Dimitris Stamatopoulos, professor at the Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies of the University of Macedonia, explains the recent events in “Vima” based on the particular dynamics that have developed in its history. At the center is the relationship between Iran and , as the two countries express two alternative ways of taking on the same challenges. The relationship with Turkey is also of particular importance for the future of Iran after the last crisis, as its attitude towards the possible destabilization of Iran is expected to affect relations in .
In your latest work (Nation and Empire. Comparative History of the Empires of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, published by Kallipos, Athens, 2025) you make, among other things, a comparison of Turkey and Iran.
In the 16th century, the formation of the Persian Safavid Empire (1501-1736), which unified an area from Baghdad to the lands of present-day Afghanistan and Pakistan, served as a major rival to the Ottoman Empire. The conflict between the two empires had an ideological character. The Ottoman Empire projected itself as the defender of Sunni Islam, while the Safavid Empire established Shia Islam as the dominant religion in Persia. It is interesting that in the same century Roman Catholics and Protestants clashed in Europe and, on the other, Sunnis and Shiites in the Middle East.
The path of the two Islamic empires was not the same, as the Ottomans lasted until the beginning of the 20th century, when the modern state of Kemalist Turkey emerged. In contrast, the lands of Safavid Iran were divided between the Ottomans and Russians in the 17th century. After all, the two nation-states of Turkey and Iran, which arose out of the two empires, were also established more or less at the same time. That is, Kemalist Turkey from 1923 onwards, while in exactly the same period Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925-1941), the father of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1941-1979) who was expelled by the Iranian revolution of 1979, constitutes modern Iran. As officer-in-charge of a Cossack brigade under Russian supervision, he occupied Tehran in 1921, overthrew the previous dynasty and established his own, which lasted until 1979.
What are the parallels between Kemalist Turkey and Iran in the 20th century?
The key similarity is that Kemalist Turkey and Iran incorporated Islamic populations. Modern Turkey was the refuge of expelled Muslims from the Balkans, but also the Middle East and the Caucasus in the 19th and 20th centuries. Quite similarly, in Pahlavi Persia Persian nationalism incorporated many other groups. Today’s Iran is actually a multi-ethnic state. Only about 61% are of Persian origin, while a 16% are Azeri, about 10% Kurds, 6% Lur, from about 2% Baluch, Arab, Turkmen, while there are also Armenians, Assyrians and other ethnicities.
It is very interesting that Pahlavi in 1935 asked the “League of Nations” to rename his state from Persia to Iran. What’s the difference: the term “Persia” comes from a southern region of present-day Iran, Pars. This is the area that is located approximately opposite the Straits of Hormuz. This is where the name of the language “Farsi” comes from.
“Iran”, however, means something different, it is the “land of the Aryans”, i.e. the land of the Indo-Europeans. Of course, not everyone is “Aryan” – e.g. Azeris are not exactly Aryans. However, Persians, Kurds, Baluchs, Lurs and others are considered as Indo-Europeans, so the name “Iran” ideologically includes more populations and not only Persians.
There is, however, an even more inclusive identity and that is Shiism which accounts for 94% of the population. Shia Islam is, therefore, a cultural core that has held Iran together despite ethnic differentiation. In fact, through Shiism, Iran retains the ability to influence the Azeris in neighboring Azerbaijan as well. The equivalent in Turkey was the modern concept of “Turkishness” as a haven for disparate Muslim populations.
In both countries they received at the same time Kemalism and Pahlavi programs of harsh authoritarian urban modernization from above. Here, however, begin the significant differences in the parallel lives of the two countries. In Turkey, already in Adnan Menderes (prime minister 1950-1960) we find pro-Muslim elements that do not align with the harder line of Kemalism, while with Necmetin Erbakan (prime minister 1996-1997), we have a kind of political Islam, which will be continued later by Recep Tayyip Erdogan (2003 and following).
In Iran we also have a similar contrast. But, unlike in Turkey, it comes from the clergy. This is due to the difference between Sunni and Shiite Islam. Usually in Sunni countries religious officials, such as muftis (interpreters of the Koran for the administration of justice), are integrated into state administrative structures, having more of a jurisprudential role. On the contrary, in Shia Islam the clergy has always been autonomous from the state and political power.
In Iran the conflict between the Shiite clergy and the secular regime had been initiated by Father Pahlavi as early as the 1930s, when an attempt was made to abolish the headscarf and change family law. By the way, the women’s movement to abolish the headscarf in Iran is very old, it already exists in 1936.
But how did the religious radicalism of the Shiite clergy turn into political radicalism in Iran?
The oil issue was important. The difference between Turkey and Iran is also revealing here. When Turkey gave up Mosul and Kirkuk to British control, everyone thought the Turks were the big losers. They actually won. Because in the countries where the British knew, already at the beginning of the 20th century, that there was oil, such as in Iran and northern Iraq, they imposed colonial conditions of exploitation.
The Anglo-Persian Oil Company, i.e. what we know today as BP (British Petroleum), had imposed a control on Iranian oil, where only 16% was attributed to the Iranian state and the rest to the company. First Reza Shah Pahlavi himself tried to increase it to 21% in favor of the Iranian state. The British fought back and a compromise was found, but again in favor of the British.
And, as we know, in the years of the second Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, we had the attempt of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh to nationalize Iran’s oil in 1951. But two years later the British together with the Americans will lead a coup, which will also have the support of Shah Pahlavi against his prime minister. This was a key point, a turning point.
And indeed eight years later, in 1961, we have the first major uprising against the regime, which will be mediated mainly by clerics of the mosques and the figure of Ruhollah Mousavi Khomeini will emerge, who was exiled to Iraq and, finally, to Paris. But although exiled, he will play a very important role in organizing and directing the revolutionary activities against the Shah.
It is important, for understanding Iran, to understand the osmosis between religious and political radicalism, which led to the political hegemony of the ayatollahs after the revolution of 1979. There was, of course, another historical mistake of the West: the revolution was not allowed to develop, but Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was supported in its attack on Iran. But when a regime is subjected to an aggressive strategy by a neighboring state, then it is not likely to fall but, on the contrary, to be established in an even stronger way.
So, recapitulating the comparison between Turkey and Iran, we would say that two nation-states in the Middle East that emerged from large empires, essentially through the consequences of the First World War, followed programs of urban modernization from above, which were not accepted by, to a large extent, rural and marginalized populations. The difference lies in the different type of political mediation in Turkey and Iran: political Islamic parties of mild Islam in Turkey, radicalized clerical groups with osmosis of political and religious radicalism in Iran.
Do you think the overthrow of the Islamic Republic of Iran would be accompanied by strong separatist movements? And what is Turkey’s reaction to a similar event today?
Mainly under the umbrella of the Kurds and the Baluch, separatist movements are currently developing. A separatist movement of the Kurds in Iran would cause a big problem in Turkey and that is why Ankara is watching with great concern and reservation the possibility of destabilization of Iran.
Starting with the Kurdish issue, Erdogan has changed the Turkish defense doctrine. While in the classic Kemalist era, from Ataturk to the first Gulf War, Turkey’s doctrine was defensive, i.e. non-involvement in the issues of neighboring countries, under Erdogan we have a new doctrine of Turkish involvement everywhere, even military for the purpose of control.
Turkey is certainly keeping a close eye on the movements of the Kurds in Iran. In any case, the more general hesitations and dilemmas regarding dynamic actions regarding the regime of the ayatollahs are also connected to the concern caused in Turkey by the prospect of destabilizing Iran centered on the Kurdish issue.
Is there a “Venezuelan recipe” in Iran?
Trump’s refusal to support Reza Pahlavi as a successor situation points in this direction. It seems like a repetition of the logic that followed in Venezuela with the rejection of Corina Machado. But the religious nature of the Iranian regime makes it very difficult to distance oneself from its steadfast politics without being considered a traitor. In Venezuela, Vice President Delsy Rodríguez, as the daughter of a famous 1980s activist from whom Chávez was inspired, has considerable moral capital. In Iran, something similar is difficult. Essentially, the dilemma for the regime is either to somehow absorb the new educated elites, or to cross a red line of violent repression after which it will collapse. What will come next, however, is unclear. Many of the alternatives are illegal. A possible breakup of the country along ethnic lines is being discussed. We must not forget, however, that the country is not called “Persia”, i.e. the country of the Persians, but since 1935 it has been called “Iran”, i.e. a country that includes a multitude of “Aryan” ethnicities.
