead are estimated at several thousand, as well as the wounded, even more arrested.
For many inside and outside Iran, the time has come to end the theocratic regime’s 47 years of rule. However, protests alone do not end tyranny, as historical experience has shown. Revolutions presuppose, among other things, the existence of an alternative power — and in this case, if the regime collapses, there is no clear answer as to who might succeed it.
This leadership deficit is a perennial problem of the Iranian protest movement. Despite repeated mass uprisings in 2009-10, 2017-18, 2019-20 and 2022-23, the opposition has failed to assemble an organized leadership to offer a clear alternative to the regime. The deep divisions that have run through it for decades remain a decisive factor in failure.
Return of Pahlavi?
In this vacuum, the son of the shah who was deposed in 1979 after nearly four decades in power, has emerged as the most recognizable opposition figure abroad. At gatherings of Iranians in the diaspora around the world, many hold up pictures of him, while he presents himself as the undisputed leader of the opposition, pointing out that even protesters inside the country are chanting pro-monarchy slogans. On Friday (16/1), speaking from Washington, he said he was ready to return to Iran.
However, despite his recognition, Pahlavi does not seem to have a coherent continuity plan. It is unclear whether his calls for strikes have resonated widely, while his claims of mass defections from security forces have not been proven. Moreover, although it appears to have some support on the streets, it lacks the organized networks at home necessary for long-term political consolidation.
A divisive figure in the opposition
At the same time, Reza Pahlavi has until recently been “anything but a unifying figure for the Iranian opposition,” as The Atlantic magazine writes. Instead of bringing the regime’s opponents together around a common agenda, his camp is pitted against the Islamic Republic’s non-monarchist opponents. Indicatively, even in the current protests, in order to focus exclusively on pro-monarchy slogans such as “Javid Shah” (“Long Live the Shah”), supporters are dismissing the 2022 movement’s slogan “Women, Life, Freedom” as a distraction. Pahlavi himself removed the phrase from his social media profiles last week. At the same time, he has repeatedly called on Donald Trump for military intervention in Iran, implying that his strategy depends on outside intervention.
An opposition without a united front
As the Washington Post points out, Pahlavi has emerged as a dominant figure in the opposition mainly due to the absence of strong alternatives. High-profile liberal leaders such as 2023 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Nargis Mohammadi and former minister Mostafa Tajadeh are in prison. Along with 15 other figures, they called on January 2nd for a “peaceful transition” from the regime, but without the visibility or organizing ability required under detention. At the same time, non-monarchist forces in the diaspora remain fragmented, often spending more time criticizing Pahlavi than building their own structures.
Attempts to create a united front have so far failed. The coalition of prominent diaspora figures formed in 2023 fell apart in less than two months, due to infighting, a lack of strategy and a strong backlash from Pahlavi’s support base. Poll-wise, Iranian society appears divided: about a third support him, another third reject him and the rest remain undecided, with lower acceptance in ethnic minority areas such as Kurds, Azeris or Baluchis, according to experts.
At the same time, the Islamic Republic is showing serious signs of decline. But analysts agree that, despite the deep crisis, the collapse of the regime cannot result from violence or mass discontent alone. Without a unifying, pluralist coalition and without rifts in the security forces, the overthrow of the Islamic Republic remains uncertain. “The critical question is not only the end of the existing system, but whether something can emerge that reflects the expectations and will of Iranian society,” concludes the Atlantic.
