Last December opened a new round of confrontation in the trial for twelve years since the civil war. Southern separatist forces turned against the leadership of the Saudi coalition fighting Shiite militants, a mini-civil war within a civil war.
Despite the dominance of the Saudi coalition, the situation in the southern part of the country remains fragile. At the same time, the ambitions of the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula – particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE – are clashing with the entrenched power of the Houthis, undermining the prospect of peace. The Houthis still maintain control of the northern part of the country.
In this context, “Vima” spoke with Thanos Petouris, a researcher of the European Peace Institute, with deep knowledge of the political situation in Yemen, in an attempt to decipher the developments.
Until recently the Southern Transitional Council (STC) was part of a single authority supported by the Saudi kingdom. What accounts for the change in attitude and how did we get into conflict?
It was a risk taken by the southern separatists, who are supported by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and who believed that the time was right to break away from the united coalition and establish themselves as the dominant political force in the South. This, in my opinion, was the mistake of the Council: it acquired an arrogance, due to the constant support it had from the Emirates, which never allowed it to come to terms with other political forces. Their agenda was limited to the secession of the South and they were unwilling to talk to anyone who wanted to keep Yemen united, not even in the form of a confederation. That reasoning led them to take action in December.
In what state do we find the Transitional Council today?
The Transitional Council is being dissolved. The information we have is that the hard core of power is based in the Emirates. It visits Aden periodically but al-Zubaidi, its leader, has escaped to Abu Dhabi. The Saudis on the other hand have brought 80% of the Council to Riyadh and control it, with the ultimate goal of coming to terms with the more moderate forces of the South. Today, the Council is weakened, news of Zubaidi’s escape has led provincial governors to ban gatherings and close Council offices.
Saudi Arabia has chosen direct confrontation with the Houthis. Wouldn’t a consultation with them be more fruitful?
Saudi Arabia does not want to leave a unified Yemen in the hands of the Houthis, for reasons of national security but also because it considers the Houthi movement a danger because of its good relations with Tehran. That is why it aimed to unify different forces and organizations so that there would be a rival awe to the Houthi regime in Sana’a, which might in the long run manage to reintegrate the northern part of the country. This plan did not succeed, because the secessionist forces of the South had come to terms with the logic of two states. Riyadh saw its “investment” turning into a risk and thus decided to intervene, precisely because the developments of December were upsetting its plan.
What is the role of the UAE and how is the support for the separatists explained?
The reason the UAE has supported the Transitional Council is because it aims to control the Red Sea coast, as part of the wider competition with Saudi Arabia for control of trade routes. Hence Zubaidi’s flight made a stopover in Somaliland, with which the UAE maintains good relations, trying to create a counterweight to Riyadh on the other side of the Red Sea.
The Houthis dominate the North but cannot consolidate their presence in the South. How is this explained?
They managed to occupy Aden in 2015, when the intervention of the Saudi coalition in the country began. However, they failed to find the alliances that would keep them in power. Also the southerners have already fought in the 90s against the central government based in the North, so they perceive the Houthis more as part of the problem.
There is also a division between North and South Yemen that was not overcome during the years of unification, from 1990 onwards.
The people of South Yemen carry the idea of greater cosmopolitanism, you often see the argument repeated: “We are more secular, Aden is a hub port for world trade, we were a British colony and a strategic ally of the Soviets. Why should we be accountable to a regime that represents other traditions?’ In short, we are talking about a state with two souls. This reality explains, combined of course with the involvement of external actors, why it is so difficult to have a unified Yemen in a state of peace.
What keeps the Houthis still in power in the North?
First the ability to provide basic services to citizens. They have managed to turn the North into a state entity, they have established a power apparatus that allows them to collect taxes and provide policing, basic functions of a state apparatus. Sana’a, even after airstrikes by the American and Israeli army, managed to re-electrify within a few days. In contrast, Aden below 45 degrees Celsius has only two hours of electricity a day.
Then, the battle position of the Houthi troops. From 2004 to 2010, they fought six different wars against the Saleh regime, which had air superiority, bombarded their villages, and generally tried to impose its authority on the North while also keeping an ambitious section of the military out of power. This valuable war experience, in a difficult mountainous terrain, shows a fighting culture that is not easily altered. The role of the warrior is most established in northern Yemen, where the Houthis dominate.
How do you interpret that the war does not have characteristics of Sunni-Shia confrontation, as in other states of the Middle East.
The northern side of Yemen is dominated by Zaydite Shiites, although the way they function ritually is more reminiscent of Sunni Islam. Yemen managed for years to balance between the two denominations and hosted a significant number of Baha’is. This kind of syncretism answers why the war in Yemen never took on religious characteristics. Saleh has previously used the Iran bogeyman to claim funding and military support from the West and the Saudis. But the confrontation never took a sectarian turn.
What is the role of Oman in the developments in Yemen?
Oman does not want changes on its borders. The region of Mahra shares an extensive border with Oman, and Muscat would not take kindly to a UAE-controlled state on its border. For this Oman aligned itself with Saudi Arabia and politically supported the Saudi intervention. At the same time he maintains excellent relations with the ruler and the business establishment of Mahra, just so that he has some influence in his zone of immediate interest.
