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When China faced Trump’s tariffs in 2025, it retaliated with force, fought a trade war with commercial weapons, managed to absorb the impact and return it. Europe’s position, with countries that differ in their exposure to the US market and their dependence on NATO, is different.
European negotiators believed they had guaranteed stability in July 2025, in the midst of global trade turbulence triggered by the famous “liberation day” the Donald Trump.
It entailed the elimination of tariffs on American products, the purchase of US energy and a commitment to American investment. But six months later, when the US president made it clear what they were in relation to Greenland, .
Trump has now threatened to apply Europeans, including the United Kingdom. Tariffs penalize countries that sent military to Greenland in support of Danish sovereignty.
The North American president stated that they will be applied 10% rates to all goods from the eight countries entering the US from February 1st, rising to 25% on June 1st, until you can buy the territory.
Curiously, this is not an aberrationsay economics professors at Aston University Jun Du e Oleksandr Shepotyloin an opinion article published in .
The USA offered to buy Greenland in 1946. And before that they bought the Alasca (in 1867, to Russia), the Florida (in 1821, to Spain) and Louisiana (in 1803, to France).
What is different now is the coercion mechanism – tariffs instead of a negotiated price – which the US president is using.
Greenland offers Arctic deposits and a strategic location from a military point of view. The anti-missile defense system “Golden Dome“Trump’s” needs more than military bases – it requires sovereign control to install classified systems without Danish supervision.
It’s the same logic that led to pressure on Panama to renegotiate US control of the canal, which demonstrated that existing agreements are not sufficient – Washington wants exclusive control.
Tariff threats serve multiple purposes: punish countries that have shown solidarity with Denmark, test whether economic pressure can fracture NATO from within and, of course, generate revenue.
US tariff revenue reached US$264 billion in 2025, US$185 billion more than in 2024, after the new tariffs came into force. This is an unexpected gain that transforms dependent allies in terms of security, unable to retaliate, on reliable payers.
The usual strategy won’t work
When a China faced tariffs in 2025, retaliated with force. China targeted soy of the swing states, restricted rare earths with new export licenses and delayed regulatory approvals for North American technology companies. Beijing managed to absorb the impact and return it.
It was a trade war fought with commercial weapons. Europe’s position is different. Brussels is now debating the anti-coercion instrument – the so-called “commercial bazooka”, or, as ZAP called it, the “” of the EU: the Anti-Coercion Instrumento, the most powerful retaliatory trade tool of the European economic bloc.
This law gives the EU the ability to respond to economic blackmail from a non-EU country and overlaps with trade agreements existing. In practice, this could restrict US companies from accessing public contracts and impose retaliatory tariffs on 93 billion euros of American products.
But the EU requires unanimity for serious trade retaliation, and Member States differ widely in their exposure to the North American market and NATO security dependence. Any serious escalation risks the guarantee of safety, a limitation that China has never faced.
And these tariffs aren’t really about trade. Fight one territorial objective com commercial weapons it’s using the wrong tools for the job. If the commercial diplomacy cannot resolve a territorial problem, what can it do?
A conventional strategy offers escalating retaliation—measured responses or catastrophic threats designed to deter a rational actor. But this assumes that the opponent is not playing a game in which the the Anti-Coercion Instrument, the European economic bloc’s most powerful retaliatory trade tool. is the goal.
Given these limitations, Du and Shepotylo identified five options for Europe. None of them are comfortable.
1. Accept the new reality
Treating US tariffs as a permanent feature of transatlantic trade rather than a disruption to be negotiated. Incorporate them into business planning and stop spending political capital in agreements that are unlikely to be maintained.
2. Diversify faster
The one signed in the same week between Brussels and the South American commercial bloc it wasn’t a coincidence. It was agreed knowing that higher US tariffs were a distinct possibility one day.
For the UK, for example, diversify means accelerate its own negotiations: the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement – CPTPP, the Gulf and India. Every percentage point diverted from the US reduces the influence de Washington.
3. Address dependency in terms of security
A European defense spending has increased sharply since Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine — from €251 billion in 2021 to €343 billion in 2024.
Mass capacity takes longer to build than budgets. Tariffs on Greenland illustrate the cost of dependence. When the security guarantorand makes the coercer economicalthe options are drastically reduced.
4. Reconsider the UK-EU relationship
The crisis creates opportunities for both sides. These options require coordination between Member States, which have a exposure to the USA and dependence on NATO vastly different.
The slow rapprochement has been limited by a reluctance to make Brexit appear costless. But as the EU and UK face a direct challenge to the post-war order Coming from your main security guarantorthe calculation changes. A closer approximation becomes a mutual strategic need.
5. Hold the line together
The worst outcome would be European countries move away from Denmark to escape tariffs. This is precisely what Trump’s policy is designed to achieve. This is the logic of political deterrencewhich would suggest that demonstrating solidarity will prevent future demands. And if Europe gives in on this point, it is likely there will be more of the same by the USA.
Whether Trump will ultimately acquire Greenland remains uncertain. Common sense says no, but common sense has been wrong before.
What is clear is that this is not a tariff dispute that requires trade concessions. It’s a structural change in transatlantic relationsand the European strategy needs to be adjust accordinglyconclude Du and Shepotylo.
