The is today in the center of political attention. Getting to this prominent – and uncomfortable – position took time. It was a long process, the result of which was not due to chance or to any design by parties, leaders or even members of the court itself.
Scholars indicate reasons for this: some anchored in 1988; others resulting from characteristics of the political system; or even contingent decisions by political representatives, ministers or social actors.
First, the institutional design that concentrates the last word on the constitutionality of laws and on almost every relevant controversy in the court. It made it inevitable that important conflicts – between federative entities, between government and opposition or between organized interests in society – would be “judicialized” in the STF. Even more so, when an extensive and programmatic Charter constitutionalized guarantees and an extensive list of social rights, goals and public policies to ensure them.
Then, because the party fragmentation itself and the slow operation of coalition governments, with decisions that were often contested, multiplied the demands on the Court, which began to occupy the decision-making vacuum left by other powers. Third, because the STF took over this space with gusto, using its competencies to shape public policies, arbitrate moral disputes and reconfigure the rules of the political game. In doing so, it gained visibility and became a focus of expectations and criticism.
Finally, came the high-profile trials, transformed into televised shows: the Mensalão; Operation Lava Jato; the Senate session that approved the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, with the participation of the President of the Court; the conflicts with the Executive under Bolsonaro and the prosecution against those involved in the coup conspiracy that culminated on January 8th. Everything contributed to making the STF the center of gravity of national politics and turning it into a target for the radical right.
With protagonism came the spotlight on its operation; about the behavior of his ministers; and the inevitable judgment of public opinion. Research carried out by the Atlas/Intel-Bloomberg Institute, in 2025, shows a large division of the public between those who believe that the STF is fulfilling its role (43.3%) and those who believe that Brazil lives under a judicial dictatorship (45.4%). On the other hand, 51.1% of those interviewed think that the majority of ministers do not demonstrate competence and impartiality, compared to 48% who believe the opposite.
A more extensive study, coordinated by sociologist Fabiana Luci de Oliveira (UFSCar) in 2024, concluded that trust in the STF results from a combination of long-term assessments (diffuse support for the court’s rules and mission) and short-term assessments (support for a specific decision). Short-term perceptions – especially performance in politically salient cases – are stronger, indicating less rooted support and more vulnerable to current circumstances and political polarization.
This is the scenario in which Supreme Court ministers have the opportunity to define a code of conduct that, if not a miracle solution to contested legitimacy, can help to reinforce it.
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